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Preface 
 
I was first introduced to philosophical problems surrounding reasons just over five 
years ago. Jonathan Dancy held a seminar on action theory, which I attended in my first 
year of graduate school. As many first-year graduate students do, I was struggling a bit to 
keep up. But some time well into the course, he introduced a debate over a particular 
question –– the answer to which I thought was perfectly obvious. He put the question to 
us like this. Imagine that it is a fine winter day, and you live near a pond. Occasionally 
you like to sit by the frozen pond and watch people skate on it. Today is such a day, and 
there is only one person skating: Edmund. After a few minutes, you notice that Edmund 
skates only near the edge of the pond. You approach him and ask him, “Why do you 
keep to the edge of the pond?” He responds by telling you that the ice in the middle of the 
pond is thin. You find out later, though, that the ice in the middle of the pond is not thin. 
In normal cases, when someone acts for the reason that (for example) the ice in 
the middle of the pond is thin, it really is the case that the ice in the middle is thin. This is 
mostly due to the fact that we are not often wrong about such mundane ways the world is. 
But, Jonathan asked, what if one takes it that the ice is thin, and in fact it is not thin? Can 
one still act for the reason that the ice is thin? I immediately thought that the answer is very 
clearly, “Yes!” “Just yesterday,” I remember thinking to myself, “my wife went to the 
store to get a particular ice cream that she likes, only to discover that they did not have 
it.” Surely she still went there to get that ice cream, or alternatively, for the reason that 
they have the ice cream that she likes. I expect that many of you are like I was in finding 
nothing suspicious about saying such things. 
 v 
 
I was surprised to hear that Jonathan was all but alone in defending this 
“Nonfactive View” of acting for a reason. At that juncture, I could not even understand 
why one would be tempted to hold the opposing view. But it was not long before I was 
confronted with a handful of puzzles that emerges when you answer these questions in 
these ways (and I was given a long working over by the likes of Jonathan Dancy, David 
Sosa, Ray Buchanan, Dan Bonevac, Maria Alvarez, Tim Williamson, Clayton Littlejohn, 
Michael Bratman, Stephen Darwall, Juan Comesaña, Miriam Schoenfield, and others). 
Chief among these puzzles, I thought, was the following. The Nonfactive View of acting 
for a reason says that an agent can perform an action for a reason even if that reason is 
something that is not the case. It is a very plausible thought that whenever someone acts 
for a reason, that reason can serve to explain their doing what they do. If you 
unexpectedly found me in the Department this week, you might have asked me why I 
have come here. It is very natural to take my answer to this ‘Why?’ question –– whatever 
it may be –– as both an explanation of my action and as a statement of the reason for 
which I acted. I might have said, for example, that “I defend my dissertation on Friday 
morning.” Here comes the trouble, though. A second very plausible thought is that 
anything that explains something must be the case; something that is not the case cannot 
explain anything. A flying baseball cannot explain a broken window if there is, in fact, no 
flying baseball. Perhaps you can already see the trouble brewing. If reasons can explain, 
and things that explain are always the case, then it seems to follow straightaway that 
reasons must be things that are the case (and so the Nonfactive View cannot be true). 
When Jonathan confronted me with this puzzle, I was immediately enthralled by 
it and its surrounding issues. Very quickly I found that thinking about reasons took me to 
the heart of foundational issues in ethics, epistemology, and metaphysics. At first, I began 
to see far too many of these foundational issues as nails, and my solution to the puzzle as a 
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hammer. But I was gradually disabused of this grand notion –– mostly thanks to Maria 
Alvarez. I came to see that my real interest was the rational evaluation and explanation of 
agents and their actions (broadly construed, so as to include epistemic actions such as 
forming a belief), and that I was interested in a fairly specific set of questions in this area. 
But I also came to think that the notion of a reason had the potential to get philosophers 
working in different areas speaking the same language; and I developed a hope (which I 
still hold onto) that illumination of this notion would put philosophers in these different 
areas in a position to more readily exchange insights. 
In the end, I have come to think that my initial reaction to Jonathan’s puzzle was 
mostly correct. But I was quite wrong to think that there was no reason to hold otherwise, 
and I have come to appreciate the good cases for a number of sophisticated views in the 
area. I set myself to defend a generally “nonfactive” view of reasons from a handful of 
forceful objections having to do with explanation and rationality. My efforts have led me 
to a package of views that spans several areas of inquiry, and one which I think is 
genuinely novel. If there is one theme to this package of views, it is that truth is irrelevant 
to rationality and justification in significant and surprising ways. 
In completing this project I have become indebted to a great many people. The 
staff in the graduate program at the University of Texas at Austin have been invaluable to 
me –– especially Michelle Botello, Sally Jackman, and Stephanie Hollub-Fletcher. I am 
appreciative of audiences at the Factive Turn Workshop in Vienna, the 2016 Pacific 
Division Meeting of the APA, the Practical Reason and Metaethics Workshop at the 
University of Nebraska, and several forums at the University of Texas at Austin. I have 
benefited from helpful conversation with Michael Bratman, Brian Cutter, Stephen 
Darwall, Sinan Dogramaci, Jeremy Evans, Jon Litland, Clayton Littlejohn, Brian Miller, 
Miriam Schoenfield, Jason Schukraft, and Tim Williamson. I am thankful for feedback 
 vii 
on drafts from Juan Comesaña, Veli Mitova, and various anonymous referees. I am 
grateful to each of my committee members, who have done all of this and more: Dan 
Bonevac and Ray Buchanan helped me to see the importance of purposes and infinitvals 
to my project; and David Sosa and Maria Alvarez helped me to genuinely appreciate and 
respect my opposition. I am especially grateful to Jonathan Dancy, who, more than 
anyone, has taught me how to think about these issues. I owe a unique debt to Daniel 
Eaton, who has helped me in ways that I cannot adequately express. Finally, I would not 
have got along at all without the unfailing support of my family –– especially my wife, 
Emily. 
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It is possible to act for a reason. We do it all the time. You might have brought her 
medicine for the reason that she is ill. He might go to the store to get milk. Edmund 
might skate in the middle of the pond because the ice in the middle of the pond is thin. 
What must be true of us, and of the world, such that we can act for reasons? 
In normal cases, when someone acts for the reason that (for example) the ice in 
the middle of the pond is thin, it really is the case that the ice in the middle is thin. This is 
mostly due to the fact that we are not often wrong about such mundane ways the world is. 
But what if one takes it that the ice is thin, and in fact it is not thin? Can one still act for the 
reason that the ice is thin? 
In my efforts to give a sufficient answer to this question, I have been led to a 
package of views, the core tenets of which are at least the following five. First, it is possible 
to act in the light of a falsehood: a consideration that is not the case can be an agent’s 
reason for acting. Second, it is not possible to act in unbelief: in order for an agent to act 
for a reason, the agent must at least believe that reason to be the case. Third, the reasons 
for which agents act can play a role in explaining the actions done for those reasons –– 
even when agents act in the light of falsehoods. Fourth, there are very few (if any) formal 
rules or principles constraining the explanatory role of reasons. Any action explanation 
 ix 
role for the reason. Fifth, all of these claims apply equally to motivating and normative 
reasons, so-called practical and epistemic reasons, and reasons for action and reasons for 
belief. 
 x 
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Chapter One:  Acting in the Light of a Falsehood 
Edmund is about to go skating on a pond near his home. He takes it that the ice in 
the middle of the pond is dangerously thin. So, when he skates on the pond, Edmund 
keeps to the edge of the pond. You are on a nearby hill, observing the skaters on the pond 
as you enjoy the nice winter day. As Edmund finishes up skating, you approach him and 
ask him why he is skating only near the edge of the pond. He responds by telling you that 
the ice in the middle of the pond is thin. After this brief exchange with Edmund, you go 
out on the pond to skate. Initially, you keep to the edge; but then you gradually try your 
luck to see how the ice is in the middle of the pond. You find that the ice in the middle of 
the pond is not thin. 
Here are a few intuitive claims about this story. First, when Edmund answers your 
‘Why?’ question concerning his skating, he is articulating to you his reason for doing what 
he was doing. Second, in the case, you would readily accept Edmund’s answer; and you 
would reasonably believe, on the basis of what he says to you, that his reason for skating 
near the edge of the pond is that the ice in the middle of the pond is thin. Third, both you 
and Edmund would be accurate in speech and belief: Edmund’s reason for skating near 
the edge of the pond really is that the ice in the middle of the pond is thin. Finally, the last 
detail of the story does nothing to make any of these intuitive claims less compelling. Most 
importantly: the fact that Edmund is wrong about how things are with the ice does not 
make you wonder, as it were, what his reason really was. 
If all of this is correct, it seems plausible to say that Edmund can act for the reason 
that the ice in the middle of the pond is thin even when it is not the case that the ice in the 
middle of the pond is thin. Generalizing, we could say that acting for a reason is not, as 
philosophers of action say, factive: it does not follow from the fact that Edmund acts for the 
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reason that r that it is the case that r. This is what the Nonfactive View of acting for a 
reason holds. So we could also say that the Nonfactive View seems to be the intuitive or 
default view concerning the factivity of acting for a reason. 
It is perhaps surprising, then, that the Nonfactive View is by far in the minority 
among philosophers. Instead, the Factive View –– which holds that the reasons for which 
agents act must be facts –– is the dominant view. How could this be? The story we just 
told about Edmund seemed perfectly natural. I offer three quite general diagnoses. First, 
many have been influenced by the tradition which holds that the reasons for which agents 
act are psychological states of the acting agents, or some other feature of the world which 
causes the action. Since it is very plausible that only something that is the case can cause 
anything, it might thereby seem undeniable that reasons (as a subset of the things that are 
causes) must be things that are the case. Second, there is growing momentum behind the 
idea that there is a connection between knowledge and acting for a reason. Specifically, 
some have begun to advance the view that acting for a reason requires knowledge that 
that reason is the case. Since one cannot know anything that is not true, this way of 
thinking has led some to suppose that the reasons for which agents act must also be truths. 
Third, there seems to be an independently powerful argument against the intuitive 
picture just painted. The argument is based on a thought about the nature of explanation. 
It is a common thought that explanation is factive: only something that is the case can 
explain something else. It is also tempting to suppose that when an agent acts for a 
reason, that reason can serve to explain the action done for that reason. It may appear to 
follow, then, that when an agent acts for a reason, that reason must be something that is 
the case. 
Of these three challenges to the intuitive picture of Edmund we were just 
considering, I find the third challenge to be the most compelling. This is partly because, 
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as we will see in the third chapter, the first two challenges tend to rely on somewhat 
robust theories including substantive assumptions about other subjects. The third 
challenge, by contrast, seems to stand on its own, adducing only considerations to which 
it would seem all parties would agree. Indeed, the ease with which the premises of the 
argument would be granted almost seems to suggest that the Nonfactive View of acting 
for reasons is a nonstarter. I believe that this dialectical state of affairs presents us with a 
puzzle about the nature of reasons, action, and explanation. Intuitively, as we just saw, 
one can act for the reason that r even when it is not the case that r. But the argument 
under consideration would seem to show that this intuitive claim is at odds with the 
conjunction of two other intuitive claims: that reasons explain actions, and that 
explanation is factive. In this first chapter I aim to dissolve this puzzle. While many 
theorists seem to think that the above argument shows that the reasons for which agents 
act must be facts, I shall argue that it fails to do so. What I believe has gone unnoticed 
about this argument is that it suffers from a fatal ambiguity in its central notion: the 
notion of something explaining something else. I shall suggest that, at the very least, we 
need a distinction between something being an explanation and something contributing 
to an explanation. Once this central notion is sufficiently disambiguated, though, the 
argument in question loses its apparent force. 
The strategy that I am presenting here is quite different from the few already 
present in the literature. So far, those who have addressed this challenge on behalf of the 
Nonfactive View have been involved in a kind of damage control: in on way or another, 
they have suggested that things are not as bad off for the Nonfactive View as this 
argument might initially lead one to believe. Contrastingly, I think that there simply is no 
damage to control; this is simply a poor argument against the Nonfactive View, and there 
is no good argument of its kind forthcoming. 
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The chapter proceeds as follows. In the first section, I will lay out some 
preliminary notions which will stay with us for the remainder of this manuscript. I will 
also address the suggestion that the very idea of acting for a reason is factive. I consider 
the going views as to what a reason is, and I show that none of them are in themselves 
suggestive of a factive notion of acting for a reason (on the contrary, some are suggestive 
of a nonfactive notion). Nearby are considerations as to whether natural language 
constructions of the form “A’s reason was that r” (for example) can be true only if it is true 
that r. I argue that such constructions are also not factive. So, at best, conceptual and 
semantic analysis of the notion of acting for a reason is suggestive of the Nonfactive View; 
at worst, it is not suggestive of any view on the issue. Either way, such analyses leave the 
Nonfactive View unscathed. Enter the argument motivated by considerations of the 
nature of explanation. In the second section, I lay out some preliminaries that will allow 
us to understand this argument. In the third section, I demonstrate that the argument 
suffers from an ambiguity in the notion of being explanatory. I disambiguate five senses of 
the notion, and show that on each of these disambiguations, the argument that acting for 
a reason is factive loses its force. I conclude by sketching out some of the explanatory 
resources and schemata all of this leaves available to the Nonfactive View. I return to this 
issue in the third chapter, where I lay out a more complete picture of what action 
explanation can look like on a Nonfactive View of acting for a reason. 
ACTING FOR A REASON: THE VERY IDEA 
In asking if acting for a reason is factive –– or whether the reasons for which 
agents act must be facts –– it seems sensible to devote some time to the questions of what 
it is to act for a reason, and what a reason for acting is. 
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Kinds of Reasons 
We can begin with a perfectly ordinary, and now standard, distinction between 
two kinds of reasons. 1 We often say that people do things for reasons: “She is doing it for 
the reason that it will make her son happy;” “His reason for doing it was to pay off his 
debt;” “They did it because he needed help.” When we talk (and think) this way, we 
invoke the notion of what philosophers now standardly refer to as a motivating reason. 
We will approach conceptual analyses of motivating reasons shortly; but we can say 
roughly that a motivating reason is a consideration that motivates an agent to act. Such 
reasons can often be summoned to explain actions done for reasons. For example, 
suppose you see me running through the halls. You might ask why I am running through 
the halls. I would likely respond by presenting the consideration(s) which motivated me to 
run through the halls (for example, the consideration that I am late to give me eleven 
o’clock lecture). You would likely be satisfied with such a response, as it would help you to 
make sense of my action. As we will see, there are legitimate doubts that motivating 
reasons can always serve to explain the actions they motivate. If they cannot, we may need 
to distinguish between motivating reasons and explanatory reasons: considerations 
that explain actions. 
Even if motivating reasons and explanatory reasons are ontologically separable, 
they both seem capable of answering some sense of the question “Why is she doing that?” 
But we might be interested not only in why someone is doing what they are doing; we 
might also be interested in why, as it were, they should be doing what they are doing. In 
                                                
1Too many to name employ this common distinction between motivating and normative reasons, which is 
perhaps owed to Michael Smith [1992: 329]. For relevant introductions to the distinction, though, see 
Jonathan Dancy [2000: 1ff, 20-25] for something brief, and Maria Alvarez [2010; 2016] for something 
more thorough. Cases like the ones central to this project might impress upon us the idea that we do 
ultimately need a third class: explanatory reasons. Alvarez [2010; 2016] has done well to argue for this 
position, which I will address along the way. 
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addition to wondering what my reason is for running through the halls, you might also be 
interested in whether there is, as we might say, any good reason for me to be running 
through the halls. Here we are interested in reasons for acting in yet another sense. We 
often say that people do things for reasons; but we also say that there are reasons for doing 
things: “One reason to do it now is that the bank will be closed tomorrow;” “That was no 
reason to pop his balloons!;” “You should do it this way because that will make for a 
beautiful painting.” When we talk this way, we invoke the notion of what philosophers 
refer to as a normative reason: a consideration that counts in favor of a response. In 
normal cases (such as the one considered here), the agent’s motivating reason will be a 
normative reason. In telling you that I am late to give my lecture, I have presented you 
with that consideration which cast my action in a favorable light. I have told you not only 
why I am running, but also, perhaps, why I should be running. 
Recently, there has been a debate concerning the “factivity” of each of these kinds 
of reasons. In epistemology, there has been much more debate about the factivity of 
normative reasons. In that debate, there are two main views. One is the 
 
Factive ViewN: in order for r to be a reason for A to Φ, it must be the case that r. 
 
The competitor to this view is the Nonfactive ViewN, which is just the denial of the 
Factive ViewN. In this context, the phrase “be a reason for A to Φ” should not be taken 
not motivationally, but rather as, roughly, “count in favor of A’s Φing.” According to the 
Factive ViewN, my being late cannot count in favor of my running through the halls 
unless I really am late. Those who endorse the Nonfactive ViewN will deny this claim, 
holding that my being late might count in favor of my running regardless of whether I 
really am late. 
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I will put aside for now the debate about the factivity of normative reasons. We 
will return to this debate in the fourth chapter. Our present concerns are about the 
factivity of motivating reasons, which has received much more attention in practical 
philosophy and action theory. In this debate, there are also two main views. One is the 
 
Factive ViewM: in order for A to Φ for the reason that r, it must be the case that 
r. 
 
Adherents to this view include Maria Alvarez, Donald Davidson and his followers, 
Jennifer Hornsby, John Hyman, Clayton Littlejohn, John McDowell, Peter Unger, and 
Timothy Williamson and his followers.2 The competitor to this view is the Nonfactive 
ViewM, which is just the denial of the Factive ViewM.The Nonfactive ViewM is defended 
most prominently by Jonathan Dancy; but it is perhaps also defended by Juan Comesaña 
and Matthew McGrath, David Enoch, Mark Schroeder, and Kieran Setiya.3 In the 
context of this debate, “Φ for the reason that r” should not be taken normatively (as in “r 
is a consideration that favors Φing”), but rather motivationally. So, independent of what 
(normative) reasons there are for me to be running through the hall, proponents of the 
Factive ViewM will hold that I cannot be running through the halls for the reason that I am 
late unless I really am late. The Nonfactive ViewM denies this, and holds that my reason 
                                                
2 See Alvarez [2009; 2010], Davidson [1963; 1980],  Hornsby [2007; 2008], Hyman [1999; 2011; 2015], 
Littlejohn [2012], McDowell [2013], Unger [1975], Williamson [201X], and also Ian Schnee [2015]. 
3 See Dancy [2000; 2003; 2008; 2011; 2014], Comesaña and McGrath [2014], Enoch [2010] Schroeder 
[2008a], Setiya [2007], and perhaps Constantine Sandis [2013]. Comesaña, McGrath, and Schroeder all 
defend a nonfactive view of having reasons; the connection to acting for a reason is not completely clear. Per 
Alvarez [2016: 25], the label may be extended to those who, like Hornsby and McDowell, seem to hold 
what has been called Disjunctivism about acting for a reason. For reasons that will be made clear in the 
second and third chapters, I do not think it appropriate to lump Disjunctivists in with Nonfactivists. 
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for running might be that I am late even if I am not really late. This debate –– between 
the Factive ViewM and the Nonfactive ViewM –– is the one I turn to now. 
What Is A Motivating Reason? 
With these preliminaries on hand, we can now proceed with the questions of what 
it is to act for a reason, and what a (motivating) reason for acting is. It may seem simpler 
to start with the latter notion, since the former notion appears to contain the latter notion 
as a part: before we can say what it is to act for a reason, we should like to know just what a 
reason is. For purposes of this project, we should also like to be on the lookout for 
whether any analysis of these notions is suggestive of either the Factive ViewM or the 
Nonfactive ViewM. 
Motivating reasons are often discussed as the reasons for which agents act. But 
analysis of this notion does not bear much fruit, not least because it itself makes use of the 
notion of a reason. I think it more helpful to start with the thought that motivating 
reasons are considerations which motivated the agent to act. In these contexts, the word 
“consideration,” like the word “belief,” admits of disambiguation. To be precise, we 
might say that motivating reasons are the things which, when considered, motivate the 
agent to act. Now, one standard way of characterizing the reasons for which agents act is 
as considerations in the light of which agents act.4 This metaphorical analysis, too, may not prove 
very useful in asking whether motivating reasons are facts. For to do something in the light 
of something else does not seem to amount to much more than doing something, taking 
that something else into consideration. In discussing motivating reasons –– things of the sort 
involved in the earlier examples of skating around ponds and running through halls –– we 
are surely looking for something more than that which is simply taken into consideration 
                                                
4 See Alvarez [2010: 7, 35; 2016: 3] and Dancy [2000: 1]. 
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when an agent acts. We are looking for something that has some motivational force. 
Dancy elaborates on the notion this way: 
 
… normally there will be, for each action, the reasons in the light of which the agent did 
that action, which we can think of as what persuaded him to do it.5 
Under this characterization, motivating reasons are the things which, when considered by 
the agent, persuade the agent to do what she does. The language of persuasion is suggestive 
here: we are not looking for things that move agents to act in the sense that they merely 
cause them to act. We are looking, rather, for things that move agents to act in the rational 
sense. Hence even Davidson, who settled on the view that motivating reasons were, after 
all, causes, acknowledges: 
What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains the action 
by giving the agent's reason for doing what he did? We may call such explanations 
rationalizations, and say that the reason rationalizes the action… A reason 
rationalizes an action only if it leads us to see something the agent saw, or thought 
he saw, in his action.6 
Even if motivating reasons turn out to be causes, it seems clear that what we are 
interested in the first instance are not mere causes, but instead something like Davidson’s 
rationalizing causes. 
So we have as one analysis of the notion of a motivating reason: for r to be a 
reason for which A Φs is for r to be a consideration that persuaded (or contributed to 
persuading) A to Φ. There are two other standard analyses of the notion that I should like 
to discuss. The first of these is the notion of a consideration taken by an agent to favor an action. 
This may seem very near to the previous analysis. After all, it might be the case that an 
agent’s being persuaded to act by a consideration at least depends on the agent’s taking 
                                                
5 See Dancy [2000: 1]. 
6 See Davidson [1963: 685]. 
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that consideration to favor the action in question. Even if that is so, this analysis is worth 
distinguishing, if only because it makes use of a normative concept –– that of favoring. On 
this analysis, if A Φs for the reason that r, r is a consideration that A took to be a 
(normative) reason for Φing.7 Motivating reasons are not simply the considerations that 
motivated the agent to act; they are the considerations that reveal the good the agent saw 
in doing what she did. 
A third way of conceiving of motivating reasons is as considerations adduced as 
premises in practical reasoning.8 Jane, for example, might be thirsty, and so go to the 
fridge to get a drink. On this conception, the motivating reasons are the considerations 
Jane made use of in deciding to go to the fridge. She may have reasoned: “I am thirsty, 
and I should get a drink to quench my thirst. There are drinks in the fridge. So, I will go 
to the fridge.” In this (admittedly over-intellectualized) bit of reasoning, the considerations 
that Jane is thirsty, that a drink would quench her thirst, and that there are drinks in the 
fridge might all count (separately or together) as reasons for which Jane went to the fridge. 
With a few standard analyses of what a motivating reason is in hand, we can 
pause now to ask: do any of the standard analyses of a motivating reason suggest that 
motivating reasons are facts? 9 I think it is clear that, quite the contrary, these analyses are 
suggestive of a nonfactive notion. The consideration that she is ill, for example, can 
                                                
7 See Pamela Hieronymi [2011: 411] for careful work in carving out this distinction. For instances of this 
standard usage, see Alvarez [2016: 3], Dancy [2000: 1ff], Alan Gibbard [1990: 162], Derek Parfit [1997; 
2001], and Schroeder [2008]. Perhaps see also T. M. Scanlon’s [1998: 19] “operative reasons” as well as 
Joseph Raz [1975: 33]. 
8 See Alvarez [2016: 3], and especially the exchange between Dancy [2011] and Hyman [2011] invoking 
this conception. Alvarez [2016: 3] adds the qualification: “a premise in practical reasoning, if any, that leads 
to the action.” 
9 I put aside for the moment analyses of motivating reasons as explanatory reasons, and as facts which guide the 
agent in acting. The former I put aside only for a moment, since the chapter is just about in what sense 
motivating reasons are explanatory. The latter I put aside because there is no sense in asking whether the 
notion of a guiding fact is factive. The more significant question is whether this is genuinely an analysis of 
motivating reasons, or of something else. I address that question in the second and third chapters. 
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clearly be a thing taken into consideration even if it is not the case that she is ill. The idea 
of persuasion does nothing to change this. We could ask Jane, for example, what 
consideration persuaded her to go to the fridge. She might cite the consideration that 
there are drinks in the fridge. Now, if it turns out that there are no drinks in the fridge, 
this is clearly not in conflict with the idea that that was the consideration that persuaded 
Jane to go to the fridge. Nearby is the idea of a premise of practical reasoning. Again, 
there is no suggestion of factivity here. We saw that Jane could reason that “There are 
drinks in the fridge; so I will go to the fridge.” There not being drinks in the fridge clearly 
does not prevent Jane from adducing this consideration as a premise in her reasoning 
about whether to go to the fridge. Finally, the notion of a consideration taken to favor 
actions likewise contains no suggestion of factivity. What considerations did Jane take to 
favor her going to the fridge? That there are drinks in the fridge was surely among them –
– this consideration reveals (at least part of) the good Jane saw in going to the fridge. But 
this does not imply that there actually are drinks in the fridge. 
Does any of this change when we begin to construct, making use of these analyses, 
standard conceptions of what it is to act for a reason? I think not. Now, a common analysis 
of acting for a reason is that of acting in the light of a consideration. Despite its commonality, I 
am doubtful that this notion reveals much about the nature of the phenomenon in 
question. As I implied a moment ago, it is not altogether clear what it amounts to to act in 
the light of something over and above taking that thing into consideration in acting. But, as we 
just saw, the concept of a motivating reason surely includes more than this. Instead, I 
would like to start with the notion of responding to a consideration. I think it will be 
uncontroversial –– perhaps even trivial –– to say that acting for a reason is a way of 
responding to a consideration. Now, it is obvious that one can respond to a thing 
considered even when that thing is not the case. Suppose that Aria, a friend of yours, has 
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called off her wedding. You tell me that she has called off the wedding, and I ask for what 
reason she has done so. You tell me that she has done it in response to the consideration 
that her fiancé has been unfaithful. There is clearly no implication here that her fiancé 
actually has been unfaithful. This is perhaps evidenced by the fact that it would not be at 
all confusing or inappropriate for me to follow up by asking whether her fiancé has in fact 
been unfaithful. 
So, that A responded to the consideration that r clearly does not entail that r. Does 
it make any difference if we elaborate on the notion of responding to a consideration by 
substituting in one of our standard analyses as to what sort of consideration a motivating 
reason is? I think not. It makes no difference, for example, if we amend the earlier story 
by saying that Aria was responding to the consideration which persuaded her to call off 
the wedding, namely, the consideration that her fiancé has been unfaithful. We could also 
amend the story by saying that Aria was responding to the consideration which she took 
to favor calling off the wedding, namely, the consideration that her fiancé has been 
unfaithful. Still, there is no implication that her fiancé has in fact been unfaithful. It is the 
same for the claim that Aria was responding to the considerations she took as premises in 
her reasoning about whether to call off the wedding, one of which was the consideration 
that her fiancé has been unfaithful. 
If any of these standard analyses is complete and correct, then, it is already 
difficult to see how the Factive ViewM could be true. Of course, these theories may be 
incorrect. Perhaps there is more to acting for a reason than responding to a consideration. 
But it is worth keeping in mind that we have not left the notion completely bare. We have 
elaborated the notion so that it makes use of the standard views as to what sort of 
consideration a motivating reason is. Even these elaborations contained no hint of 
factivity. I think that, in the light of these considerations, it is fair to say that the 
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conceptual analysis of a motivating reason and of acting for a reason provides no 
evidence for the Factive ViewM. Quite the contrary, they might provide evidence for the 
opposing Nonfactive ViewM. According to Maria Alvarez, for example,10 
…reasons must be capable of being premises, i.e. things we reason, or draw conclusions, 
from, whether in theoretical or practical reasoning. Otherwise, the connection 
between reasons and reasoning would be lost. 
But, as John Hyman notes, 
…if by a person’s reason we meant the premise or assumption on which he acted…. We 
can reason from false premises… For example, one can reason from the premise 
that the train from Paris will arrive on platform eight, even if in fact it will arrive 
on platform one. 
If motivating reasons must be capable of being premises, and premises are the kinds of 
things that can be falsehoods, it might seem to follow that reasons must be capable of 
being falsehoods. This is just what the Nonfactive ViewM says. Until we have in hand a 
critique as to why these standard analyses are misguided, I think we should be compelled 
to take the Nonfactive ViewM as the default view in our theorizing about the factivity of 
reasons. 
Are Reasons Contexts Factive? 
Evidence from conceptual analysis notwithstanding, there are some who claim 
that certain constructions in natural language which make use of the notion of a 
motivating reason –– we can call them reasons contexts –– are factive. Here, for 
example, are Maria Alvarez, Peter Unger, and Timothy Williamson (respectively). 11 
The expression ’N’s reason is/was that’ is an operator that, it seems, can only form true 
sentences when attached to a true sentence… For, as we saw, there is an implicit 
                                                
10 See Alvarez [2010: 42] and Hyman [2011: 363-364], respectively, for the following to quotes. See also 
Williamson [201X: 3, 14-15, 22]. 
11 See Alvarez [2010: 136-137], Unger [1975: 208], and Williamson [201X: 30n21], respectively. The 
redacted piece of Williamson quote continues, “projective talk of the sort mentioned in fn. 10;” footnote 10 
discusses “projective” talk of knowledge which suggests that knowledge is not factive. 
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contradiction in claims to the effect that someone’s reason is (or was) that p but 
not p, that is, claims such as ‘Alice’s reason was that her husband was at home, 
although he wasn’t at home.’ 
It is inconsistent to say “His reason was that the store was going to close, but it 
wasn’t going to close.” 
Philosophers often seem to misunderstand the bearing of ‘reasons’ through a 
literal-minded treatment of projective talk of the sort [which occasionally misleads 
people into denying that knowledge entails truth]. 
The thread of thought here seems to be that nonfactive uses of phrases like “A’s reason is 
that r” and “Her reason for Φing was that r” are somehow inappropriate. Indeed, they 
are described with notions such as contradiction and inconsistency; comparisons to claims of 
the form “A knows that p” are made; Moore’s paradox is even invoked.12 Furthermore, 
these characterizations are given without argument, leaving one to feel that they are 
supposed to be self-evident. 
It is far from being the case that all ears hear these reasons contexts as factive. But 
the discussion need not devolve into a stubborn debate over whose ears are more 
discerning of the truth. We have seen that the initial conceptual analysis and casuistry is 
at odds with this way of thinking. For if there were really a strict inconsistency or 
incoherence in claims of the form “A’s reason is that r, but it is not the case that r,” we 
would expect the conceptual analysis of either a motivating reason or acting for a reason to bear 
that out. We would expect to find the concept of a fact somewhere internal to the concept 
of a reason. Here is John Hyman echoing this sentiment: 
Let us say that a sentence-forming operator O on one more more declarative sentences is 
factive if, and only if, the statement “Os1 … sn” cannot be true unless the 
statements “s1” and “sn” are true. If this is what factivity is understood to be, it is 
not just a brute fact about language. Dancy says, “ Knowledge is factive, because 
‘he knows that it is raining but it is not’ is uninterpretable.” But this gets things the 
wrong way round. “He knows that it is raining but it is not” is uninterpretable––
                                                
12 See Alvarez [2010: 134] for the supposed analogy to Moore’s paradox. 
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or cannot be true––because “he knows that” is factive; “he knows that” is factive 
because one cannot falsely or erroneously know that something is the case; and 
one cannot falsely or erroneously know that something is the case because 
knowing that something is the case is a relation between knowers and facts or 
truths.13 
I take it one of the points here is that, roughly, Moore-paradoxical sentences are 
paradoxical in virtue of the proper analysis of the concepts they invoke. The reason that 
“A knows that p, but not p” is paradoxical, Hyman seems to say, is that it employs a 
factive concept (knowledge) nonfactively. That explanation is not readily available, 
however, when searching for an account of the alleged paradoxical nature of claims of the 
form, “His reason is that r, but it is not the case that r.” When investigating the concept of 
a reason, one finds concepts such as consideration taken to favor, premise of practical reasoning, 
and consideration which persuaded an agent to act –– none of which include, imply, or even hint 
at the concept of a fact. 
We might on these grounds content ourselves to follow the conceptual analysis, 
and discount the supposed evidence provided by the linguistic sensitivities of these 
philosophers. Lest we give this opposing line of thought short shrift, though, I think it is 
worth considering the idea that in natural language, reasons contexts are factive –– despite 
the evidence that the concept of a reason itself is not factive. That is: it is possible that our 
usage of the term ‘reason’ departs from the proper conceptual analysis of the notion of a 
reason. This is perhaps friendly to Williamson’s diagnosis concerning nonfactive, 
“projective” uses of the word ‘knowledge:’ the conceptual analysis and the natural 
language usage of knowledge simply come apart. It is worth noting, though, that 
Williamson’s inclination, like Hyman’s, seems to be to trust what is suggested by the 
conceptual analysis, and discount the deviant, nonfactive, natural language usages of 
‘knows’ as misleading. So, even if we did find that reasons contexts are factive, there 
                                                
13 See Hyman [2011: 358-359]. 
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would be a serious question as to why this finding should outweigh, when asking whether 
motivating reasons are facts, what seems to be true of the concept of a reason. 
Still, given that our linguistic practices often (rightly, we think) inform our 
conceptual analysis, perhaps there is something to be learned from further analyzing 
reasons contexts. The question is: are reasons contexts factive? The answer, I think, is 
negative. To see why, consider first the intuitive similarity between these two sentences:14 
 
(5) John’s belief was that P. 
(33b) Oscar’s secret desire is that he be well liked. 
 
Semantically, these two sentences appear to be isomorphic. Here is James Pryor on how 
these two claims should be semantically analyzed: 
In both (5) and (33b), we should understand the that-clause to be supplying an argument 
to the cognitive nominal that precedes the copula. 15 
This sentence appears, semantically, as though it should receive the same treatment as (5) 
and (33b). But if that is so, there is an important consequence for what we can say about 
the semantics of that-clauses in reasons contexts. Here is Pryor once more: 
The intuitive similarity between (5) and (7) suggests that something analogous is going on 
with (7)… That is, even if the orthodox semantic analysis of that-clauses is right, 
and “that P” is a singular term, the role it’s playing in (7) is to specify John’s reason, 
not to designate something that (7) equates with John’s reason. Thus, (7) isn’t 
offering us any direct insight into the ontology of reasons. 
Now, the intuitive semantic similarity between (5) and (7), combined with the 
obvious fact that (5) is not a factive construction, might seem sufficient evidence that 
                                                
14 In what follows, I draw heavily on the work of James Pryor [2007]. 
15 See Pryor [2007: 240] for both this quote and the next. Alvarez [2010: 40ff] seems to recognize that we 
can move back and forth between purely nominal expressions of reasons and propositional expressions of 
reasons. 
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claims like (7) are also not factive.16 While that seems to me to be correct, I think that 
Pryor’s insight here runs deeper. What Pryor points out is that that-clauses in reasons 
contexts seem only to specify the reasons in question, the same way that that-clauses in 
belief contexts specify the contents of beliefs. If John believes that Mary is ill, and it is true 
that John believes that Mary is ill, neither the truth nor the assertion of this sentence do 
anything to establish that John’s belief –– the mental state itself –– is identical to the 
proposition that Mary is ill (though the content of John’s belief may be identical to 
something like the proposition that Mary is ill). In fact, neither the truth nor the assertion 
of this sentence seem to tell us anything at all about the ontology of John’s belief. The 
semantic similarity of belief contexts and reasons contexts should lead us to say the same 
thing about that-clauses in reasons contexts. 
We so far have no reason –– aside from the linguistic sensitivities of some 
Factivists –– to suspect that reasons contexts should be factive. But if Pryor is right (and I 
know of no objection to his analysis), then even if that-clauses in reasons contexts could 
only be properly completed by truths, this would still not reveal anything about the 
ontology of reasons. Even if phrases of the form, “A’s reason was that r” could only be true 
in natural langue if r is true, it would be a mistake to take this as evidence that motivating 
reasons fall into any particular ontological category (such as facts –– or even propositions, 
for that matter). The ontology of reasons, of course, is precisely what the disagreement 
between the Factive ViewM and the Nonfactive ViewM concerns. The linguistic data 
simply provide us with little evidence to settle this disagreement. 
 If all of this is correct, those who proceed from the observation that phrases of the 
form “A’s reason is that r” are factive may be without much to stand on other than their 
                                                
16 Alvarez [2010: 137-138] seems unimpressed by the comparison between belief contexts and reasons 
contexts. But her treatment includes little mention of the semantic similarities between the two contexts, 
and she gives little independent reason for thinking that the comparison is unwarranted or misleading. 
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own linguistic sensibilities. In the spirit of charity, though, perhaps we might try to offer 
an account as to why their seems to some to be an “air of paradox” –– as Alvarez puts it –
– about claims like (for example) “My reason for giving him the money is that he needs it, 
although he doesn’t.” I believe that there is a satisfying explanation of the awkwardness of 
such claims, which does not appeal to the idea that reasons contexts are factive. The 
explanation is that, as I will argue in the next chapter, claims of the form “A Φs for the 
reason that r” and “A’s reason is that r” imply that A believes that r. It makes no sense to 
say, “My reason is that he needs the money, but I do not believe that he needs the 
money.” This is because, as I will argue, acting for a reason requires believing that reason 
to be the case.17 Furthermore, in the spirit of Moore, we can note that it is at least 
puzzling to say things such as, “I believe that he needs the money, but he does not need 
the money.” Combining these two insights provides an easy explanation of the alleged 
“air of paradox” about nonfactive uses of reasons constructions. When someone says, 
“My reason is that he needs the money,” “I believe that he needs the money” is implied; 
but when someone says, “He does not need the money,” “I do not believe that he needs 
the money” is implied. So, the assertion that “My reason is that he needs the money, 
although he does not need the money” seems to imply an inconsistent report as to what 
the speaker believes. 
 This account can also explain, I believe, Alvarez’s astute observation that 
When an agent insists that a belief of hers that others claim to be false was, nonetheless, 
her reason for acting, she will typically do so because she does not accept that the 
belief is false… if an agent still insists that what she accepts to be a false belief is 
her reason we’ll have to wonder what she means by ‘a reason’. For… [there is a] 
need to retract one’s claim that one’s reason for Φ-ing was that p on being 
confronted with the fact that not p.18 
                                                
17 I take this to be a point of widespread agreement among theorists of reasons. See Sandis [2013: 41] for 
someone who notices, in particular, that claims like these are paradoxical. 
18 See Alvarez [2010: 138]. 
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If I tell you that “My reason for doing it is that he needs the money,” and you confront 
me with  (read: convince me of) the fact that he does not need the money, it would indeed be 
puzzling if I continued to assert that I am giving him money for the reason that he needs 
the money. But that puzzlement can be explained in exactly the way just illustrated. It 
would be odd for me to say, “Okay –– you have convinced me that he does not need the 
money; still, I am going to do it for the reason that he needs the money.” Such a sentence, 
due to the connection between acting for a reason and believing that reason, seems to 
imply both that I believe that he needs the money and that I do not believe that he needs 
the money. That –– the implied inconsistent belief reports –– is the source of the oddity, 
and also of the pressure to retract my report about what my reason is. 
  Note that there is not much of a puzzle, on the other hand, if I reply, “Fair 
enough –– I see why you think he does not need the money. But I still believe that he 
needs the money; and that he needs the money is my reason for giving him the money.” 
The Factive ViewM seems to make the wrong prediction about this variation of the case: it 
seems to predict that my claim that my reason is that he needs the money remains 
paradoxical in this case. For, according to the line of thought under consideration, any 
sentence of the form “A’s reason is that r, but it is not the case that r” is paradoxical. What 
we know about A’s beliefs should make no difference to the paradoxical nature of such 
claims. But it is clear that, in the variation of the case at hand, the knowledge of what I 
believe does dissolve (or at least mitigate) the paradoxical nature of my reason-report. 
We can make a similar observation about the difference between reasons contexts 
created from the first-person as compared with the third-person, and also those 
constructed in the present tense as compared with those constructed in past tense.19 For 
                                                
19 See Alvarez [2010: 134n13] for the claim that the first-person and third-person cases are similarly 
paradoxical. 
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my part, there is not much paradox about saying, “His reason is that he needs the money 
–– although, as of course we know, he does not in fact need the money.” But even if this 
third-person construction were paradoxical, it is surely less paradoxical than the assertion 
that “My reason is that he needs the money, although he does not.” The degree of 
puzzlement also seems to vary with tense. If we switch from the present tense to the past 
tense, the air paradox seems to disperse, if not vanish completely. There is no real puzzle 
about saying, “My reason for giving him the money was that he needed the money. Of 
course, I now see that he did not need the money; but at the time, I thought that he did.” 
One could stubbornly insist that there is something uninterpretable about such a claim 
(although I can see no good reason to insist so); but surely everyone must concede that the 
nonfactive use of ‘reason’ is less puzzling in the past tense than in the present tense. 
However, these differences created by perspective and tense are not phenomena that the 
Factive ViewM can easily countenance; the Factive ViewM seems to predict that all claims 
of the form “A’s reason is/was that r, but not r,” are equally paradoxical. On the other 
hand, my proposed account on which we explain the apparent puzzles by appealing to 
the beliefs of agents has no such trouble. The first-person cases are more puzzling because 
the assertion that, “My reason is that r, but not r” seems to imply the claim that “I believe 
that r and I do not believe that r.” The claim that “His reason is that r, but not r” creates 
no such implication; it only seems to imply, “He believes that r, but I do not believe that 
r.” A similar account can be given to explain why the past-tense constructions are at least 
less puzzling than the present-tense constructions. When I say, “My reason was that r, but 
not r,” I imply only that “I believed that r, but I do not believe that r.” 
 So it seems we do not, after all, need to appeal to the idea that reasons contexts 
are factive to explain any of these apparent puzzles. We need only appeal to something 
like Moore’s original paradox, and the idea that acting for a reason requires believing that 
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reason. Indeed, this explanation does not only handle well the apparent paradoxes 
pointed out by some Factivists. It also provides a satisfying account as to why some 
nonfactive uses of ‘reason’ are not paradoxical (or, at least, less paradoxical than others); 
whereas the Factive ViewM predicts that all nonfactive uses of ‘reason’ should be equally 
puzzling. We may admit that there is an air of paradox about some nonfactive uses of 
reasons contexts –– but we should ultimately say that it is only an air, blown in by the 
genuinely paradoxical nature of saying both that “A believes that p” and that “A does not 
believe that p.” 
Summary Remarks 
If all of this is correct, the default view concerning the factivity of both acting for a 
reason and motivating reasons should be the Nonfactive ViewM. We find in the 
conceptual analysis of these notions no hint of the concept of a fact; and we even find 
some evidence that these notions cannot be factive. Still, there is the suggestion that natural 
language constructions of the form “A Φs for the reason that r” and “A’s reason is that r” 
cannot be true unless r is true. But this suggestion turns out not to have much force, since: 
(i) the conceptual analysis does not bear out the idea that these constructions are factive; 
(ii) the semantic analysis does not bear out the idea that these constructions are factive; 
and (iii) even if the semantic analysis did suggest that these constructions are factive, this 
would not entitle us to any inferences about the ontology of reasons. It is sometimes 
suggested that the factivity of these constructions would explain the air of paradox 
surrounding their nonfactive uses, and also the felt need to retract reasons claims when it 
is demonstrated that the thing claimed to be a reason is something that is not the case. 
But these things can be just as easily, if not more satisfactorily, explained by the idea –– to 
which all parties will agree –– that acting for a reason implies believing that reason. 
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Furthermore, this connection between reasons and beliefs seems to give satisfying 
accounts of other cases in which the Factive ViewM simply gives the wrong prediction. As 
I will show in the next chapter, this connection between reasons and beliefs can be easily 
accommodated by the Nonfactive ViewM. 
 If the Factive ViewM should be ultimately favored, then, it will have to find its 
support from some other line of argument. I devote the rest of this chapter to discussing a 
formidable candidate for such a line of argument. 
REASONS, EXPLANATIONS, AND FACTIVITY 
Consider now a variation of the example discussed at the beginning of the 
chapter.20  Imagine a pond that has thin ice in the middle. Edna takes it that the ice in the 
middle of the pond is thin. So, when she skates, Edna keeps to the edge of the pond. Now, 
imagine a pond with thick ice throughout. Edmund takes it that the ice in the middle of 
the pond is thin. So, when he skates, Edmund keeps to the edge of the pond. 
We might ask why Edna and Edmund are skating near the edge of the pond. 
Insofar as we take ourselves, in asking this question, to be asking for what reason Edna and 
Edmund act as they do in skating near the edge, we express some sympathy for the claim 
that 
 
                                                
20 I am adapting this example from Hornsby [2008: 251], which to my knowledge traces back to Gilbert 
Ryle [1949: 117-118] –– although its more contemporary usage may be due to Unger [1975: 209-211]. I 
have changed some of the details of the case in order to avoid the epistemological baggage that comes with 
Hornsby’s version. 
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REASONS-EXPLANATIONS: a motivating reason is the kind of thing that can play a 
role in explaining an agent’s action (when the action is one the agent does for a 
reason).21 
 
The idea that motivating reasons play an explanatory role is extremely plausible. Kieran 
Setiya has even gone so far as to suggest that it is conceptual truth: “the sense of “reason” 
in which one takes something as one’s reason is explanatory”.22 The very concept of a 
motivating reason might seem to be one that picks out entities with explanatory power. 
One way to see this is to revisit the supposition that when we ask why Edna and Edmund 
are doing what they are doing, we are asking for what reason they are doing what they are 
doing. When we ask “Why?” questions about actions, we usually take answers to these 
questions to be giving explanations of the actions in question. This indicates a quite 
intimate connection between motivating reasons and action explanations –– even if the 
intimacy does not approach the level of identity, or amount to a conceptual truth. Indeed, 
the apparent intimacy of the connection here might lead one to hope for action 
explanations to be given in terms of, or wholly exhausted by, reasons for which agents act. 
One might also hope, in the present case of Edna and Edmund, for two different 
explanations of what the two different agents are doing. This hope is founded on the 
observation that there is a seemingly significant difference between Edna and Edmund: 
Edna has a true belief about the ice, while Edmund has a false belief. To the extent that 
we expect this feature to make a difference to the explanations of their actions, we express 
some sympathy for the claim that 
                                                
21 Sandis [2013: 30] rightly refers to this claim as a common “assumption” in the literature. Setiya [2007: 
39-47] provides a nice defense of the axiom if one is needed. The earliest contemporary treatment of 
something approximating this thought, to my knowledge, is found in G. E. M. Anscombe [1957: 9ff]. 
22 See Setiya [2007: 42], and Setiya [2007: 23] for the same sentiment redescribed. 
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FACTIVE EXPLANATIONS: something that is not the case cannot explain 
anything.23 
 
This claim is also very plausible –– even if, unlike REASONS-EXPLANATIONS, it does not 
seem to be a conceptual truth. Consider a paradigm class of explanations: causal 
explanations. Suppose your office is adjacent to mine, and while you are working, you 
hear what sounds like glass breaking in my office. You rush into my office and notice that 
one of my windows is broken. You proceed to ask me why the window is broken, and I 
respond with something like: “My window is broken because a baseball was thrown at it.” 
It would be quite puzzling if, when you go on to ask me where the baseball is, I respond, 
“Oh, there is no baseball –– it is not the case that a baseball was thrown at my window.” 
You should like to know, I think, just what I mean by “because.” My “because” claim 
seems to make no sense; claims of the form “P because Q” (and perhaps, “What explains 
P is that Q”) seem to be doubly factive: they can be true only if both P and Q are true.24 
Furthermore, since claims of this form seem to be paradigmatic explanatory claims, we 
might take their factivity to be good indication that explanatory claims in general are 
factive. 
So far, I have been describing a natural way of looking at actions and explanations 
of them. But anyone looking at things in this way might feel disappointed by the natural 
way in which we were looking at acting for a reason earlier –– the natural way of looking 
at things which led us to believe that the Nonfactive ViewM is the intuitive view of acting 
                                                
23 As with the previous axiom, this is a widely held assumption. But it is not difficult to find statements of 
the assumption, as in Dancy [2014: 83], Hyman [1999: 443], Littlejohn [2012: 102] Sandis [2013: 31, 46], 
Scott Sehon [2005: 178], P. F. Strawson [1992: 109], and Schnee [2015: 1]. 
24  I have borrowed the phrase “doubly factive” from Dancy [2014: 84]. 
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for a reason. The disappointment is likely to come when inquiring about pairs of agents 
like Edna and Edmund. The case of Edna is straightforward enough for the Factivist and 
Nonfactivist alike. The natural answer to the question, “Why is Edna skating near the 
edge of the pond?” is that thin ice: the ice in the middle of the pond is thin. This 
explanation respects both of the intuitive claims we just observed: it explains the action 
via a reason for acting, and it provides as the explanation something that is the case. But 
the same explanation is not available in the case of Edmund. We certainly cannot answer 
the question, “Why is Edmund skating near the edge of the pond?” by saying that the ice 
in the middle of the pond is thin.25 Since it is not the case that the ice in the middle of the 
pond is thin, such an explanation (aside from being plainly incorrect to say) strictly violates 
our commitment to FACTIVE EXPLANATIONS. Notice, though, that the Nonfactive ViewM 
allows that Edmund’s reason for acting could be that THIN ICE even though it is not the 
case that thin ice. Furthermore, we have agreed by our commitment to REASONS-
EXPLANATIONS that Edmund’s reason for acting –– whatever it may be –– is the kind of 
thing that can play an explanatory role vis-à-vis his action. So it seems that the Nonfactive 
ViewM is set up to allow for a conflict between REASONS-EXPLANATIONS and FACTIVE 
EXPLANATIONS; and those who endorse the view will be forced, on pain of contradiction, 
to deny at least one of these very plausible claims. 
 So there seems to be a real puzzle here about actions, reasons, and explanations. 
Intuitively, all three of the Nonfactive ViewM, REASONS-EXPLANATIONS, and FACTIVE 
EXPLANATIONS are incredibly plausible; but they also seem to be jointly inconsistent. The 
puzzle has the potential to be a powerful criticism against the Nonfactive ViewM. The 
                                                
25  For the remainder of this manuscript, I will sometimes use THIN ICE as a convenient shorthand (and I 
will use other similar shorthands with different contents). As it makes no difference to my discussion, I make 
no distinction between the proposition that the ice in the middle of the pond is thin and the state of affairs of the 
pond having thin ice in the middle. Neither do I make any distinction between the true proposition, the 
obtaining state of affairs, or the fact. In similar spirit, I often use “false” and “not the case” interchangeably. 
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puzzle revolves around a certain kind of case: cases like that of Edmund, wherein the 
agent is wrong about how the world is, and then acts in the light of that erroneous view of 
the world. Call such cases error cases.26 The criticism, very simply put, is that the 
Nonfactive ViewM is not compatible with correct and satisfying reasons-explanations of 
actions in error cases, and it seems to provide no theoretical tools for avoiding obviously 
problematic explanations in error cases. If these difficulties were unavoidable in general, 
we theorists might begin considering whether we should do away with one of either 
REASONS-EXPLANATIONS or FACTIVE EXPLANATIONS. However, the combination of these 
two axioms with the Factive ViewM appears to create no such problems in error cases. 
According to the Factive ViewM, A can Φ for the reason that r only if it is the case that r. 
Since it is not the case that the ice in the middle of the pond is thin, then, Edmund could 
not have acted for that reason. Since Edmund could not have acting for that reason, there 
is no temptation to answer the relevant “Why?” question by citing that false consideration 
as his reason. There is therefore no looming conflict, given the truth of the Factive 
ViewM, between REASONS-EXPLANATIONS and FACTIVE EXPLANATIONS. Indeed, perhaps 
what all of this shows is that the Nonfactive ViewM is ultimately a nonstarter despite its 
initial plausibility; and we theorists should direct our efforts toward developing the best 
version of the Factive ViewM possible. 
THE ARGUMENT FROM THE FACTIVITY OF EXPLANATION 
Or so one chief argument against the Nonfactive ViewM goes. Now that we have a 
good idea of what could motivate critics of the Nonfactive ViewM to raise this objection, 
we can take a closer look at it. But first, I engage in an ultimately orthogonal, but 
nonetheless necessary, aside concerning the dialectic surrounding this argument. 
                                                
26  This is now a standard way of labeling such cases, but see Alvarez [2010: 50, 124; 2016]. 
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I have sometimes been met with puzzlement when suggesting that error cases 
should present a problem for the Nonfactive ViewM. Indeed, some have suggested to me 
that such cases appear to present a problem for the Factive ViewM. Such puzzlement, I 
think, has two primary sources. One source is that, insofar as it seems true that agents can 
act in the light of a falsehood (that is: they can Φ for the reason that r even if it is not the 
case that r), the conceivability of cases in which agents act in the light of falsehoods poses 
a putative problem for the Factive ViewM, since it holds that there are no such cases. As I 
see it, this amounts to not much more than placing an intuitive burden on the Factive 
ViewM for giving the wrong verdicts in some cases. The problem under consideration, 
though, is not just the task of saying whether it is possible for agents to act in the light of 
falsehoods. The task is reconciling that possibility with the ideas that (i) reasons have 
explanatory power and (ii) explanation is factive. 
A second source of confusion here is the thought that error cases create an 
argument not for the Factive ViewM, but instead for the view often called Psychologism. 
This is the view that, roughly, all motivating reasons are psychological facts about the 
acting agents. Non-Psychologism  (or “Anti-Psychologism”) is the denial of Psychologism. 
Here is James Lenman, describing how error cases are supposed to benefit Psychologism: 
The biggest headache for anti-psychologists such as Dancy however is furnished by cases 
where the agent’s belief is false. The fact of Angus’ being fired is naturally adduced 
to explain his punching his boss in cases where he has indeed been fired. But in 
cases where Angus punches his boss, believing mistakenly that he has been fired, it 
seems quite wrong to say he so acts because he has been fired. In such a case we 
surely must retreat to a psychologised explanation if we are to have a credible 
motivating reason explanation at all.27 
                                                
27 See Lenman [2011: 20-21]. See Alvarez [2016: 4-5, 24ff] for a similar characterization of the dialectic; 
but see Sandis [2013: 32] for an example of one who seems to recognize that the real issue here is that of 
factivity. A fuller discussion of Psychologism comes in the next two chapters. 
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The crux of the argument comes at the end. Psychologism is thought to benefit from such 
cases because, in such cases, it is tempting to think that the only available explanation is 
the psychologized one: Angus punched his boss because he believed that he was fired. 
Whence this temptation, though? As Lenman’s analysis itself reveals, the temptation is 
brought about by the thought that we cannot explain Angus’ action by simply giving the 
content of (what seems to be) his reason for acting (“he was fired”). But that thought is 
appealing only because the consideration that initially seems to be Angus’ motivating 
reason is a falsehood. To put it in the terms we have used so far: explaining Angus’ action 
by appeal to this false reason would seem to violate the axiom of FACTIVE 
EXPLANATIONS. So the pressure to turn to Psychologism in such cases ultimately has 
nothing to do with Psychologism and Non-Psychologism per se. The driving force of the 
case is found in the tension between saying that (i) Angus acted for the reason that r, 
although not r; (ii) Angus’ motivating reason can serve to explain his punching his boss; 
and (iii) only facts can serve to explain Angus’ punching his boss. This is just an instance 
of our more general present problem: that of reconciling the Nonfactive ViewM with 
REASONS-EXPLANATIONS and FACTIVE EXPLANATIONS. Psychologism seems appealing in 
such cases only because it dissolves this trilemma, by saying that motivating reasons are 
psychological facts (and therefore, giving up the Nonfactive ViewM). So, the argument for 
Psychologism here –– if there is one at all –– ultimately proceeds by way of a more 
fundamental argument for the Factive ViewM.28 
With these confusions out of the way, we may proceed to the argument itself, 
which I will refer to as the Argument from the Factivity of Explanation (or, 
                                                
28 One might conjecture that the confusion is compounded by the fact that many Non-Psychologists are at 
pains to argue, against Psychologism, that motivating reasons are facts rather than psychological states of 
agents. Since error cases are often thought to present a problem for Non-Psychologists, this fact may also 
naturally (though erroneously) lead to the thought that error cases present a problem for Factivists. 
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“AFE”). The argument appears in many forms in the literature. These vary in the extent 
to which they explicitly state that the nonfactivity of motivating reasons is at odds with 
motivating reasons playing an explanatory role; but the sentiment has nonetheless more 
than worked its way into the air.29 Here is Dancy’s rendering of AFE: 
This Edmund example faces us with an inconsistent triad.                                                 
1.  We explain an action by giving the reason for which it was done.                     
2. Edmund’s reason for keeping to the edge of the pond was that (as he had been 
told) the ice in the middle was thin.                                                                          
3. That the ice in the middle was thin is not (any part of) what explains Edmund’s 
keeping to the edge. 
Here also is Pamela Hieronymi: 
If Erin’s operative reason for leaving was that the meeting was over, but the meeting was 
not over, then we cannot appeal to the meeting’s end to explain her departure––
because the meting did not end. Something that is not the case cannot explain 
something that is. To provide an explanation of Erin’s departure, one must cite 
some fact. 
Finally, for one more example, here is Michael Smith: 
But if [John] failed to illuminate the room then he would be forced to say that the belief is 
what moved him, as in that case it wouldn’t be true that flicking the switch 
illuminated the room. Quite in general, then, when we are motivated by a false 
view of a situation, it is not true that what moves us is… something about the 
nature of the situation… Only explanatory connections that go via the 
psychologies of the agents whose bodies move are able to explain their actions. So 
even though Dancy says that what motivates us is the nature of the situation, it 
seems that even he has to admit that which features of a situation motivate us is a 
function of our psychology. 
Abstracting away from some of the particularities of each of these, it is perhaps natural to 
put the argument in the form of a trilemma: 
 
[_] All motivating reasons are explanatory; 
[_] All things that are explanatory are facts; 
                                                
29 See Dancy [2014: 83], Hieronymi [2011: 410-411], and Smith [2012: 391-392], respectively. 
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[_] Some motivating reasons are not facts. 
 
Since we are looking for a positive argument in favor of the Factive ViewM, though, it 
might be more straightforward to put the argument this way: 
 
[1] All motivating reasons are explanatory; 
[2] All things that are explanatory are facts; 
[3] Therefore, all motivating reasons are facts. 
 
Here claims [1] and [2] are articulations of REASONS-EXPLANATIONS and FACTIVE 
EXPLANATIONS, respectively. Of course, if the argument is sound, and claim [3] is true, 
then the Factive ViewM is true and the Nonfactive ViewM is false. 
In this section I want to begin discussing what I take to be a major shortcoming of 
this argument. Indeed, I think the shortcoming turns out to be fatal. The shortcoming is 
that both claims [1] and [2] are ambiguous; their ambiguity is owed to an ambiguity in 
the notion of being explanatory. What does it mean for something –– a motivating reason, 
for example –– to be explanatory? Of particular interest to present purposes is the 
question: what does it mean for a reason to be explanatory with respect to an action done 
for a reason? What does a claim like [1] amount to? Here are some options from the 
literature.30 
                                                
30 See Anscombe [1957: 9], Hornsby [2008: 250], Alvarez [2010: 170], Dancy [2014: 83], and Sandis 
[2013: 32] (respectively), for the following passages. I expect claim [1a] below will be agreeable to most 
everyone in the area; see also Peter Achinstein [1983], Dancy [2014: 90], Wayne Davis [2003: 456f], and 
Hieronymi [2011: 409]. For claim [1b], see also Hyman [1999: 443; 2011: 359], McDowell [2013: 18-19], 
and Sandis [2013: 32]. For [1c] I also draw on Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim [1948: 137ff]. I expect 
there would be wide endorsement around [1c], save for Sandis [2013: 33] and perhaps Dancy [2014]. For 
[1d] see also Hyman [1999: 443]; but again I expect all in the area would agree on something at least as 
strong as this. I expect again that [1e] would be agreeable to most in the area; it was suggested to me by 
Maria Alvarez. 
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 [Intention actions] are the actions to which a certain sense of the question ‘Why?’ is 
given application; the sense is of course that in which the answer, if positive, gives 
a reason for acting… the question “What is the relevant sense of the question 
‘Why” and “What is meant by ‘reason for acting’?” are one and the same.            
X Φ-d because p (where ‘because’ can be glossed with ‘for the reason that’)… 
where there is a reasons-explanation from X’s knowledge, the fact that p was a 
reason X had for Φ-ing. 
A reason explanation, in the sense in which I am using this phrase, is an 
explanation whose explanans is the agent’s reason for acting. 
Every statement we make, in giving an explanation of anything, needs to be true. 
But explanations often contain clauses that are themselves capable of truth and 
falsity, and if the truth of the whole does not depend on the truth of the contained 
party, we think of the context as intensional. 
Even in cases where we… explain her action with a simple ‘she did it because p’ 
what does the explaining is not the falsehood ‘that p’… The reason cited does not 
itself even contribute to the explanation. 
From these we can perhaps glean an initial menu of options for disambiguating claim [1]: 
 
[1a] A reason is the kind of thing that can be given in an answer to a “Why?” 
question. 
[1b] A reason is the kind of thing that can replace q in a claim of the form “P 
because q”. 
[1c] A reason is the kind of thing that can be the explanans of an action 
explanation. 
[1d] A reason is the kind of thing that can be a part of an action explanation. 
[1e] A reason is the kind of thing that can contribute to the explanation of an 
action. 
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I want to start by making a few observations about this menu of options. First, it seems to 
me that none of these disambiguations of claim [1] can lay claim, pre-theoretically, to 
being what it really means for a reason to be explanatory with respect to an action. At least 
initially, each of these claims seems to adequately, though differently, express the idea. 
But if that is right, AFE runs into a complicating question right from the start: which of 
these disambiguations is being used in the argument for the Factive ViewM? On the heels 
of this observation is a second one: advocates of AFE must choose (and perhaps defend) 
some particular disambiguation to run the argument on, lest the opponent dodge the 
argument by simply claiming that she meant something else by “explanatory.” A third 
observation here is that, if any of these disambiguations is substituted into our current 
version of AFE, the argument will be rendered invalid. This may be obvious, but here is a 
quick demonstration using the first disambiguation: 
 
[1a] A reason is the kind of thing that can be given in an answer to a “Why?” 
question. 
[2] All things that are explanatory are facts; 
[3] Therefore, all motivating reasons are facts. 
 
Claim [3] clearly does not follow from claims [1a] and [2]. In order to produce a valid 
argument using [1a], claim [2] will have to be revised as well. This will be a complication 
when any disambiguation of claim [1] is substituted into AFE. 
 Finally, I want to note that even these five disambiguations seem to admit of 
further disambiguation –– and they do so in a manner that is suggestive of more general 
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ways of understanding the notion of being explanatory.31 For example, claims [1a] and [1b] 
seem to associate the notion of explanation with a human practice, often carried out in 
conversation. We ask questions of a certain kind (or form), and we try to give answers of a 
certain kind (or form). The explanatory nature of reasons might be understood according 
to the role reasons (or their contents) play in this practice. Claims [1c], [1d], and [1e] 
seem to abstract away from some of these particularities. They seem to associate the 
notion of being explanatory with a certain kind of proposition, sentence, or assertion –– 
or perhaps with a certain kind of relation between propositions, sentences, or assertions. 
More general distinctions such as these may be useful to keep in mind as our examination 
of AFE proceeds. 
‘Why?’ and ‘Because’ 
With these preliminaries in mind, we can return to the complication that occurs 
when one tries to substitute claim [1a] in for claim [1] in AFE. The resulting argument is 
invalid. Fair enough, one might think ––– but it is obvious enough how to revise the 
second premise and fix the argument here: 
 
[1a] A reason is the kind of thing that can be given in an answer to a “Why?” 
question. 
[2a] Anything that can be given in an answer to a “Why?” question is a fact. 
[3a] Therefore, all reasons are facts. 
 
                                                
31 Thanks to Dan Bonevac for helping me to clarify my thinking with these categorizations. The reader will 
see that things could have been grouped in more than one way, since many of my critiques will cut across 
categories. 
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Recalling how we started our inquiry wondering about Edna and Edmund, one might 
suppose that any answer to a “Why?” question counts as an explanation. According to 
the thought expressed by [1a], one might therefore suppose that anything given in an 
answer to a “Why?” question also counts as explanatory. So, anything given in an answer 
to the question, “Why is she Φing?” will count as explanatory vis-à-vis her Φing. 
Much of that seems sensible enough. But to use this conception of explanation in 
a successful variation of AFE, one must also make use of claim [2a]; and claim [2a] is 
clearly false. In fact, as far as I can tell, although many theorists would endorse [1a], no 
theorist would endorse [2a]. This makes this sample argument a useful starting point for 
us: I expect everyone will agree that the argument is a poor one, and that its obvious 
shortcoming is in [2a]; and yet this argument provides a model for illustrating the general 
kind of trouble that AFE faces. To see this, consider the following answer to the question 
of why Edmund is skating near the pond: 
 
He believes that the ice in the middle of the pond is thin. 
 
This kind of explanation (which I will refer to as psychologized) seems perfectly correct, 
and it seems to me that everyone acknowledges the plausibility of such psychologized 
explanations. Indeed, as we saw earlier, such explanations are favored by Factivists in 
error cases like that of Edmund. For, although it is not the case that the ice in the middle 
of the pond is thin, it is the case that Edmund believes it to be thin. So, in error cases, 
Factivists will often switch to a psychologized explanation in order to preserve the factivity 
of the explanation.32 The result of this switch, though, is that explanations in error cases 
                                                
32 As Dancy [2014: 83] points out, this move is almost always accompanied by a revised account of what 
the agent’s reason is: many Factivists adopt the view that Edmund’s reason is that he believes that the ice in the 
middle is thin. One notable exception to this is Alvarez [2010]. 
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will always proceed by way of falsehood. In the case of Edmund, the falsehood is that the 
ice in the middle of the pond is thin. If claim [2a] were true, we should expect falsehoods 
to be prohibited from entering into explanations. So, psychologized explanations render 
this variation of AFE ineffective twice over. First, claim [2a] is shown, by the plausibility 
of psychologized explanations in error cases, to be simply implausible. Second, [2a] is 
shown, by the state of the dialectic surrounding error cases, to be unacceptable by many 
Factivists’ own lights. 
In view of this difficulty, advocates of AFE might want to make an adjustment. 
They might try using, instead of claim [1a], 
 
[1a*] A reason is the kind of thing that can be given as an answer to a “Why?” 
question. 
 
This revision conceives of the explanatory role of reasons not as consisting in just being 
given in an answer to a “Why?” question, but in being the answer to a “Why?” question. 
Now, without any restrictions on what may count as an answer to a “Why?” question, 
[1a*] will not serve to improve AFE. For one answer to the question “Why is Edmund 
skating near the edge of the pond?” might be, “His reason is that the ice in the middle of 
the pond is thin.” If this is an acceptable answer, [1a*] hurts, rather than helps, this 
argument for the Factive ViewM. Any helpful parameter as to what counts as an answer 
to a “Why?” question, of course, will be one that pressures us to think that the agent’s 
reason must be a fact. Perhaps conception [1b] can be of help here. After all, when we 
ask questions of the form, “Why did A Φ?” we often expect an answer of the form 
“Because q,” and take q to be the answer to our question. It might be thought, then, that 
the explanatory role of motivating reasons consists in being able to replace Q in a claim of 
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the form “P because q” (or “What explains p is that q,” or perhaps, “Q is the explanation 
of p”). 
Of course, in order to make use of these ideas in AFE, we must also revise the 
second premise of the argument. Here is what the argument using [1b] would look like. 
 
[1b] A reason is the kind of thing that can replace q in a claim of the form “P 
because q”. 
[2b] Anything that can replace q in a claim of the form “P because q” is a fact. 
[3b] Therefore, all reasons are facts. 
 
As we saw in the previous section, it does seem clearly incorrect to make a claim of the 
form “P because q” where q is a known falsehood. So perhaps we should accept claim 
[2b]: such claims are indeed doubly factive. The trouble with this argument is rather in 
what claim [1b] implies that it means for something to be explanatory. It is indeed 
natural to offer explanations by making claims of the form “P because q.” Some might 
even follow Hyman in his proclamation that “reasons can be stated or given; and the 
canonical form of a sentence stating or giving a person’s reason for doing or believing 
something is ‘A Φed because p’.” Constatine Sandis cites Hyman approvingly, even going 
to far as to say that “all reasons-statements must be translatable (without change of 
meaning) to any of the standard forms of explanation, on pain of failing to qualify as 
explanatory.” 
I think that both Hyman’s claim about canonical explanatory form, and Sandis’ 
claim about translatability, are false; and I will turn to them shortly.33 It is worth first 
                                                
33 See Hyman [1999: 443] and Sandis [2013: 38], respectively. I give fuller treatment to these thoughts in 
chapter three. 
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mentioning that even if “P because q” is the natural (or even canonical) form of reasons-
explanations, it is hardly obvious that all reasons-explanations must therefore be given (or 
be capable of being given) in this form. Now, depending on what is involved in something 
being canonical, and whether Sandis’ claim about translatability is true, it may after all be 
true that any reasons-explanation must be capable of taking the form in question. But, as 
we will see, there are other explanatory forms that have just as strong a claim to being the 
canonical form of a reasons-explanation, and Sandis’ translatability claim is implausible.34 
Is there any good independent reason to think that reasons-explanations must be 
given in the form, “P because q,” where p is the fact that A Φd, and q is the content of A’s 
reason for Φing? I cannot find any. Indeed, there are good reasons not to think this. The 
first comes from a general skepticism about appeal to natural language here. It is true 
that, in English, claims of the form “P because q” are used to offer explanations, and that 
we can give reasons-explanations by giving the content of the agent’s reason for q in such 
claims. But it is a strange suggestion that whether something counts as explanatory, 
metaphysically, depends on the contingencies of how any natural language is constructed. 
This is not to say that data from natural language cannot provide us any insight into the 
nature of explanation. But we should be skeptical, unless we are presented with good 
argument, of the claim that playing an explanatory role can be reduced to playing a 
syntactic or semantic role in natural language. Of course, such a reduction is just what 
seems to be implied by [1b]. 
A more substantive reason to reject this conception of the explanatory is that, if 
any one explanatory form can lay claim to being the “canonical” reason-giving form, it 
                                                
34 On the issue of translatability I make only brief remarks here. See chapter three for more. 
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seems to me that honor must be reserved for the form: “A’s reason for Φing is r.” It is 
unquestionable that 
 
[1b*] A motivating reason is the kind of thing the content of which can replace r 
in a claim of the form, “A’s reason for Φing is r.”35 
 
Indeed, claim [1b*] might be an analytic truth. So, if we are going to reduce the 
explanatory role of reasons to any role in natural language, it seems to me that it should 
first and foremost be one that satisfies [1b*]. Now, perhaps an advocate of AFE might 
want to assert [1b] in addition to [1b*]. But we now have independent reason not to 
allow this addition without qualification. As we saw earlier, natural language claims of the 
form “A reason for Φing is that r” do not appear to be factive; but claims of the form “P 
because q” are doubly factive. So, we should not expect that everything that can be 
substituted in for r in a claim of the first form can also be substituted in for q in a claim of 
the second form. Since we have little independent reason to accept [1b], and some good 
independent reason to accept [1b*], we should retain [1b*] if we are forced to make a 
choice. Furthermore, even if there is independent reason to insist on [1b], the comparison 
with [1b*] casts doubt on the idea that [1b] can be used in an argument for the Factive 
ViewM without begging some question. Since the Nonfactivist presumably holds that 
reasons contexts are not factive, but ‘because' contexts are factive, the Nonfactivist should 
reject out of hand any suggestion that reasons claims are interchangeable with any factive 
construction. A Factivist aiming to use [1b] to run AFE might try to insist either that they 
                                                
35 Notice that this scheme does not require that the reason be presented in propositional form. A fuller 
discussion of this possibility takes place in chapter three. There should be no concern about the switch, 
since we have already seen that claims of the form “A’s reason for Φing is that r” are not factive; and the 
propositionality could only serve to increase factive pressure. 
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ought to be interchangeable or that the because contexts are somehow primary, but it is 
hard to see, in the light of the foregoing considerations, what argument could be offered 
for these claims. 
A third reason to reject the [1b] conception of the explanatory comes from the 
known success of what I will call purposive explanations. Consider the following 
answers to the question of why Edmund is skating near the edge of the pond: 
 
In order to avoid thin ice in the middle of the pond. 
He did it to avoid falling through the ice. 
His purpose was to stay clear of thin ice. 
 
These ways of explaining Edmund’s action seem perfectly correct, and every bit as 
natural and familiar as answers of the form “P because q”. Indeed, some might even go so 
far as to say that it is purposive schemes –– not ‘because’ schemes –– that present the 
canonical form of reasons-explanations of actions. Here are Scott Sehon and G. F. 
Schueler (respectively): 36 
 [Common-sense] explanations [of action] are not causal; instead, I claim that they are 
teleological. A teleological explanation explains by citing the purpose or goal of the 
behavior in question… The paradigmatic form of a teleological explanation is A 
Φd in order to Ψ. 
Explanations of actions in terms of the agent’s reasons, I want to claim, work by 
citing the purpose or purposes for which the person who performed the action 
actually acted. 
 
                                                
36 Notice that this scheme does not require that the reason be presented in propositional form. A fuller 
discussion of this possibility takes place in chapter three. There should be no concern about the switch, 
since we have already seen that claims of the form “A’s reason for Φing is that r” are not factive; and the 
propositionality could only serve to increase factive pressure. 
 40 
However, to the extent that we accept such explanations, we should resist at least [1b].37 
Purposive explanations appear to comport well with [1a*], and even [1b*]. We can 
satisfactorily answer the question, “Why did A Φ?” with the answer, “In order to Ψ.” 
Following the model presented to us by ‘because’ schemes, we might take the ‘in order’ 
operator to signal that what comes next is being offered up as the bit with explanatory 
power. So, insofar as we accept these kinds answers as reasons-explanations, we may also 
be inclined (correctly, I think) to accept claims of the form, “A’s reason for Φing is to Ψ.” 
Here we capture the agent’s reason for acting in an infinitival clause. But one can 
substitute neither the infinitival clause nor the content of that clause for q in a claim of the 
form “P because q”. It makes no sense to say, “He did it because to avoid thin ice,” or, 
“He did it because stay clear of thin ice.” So the plausibility of purposive explanations 
appears to make [1b] implausible. 
It is possible to push back here by saying that reasons and purposes are very 
different beasts, ontologically speaking. If reasons and purposes are not to be identified, 
then perhaps this talk about explanations that appeal to purposes is a red herring, and 
should not be taken as evidence against [1b] as a claim about the explanatory nature of 
reasons. I postpone fuller discussion of purposive explanations for later. This resistance 
can be held off, for now, by noting that explanations of the form, “A Φd in order to Ψ” 
can be reasons-explanations (and clauses of the form “to Ψ” can be used to specify an 
agent’s reason) even if purposes are not motivating reasons. Recalling Davidson’s well-
known thought, we can see that these purposive explanations are in the business of doing 
exactly what reasons-explanations do: they reveal the good the agent saw in doing what 
she did, and specify the considerations that motivated her to act as she did. Now, this 
                                                
37 Such schemes are receiving increased attention; Scott Sehon [2005] provides a nice discussion. These 
same criticisms will be applicable to any version of AFE making use of claim [1c] (despite my categorizing 
them separately). For the sake of brevity and focus, I do not demonstrate this in the main body of the paper. 
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revelation and specification comes in a clause of infinitival, rather than propositional, 
form. One might then quibble about whether the clause, “to avoid thin ice” really specifies 
a  motivating consideration, since things considerable must be propositional. But surely 
there is no real confusion here about what motivates, for example, Edmund to skate 
around the edge of the pond. We could hardly respond to someone who offered us this 
purposive account, “Yes, that seems right. But why is he skating around the edge of the 
pond? I was hoping to know his reason.” His reason has been given by the thought that 
he is skating so as to avoid thin ice. So the bottom line, for now, should be just this: if a 
reasons-explanation can be given by a claim of the form, “to Ψ,” then claim [1b] looks 
implausible. It may turn out that reasons-explanations cannot be given in this form, but 
that remains to be seen.38 
 The points raised so far, I think, give us good reason to believe that any variation 
of the Argument from the Factivity of Explanation that relies on precisifying the 
explanatory role of reasons in the manner of [1a] or [1b] is likely to fail. One simply does 
not find, in investigating the nature of answers to “Why?” questions and “because” 
claims, the necessary resources for mounting a successful argument for the Factive 
ViewM. 
Explanatory Sentences 
In view of these difficulties, advocates of AFE may be wary of putting too much 
weight on questions and claims of certain forms. There is a way of conceiving of the 
notion of being explanatory that abstracts away from some of these difficulties. One 
might think generally of explananda and explanantia as sentences or sets of sentences (or 
                                                
38 See chapter three for more on whether purposive explanations count as reasons-explanations. 
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perhaps propositions or assertions). Here are Hempel and Oppenheim laying out their 
well-known sentential framework for explanation: 
By the explanandum, we understand the sentence describing the phenomenon to be 
explained (not that phenomenon itself); by the explanans, the class of those 
sentences which are adduced to account for the phenomenon.39 
So, for example, in trying to explain the phenomenon of Edmund’s skating near the edge 
of the pond, we have as our explanatory target the sentence describing that phenomenon. 
Perhaps it is something like, “Edmund is skating near the edge of the pond”. We then 
search for another sentence (or, perhaps, a set of sentences) that would account for the 
phenomenon described in this sentence. 
This way of thinking immediately calls for further disambiguation of the notion of 
being explanatory. Being explanatory could here mean being the (whole) explanans in the sense 
of being the whole set of sentences which completely explains the phenomenon in 
question. But it could also mean being a subset of those sentences (which, by themselves, 
give only part of the whole explanation). Zooming in a bit more, being explanatory could 
mean being a component of a sentence: being a crucial that-clause –– or perhaps a noun-
phrase –– in one of the sentences in the set. Finally, being explanatory could even mean 
being a crucial referent of one of the sentences of the whole set. There may be other 
options here as well. 
So any version of AFE that conceives of explanation in this way will have to 
further clarify the notion of being explanatory. Now, if one holds that being explanatory 
amounts to being the explanans in the sense just described, the one might endorse claim 
[1c]. The version of AFE operating on this disambiguation would go as follows: 
 
                                                
39 This way of thinking about explanation is common, but see Hempel and Oppenheim [1948: 136-137]. 
Thanks to Dan Bonevac for encouraging me to give fuller consideration to this framework. 
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[1c] A reason is the kind of thing that can be the explanans of an action. 
[2c] Anything that can be the explanans of an action is a fact. 
[3c] Therefore, all reasons are facts. 
 
It is perhaps easy to slide into accepting claim [1c] by way of accepting claim [1b]. This is 
due to the temptation to think of p and q in a claim of the form “P because q” as the 
explanandum and explanans (respectively). To the extent that disambiguation [1c] just 
collapses into disambiguation [1b], any argument featuring it will face the problems 
pointed out in the previous section. One might also come to conception [1b] through the 
something like [1a*], with the addition that any (proper) answer to a “Why?” question 
must be a sentence. This might lead us to think that the explanans of an action is the 
sentence that is the answer to the relevant “Why?” question. However, given that two 
common ways of answering such “Why?” questions are with clauses of the form “to Ψ” 
and “for the reason that r,” and that such clauses do not appear to be sentences, this 
addition is at least suspect. Perhaps one would like to argue that such clauses are, in fact, 
sentences. I will come to this suggestion momentarily. In any case, it remains to be seen 
whether [1a*] and [1c] might rise and fall together; but we should at least not assume that 
it is safe to move from [1a*] to anything like the sentential conception of [1c]. 
Setting aside these complications for the moment, we can see that there is good 
reason to reject claim [1c] if we are adopting the sentential conception of explanation just 
laid out. On this conception, when we talk of the explanans, we are talking about the whole 
set of sentences comprising the complete explanation. So, in our current example 
involving Edmund, the explanans is taken to be the whole set of sentences that accounts for 
Edmund’s skating near the edge of the pond. If that is right, though, we should clearly 
reject claim [1c] as a conception of the explanatory role of motivating reasons. In looking 
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for a reasons-explanation of Edmund’s action, we are looking in particular for those 
sentences which, at the very least, somehow indicate or make use of the content of 
Edmund’s reason for acting. The whole set of sentences accounting for the phenomenon 
captured by the sentence, “Edmund is skating near the edge of the pond” will be quite a 
large complex, including sentences like, “Ice skating is a cold-weather pastime,” 
“Edmund owns ice skates,” and “Edmund chose not to skate with Edna today.” It 
borders on absurdity to think that Edmund’s motivating reason for skating near the edge 
is identical to the whole set of sentences including all of these (and more). It is simply not 
plausible that each and every one of these sentences is part of what motivated Edmund to 
skate near the edge of the pond. 
Now, as was the case with [1a], I do not think that anyone advancing AFE 
conceives of the explanatory nature of reasons in this way. I think that the more plausible 
conception in this family of views is that what it comes to for a reason to be explanatory is 
for it to be a subset of the sentences in the whole set comprising the explanans, or perhaps a 
part of one of those sentences. These conceptions sit more comfortably with the fact that 
discussions about acting for reasons often proceed by attending to examples focused on 
individual reasons captured by a single that-clause. If we retain the thought that the 
(whole) explanans is the complete set of sentences accounting for the phenomenon in 
question, we can think of subsets of sentences (even single sentences), and clauses in the 
individual sentences, as parts of the explanation. So perhaps we are moving here toward 
conception [1d] of the explanatory role of reasons. Making use of that disambiguation, 
here is what AFE looks like: 
 
[1d] A reason is the kind of thing that can be a part of the explanation of an 
action. 
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[2d] Anything that can be a part of the explanation is a fact. 
[3d] Therefore, all reasons are facts. 
 
As we just saw, being a part here could mean being a set of sentences, being a single 
sentence, being a clause in a sentence, or something else. In the rest of this section I will 
argue that none of these conceptions can be used in a successful variation of AFE. 
It is perhaps easiest to start by quickly setting aside the “clausal” conception of 
being a part. On this way of thinking, [2d] seems to suffer all of the basic shortcomings we 
saw earlier in [2a]. If a clausal conception of [2d] is true, for example, then in error cases 
we cannot make use of psychologized explanations (since the psychological state adduced 
to explain the action will have its content represented by a false that-clause). We can 
clearly explain Edmund’s behavior with the sentences, “He believes that the ice in the 
middle is thin,” “He is doing it for the reason that the ice in the middle is thin,” and “He 
is doing it to avoid thin ice in the middle;” but neither “the ice in the middle is thin” nor 
“to avoid thin ice” are facts. I cannot see how this sort of objection could be overcome; 
but as I said before, I do not think that anyone advancing AFE would actually endorse 
this reading of AFE. Instead, I think it more likely that Factivists might adopt the view 
that a reason is the kind of thing that can be a part of an action explanation, where “be a 
part” means “be a subset of the whole set comprising the complete explanation” (whether 
that subset be many sentences or just one). In effect, then, [1d] is saying that anything 
explanatory (including reasons) must be one of these sentences; and [2d] is saying that all 
of these sentences must be true sentences. For the sake of clarity, we could alter AFE in 
the following way. 
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[1d*] A reason is the kind of thing that can be one of the sentences in the 
explanans. 
[2d*] Anything that can be a sentence in an explanans is a fact. 
[3d*] Therefore, all reasons are facts. 
 
There is, in my view, nothing wrong with saying that reasons can be represented in 
sentential forms, or that things so represented can have explanatory power. But claim 
[1d*] implies that in order for something to play an explanatory role, it must be capable 
of being a sentence. At the very least, this requires argument. Purposive schemes are 
again illustrative here. Against this reading of [1d], it is perfectly correct to say that 
Edmund’s reason is to avoid thin ice in the middle of the pond. Here we do have a 
sentence –– something that could be a part of the whole explanation –– that adequately 
accounts for the phenomenon of Edmund’s skating near the edge of the pond. But what 
this sentence gives as Edmund’s reason (“to avoid thin ice in the middle of the pond”) is 
not itself a sentence, and it is not clear that it could be a sentence. So again, to the extent 
that we are impressed by the plausibility of purposive schemes, we should resist the view 
that either being a reason or being explanatory necessarily involves being a sentence. 
This point about purposive explanations is suggestive of a more general reason to 
reject [1d*]. We might ask, “Why is Edmund skating near the edge of the pond?” as a 
way of pinpointing the phenomenon targeted by our explanatory efforts. Consider the 
following accounts of Edmund’s skating near the edge of the pond. 
 
“For the reason that the ice in the middle of the pond is thin.” 
“To avoid thin ice in the middle of the pond.” 
“In view of the danger posed by skating on thin ice.” 
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The second answer here is transparently purposive; but I want to focus on a different 
aspect of it here. All of these accounts are what I will refer to as fragmentary: they are 
not complete sentences (of natural language), but rather fragments. They also seem 
perfectly adequate as answers to the question posed. If you asked me why Edmund is 
doing what he is, my responding in one of these ways would not likely arouse any 
complaint or unclarity in your mind. But if the view put forth by [1d*] is correct, then we 
ought to find some deficiency in these responses qua explanatory accounts, and also as 
presentations of Edmund’s reason. 
We can sidestep the issue of what exactly is supposed to be wrong with these 
answers, since, on the view in question, the deficiency would presumably be remedied by 
transforming these accounts into proper sentences. As far as I can see, there are three 
sensible ways to do this. All three strategies rely on the suggestion that the fragmentary 
accounts are somehow shorthanded or elliptical; and that they in fact contain a hidden 
subject (the agent) which would be revealed if things were fully spelled out. One particular 
strategy is to suggest that the subject is somehow hiding in the operators that signal what 
the agent’s reason is. So, according to this strategy, if we are to have the real explanatory 
claims, these fragments should be completed as follows. 
 
“His reason is that the ice in the middle of the pond is thin.” 
“His purpose is to avoid thin ice in the middle of the pond.” 
“His consideration is the danger posed by skating on thin ice.” 
 
We need not address the plausibility of the claim that the earlier fragmentary accounts 
are really shorthanded ways of expressing these sentential accounts. According to [1d*], a 
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reason is the kind of thing that can be a sentence in the whole explanans. So, in 
transforming our fragments into sentences, the product ought to be something that could 
be Edmund’s reason for skating near the edge. But it is obvious that none of these 
sentences could be Edmund’s reason. Edmund does not skate near the edge of the pond, 
for example, for the reason that his reason is that the ice in the middle of the pond is thin. 
Of course, this sentence might contain a clause representing or giving the content of 
Edmund’s reason. But with that thought, we revert back to the “clausal” conception of 
[1d] we just discarded in a manner similar to [1a]. 
It seems that a similar problem arises with a second strategy, which operates on 
the suspicion that both the agent and his action are somehow hidden in the fuller meaning 
of the fragmentary accounts. Consider the following explanatory sentences. 
 
“He is doing it for the reason that the ice in the middle of the pond is thin.” 
“He is doing it in order to avoid thin ice in the middle of the pond.” 
“He is doing it in view of the danger posed by skating on thin ice.” 
 
As with the sentences resulting from the first strategy, it is not plausible that any of these 
sentences are identical to Edmund’s reason for skating near the edge of the pond, or even 
the content of Edmund’s reason. It is not plausible, for example, that Edmund keeps to 
the edge for the reason that he is doing it in view of the danger posed by skating on thin 
ice. But this is just what the conception of the explanatory role of reasons expressed in 
[1d*] might lead us to if we insist that these fragmentary accounts are actually disguised 
sentential accounts of Edmund’s reason. 
There is a second, deeper problem with this strategy for [1d*] accommodating 
fragmentary explanations. It is clear that, even if the fragmentary accounts of Edmund’s 
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skating are somehow deficient, there are satisfactory accounts very nearby. If [1d*] were 
true, we would expect that transforming these fragments into sentences would remedy 
this explanatory deficiency. However, it is difficult to locate any deficiency in the 
fragmentary explanations that could be remedied in the sentential accounts. The 
sentential accounts are not clearly better qua explanations of Edmund’s action or 
presentations of his reason. Indeed, it seems clear that they are not any better. One hint 
that this is so is that the only revision is the addition of the clause “He is doing it;” but of 
course, we do not want to say that the fact that he is doing it can explain the fact that he 
is doing it. Neither should we like to say that “I am doing it” is any part of Edmund’s 
reason for acting. So it seems that the clause added to transform these fragments into 
sentences does not contribute anything to the accounts qua explanations. Indeed, I 
struggle to see any explanatory task that is accomplished by the sentential accounts, but 
not by the fragmentary accounts. It is not as though, for example, the sentential 
explanations put us in a better position to understand what Edmund is doing, or give us a 
better grasp of what Edmund’s reason is. But again: if [1d*] were true, the sentential 
accounts should have some clear explanatory advantage over the fragmentary accounts. 
There is a third, more subtle strategy for transforming my fragmentary accounts 
into sentences. It relies on the thought, common among linguists, that infinitival clauses 
themselves contain a hidden subject.40 Borrowing this thought, we could translate our 
second fragment as follows.41 
                                                
40 I am indebted to Ray Buchanan, Josh Dever, and Chris Hom here. See Liliane Haegeman [1991: 235ff] 
and Elizabeth Cowper [1992: 157ff] for standard accounts of this orthodoxy in government and binding 
theory. I am aware that there is a controversy about PRO theory in generative linguistics. But my 
impression is that even those linguists who think we can do without so-called “big PRO” (and get along fine 
with just so-called “little pro”) hold that there is a hidden subject in infinitival clauses. 
41 Since this linguistic account seems to hold only for infinitival clauses, it is not clear how it could be used 
to address the other two fragmentary explanations. For that reason I treat only the infinitival 
account.impression is that even those linguists who think we can do without so-called “big PRO” (and get 
along fine with just so-called “little pro”) hold that there is a hidden subject in infinitival clauses. 
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“[In order that] He avoids thin ice in the middle of the pond.” 
 
The idea here would be that the proper answer to the question “Why is Edmund skating 
near the edge of the pond?” is given by the that-clause picked out by the phrase ‘in order 
that’. As before, we need not concern ourselves with whether this sentence is truly 
identical in content to the infinitival clause given our second fragment. Our questions 
remain the same: (i) Is it plausible that this sentence is either identical to or gives the 
content of Edmund’s reason for skating near the edge of the pond?; (ii) Does this 
sentential explanation have any advantages over the fragmentary explanation, such that 
we should insist upon it?; and (iii) Does this transformation into sentential form do 
anything to convince us that a motivating reason must be a fact in order to have 
explanatory power? 
I see no principled reason not to allow a positive answer to question (i). Though 
one might think it odd that Edmund reference himself in giving his reason, there is no 
reason to think that with this addition we are no longer dealing with something that could 
be his reason for acting. In my view, Edmund could very well be motivated by the 
consideration that he will avoid thin ice in the middle of the pond. The answer to 
question (ii), though, remains negative, for the same reasons as mentioned previously. 
There is simply nothing to choose, vis-à-vis explanatory power, between the following two 
accounts of why Edmund is skating near the edge: 
 
“In order to avoid thin ice in the middle of the pond;” 
“[In order that] He avoids thin ice in the middle of the pond.” 
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It is not as though the mention of or reference to Edmund lends greater understanding to 
Edmund’s action, or somehow improves the account such that it better captures the 
phenomenon of Edmund’s skating near the edge (or Edmund’s reason for so skating). But 
again, if [1d*] were true, we should expect to have gained an explanatory advantage by 
introducing the second account. 
Finally, the answer to question (iii) also remains negative. There seems to me to be 
no more reason to think that “In order that” constructions are factive than there is to 
think that “In order to” constructions are factive. It is true that “In order that” 
constructions will be completed by propositions –– things that can be true or false. On the 
other hand, “In order to” constructions are not completed by a clause that 
straightforwardly accepts a truth value. But the introduction of a that-clause by itself 
creates no factive pressure at all. We saw this when we considered psychologized 
explanations. The claim that “A Φd in order that p” no more requires the truth of p than 
does the claim that “A Φd because he believed that p.” So, if we adopt [1d*] in a manner 
that allows the that-clauses in “In order that” contexts to count as explanatory sentences, 
then we show [2d*] to be implausible. 
The points raised in this section, I think, give us good reason to believe that any 
variation of AFE that insists on any kind of sentential conception of motivating reasons, 
or their explanatory role, will fail. Whether one fills out this framework by saying that 
being explanatory is being the whole set of sentences comprising the explanans, being one of 
the sentences of that whole set, or being a part of one of those sentences, it seems that any 
version of AFE resting on this framework will include at least one implausible premise. 
So, as with our investigation of “Why?” and ‘because’, we simply do not find here the 
necessary resources for mounting a successful argument for the Factive ViewM. 
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CONTRIBUTING TO AN EXPLANATION 
So far, the considered accounts of what it is for a reason to be explanatory have 
relied heavily on analyzing things that can be thought of as pieces of language –– 
questions, answers, sentences, and so on. But we can imagine a Factivist conceding, for 
instance, that I can explain Edmund’s action by saying, “For the reason that the ice in the 
middle of the pond is thin,” or “He is doing it in order to avoid skating on thin ice.” This 
can be conceded even while rejecting the idea that the false consideration that “the ice in 
the middle of the pond is thin” has been given a bonafide explanatory role. Here is 
Constantine Sandis: 
… it is people who explain actions by citing one or more agential reasons, thereby 
implying strictly that (a) the agent took p and/or q to count in favour of her action 
and (b) acted accordingly. But the explanation is not done by the reason cited… 
Even in cases where we mistakenly agree with the agent’s [false] belief at the time 
of acting and therefore (successfully) explain her action with a simple ‘she did it 
because p’ what does the explaining is not the falsehood ‘that p’ but the implied 
truth that she acted upon the belief that it was. The explanation is only non-
factive in the weak sense that a falsehood can feature in an explanatory statement 
that is true. The reason cited does not itself even contribute to the explanation. 
Just as the statement ‘this was her cat’ can, if true, explain why the animal 
followed her without the cat being an explanans, so the statement ‘this was her 
reason’ can explain why she did something, without the reason functioning as an 
explanans.42 
We can see here various rejections of some of the conceptions of the explanatory role of 
reasons we have treated so far. Clearly, Sandis thinks, conceptions such as [1a], [1b], 
[1c], and [1d] are out. What, then, is left? What seems to be left in Sandis’ treatment is 
the idea that what it would mean for a reason to play an explanatory role vis-à-vis an 
action is for the reason itself –– not merely a statement of or including the reason –– to 
contribute to the explanation of an action. 
                                                
42 See Sandis [2013: 37]. 
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With this thought, we arrive at the conception given by [1e], which leads us to yet 
another variation of AFE: 
 
[1e] A reason is the kind of thing that can contribute to the explanation of an 
action. 
[2e] Anything that can contribute to an explanation is a fact. 
[3e] Therefore, all reasons are facts. 
 
This variation of AFE is not vulnerable to many of the criticisms I have raised so far. 
There can be no worry, for example, about [2e] implying that explanatory claims or 
sentences cannot include false that-clauses; or about improper restrictions on the sort of 
thing that can be given in an answer to a certain kind of question; or about insisting that 
all explanations come in the same form. 
The real force of this variation of AFE is that it concedes that reasons claims may 
not be factive, and may also be explanatory. But, while it may be true that we can explain 
Edmund’s action, for example, with the claim “His reason for Φing is that the ice in the 
middle of the pond is thin,” this should not lead us to think that ice’s being thin is playing 
any explanatory role vis-à-vis his Φing. On the contrary, it is clear that in this 
explanation, the consideration that the ice is thin is not making an explanatory 
contribution, because it has no explanatory power of its own to contribute. We know that 
the consideration that “the ice in the middle of the pond is thin” has no explanatory 
power of its own because it could not by itself do anything to explain Edmund’s action 
(because it is patently untrue, and only facts can explain things). But anything that is 
explanatory must itself be capable of at least contributing to an explanation. Since we 
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know that reasons are explanatory, we may then infer that anything that is not the case 
cannot be a reason.43 
Or so this variation of AFE would say. While I think this is, in a way, the most 
promising way to run AFE, I think that it ultimately falls short of its target. This is 
because [2e] does not seem to me to be true. To see why, we can revisit psychologized 
explanations of characters like Edmund. This present version of AFE makes no attempt 
to prevent the claim that “the ice in the middle of the pond is thin” from entering into the 
explanation of Edmund’s skating near the edge of the pond. Indeed, we have seen that no 
one should try to impose such a prohibition, because it seems that any good reasons-
explanation of Edmund’s action must make use of the false that-clause in question. Recall 
that (most) Factivists simply opt to embed the false clause in an inoculating psychologized 
context (such as belief). Furthermore –– and more importantly –– it is clear that this 
psychological embedding does not (and is not meant to) make the content of the 
psychological state explanatorily irrelevant, because it is clear that not just any content 
can play the desired role here. The consideration about the thinness of the ice is unlike, 
for example, Edmund’s belief that George Washington was the first President of the 
United States. The latter is not poised to do anything to explain Edmund’s skating near 
the edge of the pond, but former is. What is under discussion here is, in a way, an 
example of what all action theorists are after in error cases: a way to allow untrue yet 
explanatorily relevant contents into explanations of actions without violating the axiom 
that explanation is factive. 
                                                
43 Sandis [2013] seems to arrive at a different conclusion, which is that these motivating reasons do not 
explain actions. This is perhaps of the same spirit as Alvarez [2010], who would like to make a distinction 
between motivating and explanatory reasons. Despite some of the complications noted here, I am 
somewhat more hesitant –– in view of considerations of simplicity, perhaps –– to move to a disjunctive 
account. 
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All of this, however, creates a puzzle for those who would use the version of AFE 
that has claim [1e] as a premise. Once we agree that the consideration that the ice is thin 
is, in this way, explanatorily relevant –– indeed, it seems indispensable –– vis-à-vis 
Edmund’s action, what could it amount to to claim that the consideration does not 
contribute anything to the explanation (or that it does not make an explanatory 
contribution)? What could it amount to to claim that some thing can (must?) be given in a 
good answer to the question “Why?”, be given in order to explain an action, be an 
indispensable part of any satisfying explanation, be used to explain an action, be a part of 
the explanans, and so on –– and yet also claim that this thing does not contribute to the 
explanation of the action? It is not clear that there is here a sufficiently distinguished 
notion of contributing to an explanation that can be used to drive a wedge between the 
possible explanatory roles of true and false motivating considerations. 
One thought might be that we can use a sort of isolation test, in the spirit of Moore’s 
test for whether some state or feature has intrinsic value.44 In order for something to make 
a contribution to an explanation, it must have some explanatory power of its own to 
contribute; and we can tell whether something has explanatory power of its own by 
observing whether it can, on its own, serve to (at least partly) explain the phenomenon in 
question. Nothing that is not the case can explain anything on its own, because 
explanation is factive. So, false considerations, such as the one supposed to be Edmund’s 
reason for keeping near the edge of the pond, are shown to have no explanatory power of 
their own –– and thus none to contribute to any explanation. 
                                                
44 See G. E. Moore [1903: 142, 145-157, 236, 256] and W. D. Ross [1930]. My line of resisting such tests is 
perhaps in the spirit of and Dancy [2004], and also McDowell [2013: 19], who observes that “it does not 
add to the explanatory power of explanations given by using those forms if things are as the agent relevantly 
takes them to be.” 
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This line of thought, though perhaps somewhat appealing, seems to me to miss 
most of the truth about how explanation works in general. Explanation, it seems to me, is 
holistic: the fact that some feature serves to explain something in one context may have 
little to no bearing on whether it serves to explain something (even that very same thing) 
in another context. This seems to me to be true even of ordinary causal explanation. The 
fact that it is cold outside does nothing, by itself, to explain the fire’s being lit. It is only in 
the presence of other features –– Frank’s being home from work today, Frank’s aim to 
keep the house warm, et cetera –– that its being cold has any explanatory power vis-à-vis 
the fire’s being lit. Now, together, these features provide the materials for a satisfying 
account as to why the fire is lit. There is no doubt about whether its being cold contributes 
to this explanatory account of the fire’s being lit; and the fact that its being cold would 
not, by itself, do anything to explain the fire’s being lit does nothing to affect our 
judgment that its being cold contributes to the more complex explanation. 
So it seems to me that isolation tests of the sort considered here should hold little 
to no weight in determining whether any feature or consideration can contribute to any 
particular explanation. We are then left with the thoughts that false motivating 
considerations are essential to any good explanation of action in error cases, that they 
play a crucial role in helping us to understand the phenomena in question, and that they 
can lend rational intelligibility to an action even when cited in isolation. These thoughts 
are asked to face up to a second thought, that no thing that is not the case can contribute to 
an explanation. But we are left without an analysis of contributing to an explanation which 
should convince us that, despite the crucial role they play in action explanations, false 
motivating reasons do not contribute to action explanations. Admittedly, this has all 
proceeded without my supplying any analysis of what it means to contribute to an 
explanation, such that we can positively establish that false motivating reasons are 
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capable of doing so. My own view is that all motivating considerations –– even false ones 
–– play an explanatory role with respect to actions, and I will say just what that role 
comes to momentarily. But suffice it to say, for now, that there does not seem to be much 
sense in saying that motivating reasons play an explanatory role vis-à-vis actions, and 
then proceeding to deny that motivating reasons contribute to explanations of action. In 
light of the foregoing considerations, I suspect anyway that any analysis that leaves the 
notion of contributing to an explanation close enough to the intuitive notion will render [2e] 
implausible; but any analysis sufficiently tailored to guarantee [2e] will likely ring false 
when applied to reasons, rendering [1e] implausible. Either way, though, the burden is on 
the advocate of AFE to provide us an informative analysis which precludes false 
motivating considerations from playing an explanatory role. Unless one has been 
provided, the Nonfactivist can comfortably reject AFE by the reasoning laid out in the 
previous paragraphs. So, as in the previous two subsections, I think that advocates of AFE 
will need to look elsewhere to find the resources necessary for mounting a successful 
argument for the Factive ViewM. 
FACTUAL EXPLANATIONS FOR THE NONFACTIVE VIEW: A BRIEF SKETCH 
I hope that at this point one can see a pattern emerging. We have examined at 
least five disambiguations of what it might mean for something to be explanatory. While 
to my knowledge these five disambiguations pretty well run the gamut of how things are 
discussed in the literature, it must of course be acknowledged that these disambiguations 
do not exhaust logical space; there may be other ways of disambiguating the notion of 
being explanatory, and therefore, there may be other ways of formulating AFE. But, as I 
said, one can see a pattern emerging. Advocates of AFE must disambiguate the notion of 
being explanatory. On pain of fallacy, they must proceed to revise both premises of their 
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general argument captured by [1]-[3]. But, once both premises are revised to include any 
satisfactory disambiguation, at least one of the two premises is seen to be implausible. 
While it is true that we have only examined a handful of options for the advocate of AFE, 
we have no reason to believe that any forthcoming disambiguation will deliver more 
promising results for the Factive ViewM. We have at least reached a point, then, where we 
can reasonably require as much –– the presentation of a more troubling disambiguation –
– of the Factivist adopting this strategy; and we can refuse his argument until he obliges.45  
Now, none of this shows that AFE is bound to fail (although it does perhaps 
suggest this, and I do suspect that it is bound to fail). But this all does make it difficult to 
see how the argument could succeed. It is difficult to see how adherents of the Factive 
ViewM can succeed in articulating our two axioms (REASONS-EXPLANATIONS and 
FACTIVE EXPLANATIONS) in a way that both retains their plausibility and puts them in a 
strict entailment relation to the Factive ViewM. As I hinted at the beginning of this essay, 
though, I think that at the heart of the objection is a suspicion that the Nonfactive ViewM 
is not compatible with satisfying reasons-explanations in all cases. Trying to show that the 
Nonfactive ViewM is logically inconsistent with the two axioms in error cases is just one 
way of trying to formalize this deeper suspicion. While my main objective so far has been 
to demonstrate that AFE suffers from a fatal ambiguity, I want to conclude this chapter 
by going some of the way toward putting this suspicion to rest. I will do this by briefly 
sketching the kinds of satisfying reasons-explanations of actions that are available to the 
Nonfactivist, in accord with REASONS-EXPLANATIONS and FACTIVE EXPLANATIONS. 
                                                
45 Those still feeling the pressure of this version of the argument may, like Sandis [2013: 37] reject one of 
the axioms in order to resolve the tension. But if something rightfully thought of as axiomatic is in doubt, 
and the argument thought to place it in doubt is also in doubt, it is better practice to keep the axiom and 
refuse the argument. 
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What is presented in this section will be only a sketch, to be completed once our inquiry 
in the third chapter gives us a fuller theory of explanation. 
Conveniently, most of the explanations I want to focus on are just those which 
created trouble for AFE in the previous section. To get these explanations in view, 
though, we can reset to the beginning of the essay. Edmund is going skating, and he takes 
it that THIN ICE: the ice in the middle of the pond is thin. So, when he skates, he keeps to 
the edge of the pond. Unbeknownst to Edmund, the ice in the middle of the pond is quite 
thick and presents no actual danger. We might ask Edmund –– inquiring about his reason 
for acting –– why he is keeping to the edge of the pond. Edmund would probably say 
something like, “the ice in the middle of the pond is thin.” Suppose we, as theorists, now 
ask ourselves why Edmund is keeping to the edge of the pond. The Nonfactivist can use 
the materials provided by Edmund’s answer, and is uniquely poised to do so. Here are 
some explanations available to the Nonfactivist: 
 
“He is doing it for the reason that THIN ICE.” 
“He is doing it in order to avoid thin ice.” 
“His reason is to avoid thin ice in the middle of the pond.” 
“His purpose is to avoid falling through the ice in the middle of the pond.” 
“He is aiming to avoid thin ice in the middle of the pond” 
“He is skating so as to avoid dangerously thin ice.” 
“He is doing it in view of the danger posed by thin ice.” 
“He is responding to the consideration that THIN ICE.” 
“He is doing it because his reason is that THIN ICE.” 
“He is doing it so that he will not fall through the ice.” 
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For the sake of brevity, I will not give extensive treatment here as to just how I think each 
of these explanations is working (as I said, fuller treatment will come in the third chapter). 
But I do think that in each of these accounts we have satisfied any plausible conception of 
the axiom that reasons play an explanatory role –– those suggested by [1a], [1a*], [1b*], 
[1d], and [1e], for example. These accounts explain Edmund’s action by specifying (à la 
Pryor) and making indispensable use of his reason for acting; we have explained his action 
by, one way or another, making clear and salient the consideration which motivated 
Edmund to act in the way he did. This is at least one significant sense in which the 
Nonfactive ViewM respects the axiom of REASONS-EXPLANATIONS: it reserves a legitimate 
explanatory role for motivating reasons by holding them to be that which must be 
specified in any good reasons-explanation of an action done for reasons.  
Furthermore, each of these answers seems to be in keeping with any plausible 
understanding of the axiom that explanation is factive, since each of these answers is 
true.46 One might complain that these explanations, as I have put it, proceed by way of 
falsehood. But here we must recall once more that the explanations favored by Factivists 
in these cases also proceed by way of falsehood. For the Factivist’s explanation in this case 
will be something like: 
 
“He is doing it because he believes that thin ice.” 
 
According to (most) Factivists, this psychologized explanation is a good reasons-
explanation, and we should say here that Edmund’s reason just is that he believes that 
                                                
46 Of course, it would be infelicitous for the critic of the Nonfactive ViewM to object to this claim at this 
point (that is, without some other argument as to why falsehoods cannot be reasons). 
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THIN ICE.47 But according to the Nonactive ViewM I am sketching out here, Edmund’s 
reason may be that THIN ICE; and we may present this as Edmund’s reason by specifying 
what he believes without equating his reason with his belief. In the above explanations, the 
that-clause THIN ICE specifies the content of something crucial to a good reasons-
explanation of what is doing. Due to the structural similarity between each of these 
explanations, I suspect that it will be difficult to generate any complaint about factivity 
which impugns the explanations just offered as available to the Nonfactivist, but not the 
psychologized explanations preferred by Factivists. If this remark seems to be tu quoque, it 
need not be. The point here is not that Factivists are companions in guilt with 
Nonfactivists. The point, rather, is that in error cases, every good reasons-explanation must 
proceed by way of falsehood at least in this weak sense. Since a good reasons-explanation 
will be one which helps us to see what the agent saw in doing what she did, the use of 
false clauses or considerations capturing what the agent saw is not a shared shortcoming, 
but a common strength, and the mark of a good explanation. 
So, I would say that each of the above accounts satisfies REASONS-EXPLANATIONS 
and FACTIVE EXPLANATIONS in a manner consistent with the truth of the Nonfactive 
ViewM. Indeed, each of these accounts (save for the psychologized one) is available only to 
the Nonfactivist, since what they present to be Edmund’s reason is not a fact. So the 
suspicion that the Nonfactive ViewM is incompatible with good reasons-explanations in 
error cases is ultimately unfounded. Admittedly, this has only been a very brief sketch of 
the way in which the Nonfactivist could begin to fill out an explanatory program while 
respecting the two axioms we have been discussing; and a complete view of action, 
reasons, and explanation will say much more than this. The point of providing this sketch 
                                                
47 The qualification here is in observation of those Factivists like Alvarez [2010], and perhaps Alfred Mele 
[2007] and Sandis [2013], who opt to say of characters like Edmund that there is no (motivating) reason for 
which he acts (though there is a psychologized explanatory reason). 
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was simply to show that one going narrative in action theory is not true: AFE is quite far 
from taking the Nonfactive ViewM off the table. Indeed, the Nonfactivist has good 
prospects of providing what AFE puts under scrutiny: good reasons-explanations of 
actions. In fact, there seems to be no reason to think that the Nonfactive ViewM is any 
worse off than the Factive ViewM as far as that goes. It may, of course, turn out that a 
Factivist program is in general more plausible than a Nonfactivist program in action 
theory; but this claim has certainly not been earned via AFE. Indeed, AFE has not even 
earned the Factivist an advantage vis-à-vis action explanation. What I take from all of this 
is that, all the dispute around AFE notwithstanding, the debate between Factivists and 
Nonfactivists will likely have to be settled along some other line. 
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Chapter Two:  Acting in Unbelief 
But how else might the debate be settled? For some time now, theory of acting for 
reasons has developed around three general questions. One question concerns the 
ontology of reasons: are reasons propositions, states of affairs, beliefs, desires, or 
something else? Relatedly: whatever else reasons are, are they causes? This present 
project comments on this question only negatively and somewhat indirectly, insofar as the 
first chapter offers arguments that motivating reasons need not be facts (and so therefore 
not true propositions, obtaining states of affairs, occurrent psychological states, or perhaps 
causes), and this chapter will terminate in an argument against the view that reasons are 
psychological states (such as beliefs and desires). A second question concerns the factivity 
of acting for a reason: must it be the case that r in order for A to Φ for the reason that r? 
On this second question, I hope to have offered good grounds in the previous chapter for 
holding that acting for a reason is not factive. Finally, a third issue concerns the 
explanation of actions done for reasons: what must be true of the reasons for which agents 
act, such that they can play an explanatory role vis-à-vis the actions done in response to 
them? While this issue was addressed in the previous chapter, a fuller answer will come in 
the next chapter. 
Quite recently, though, a fourth question has arisen –– although, as I will suggest, 
it has not been sufficiently separated from the three questions just mentioned. This is the 
question of what I will call the cognitive constraint on acting for a reason. Currently, the 
discussion of this issue centers around the question of whether an agent must know some 
consideration to be true in order for that consideration to be a reason for which the agent 
acts. What I call the Knowledge View answers in the affirmative. But, as I will suggest, 
that question has been considered largely as a part of the question of whether acting for a 
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reason is factive (indeed, if we have good reason to accept the Knowledge View, then to 
that extent we should reject Nonfactive ViewM I have so far defended). I think the issue of 
the cognitive constraint warrants thorough and independent discussion in its own right; 
and my first intention in this chapter is to try to initiate and set parameters for such a 
discussion. I will argue that, once we get a clear view of the question, the most plausible 
position is what I call the Belief View: in order for an agent to act for a reason, the agent 
need only believe that reason to be the case. 
The course of the chapter is as follows. In the first section, I sift through some of 
the current literature and argue that there is an independent and significant question 
about the cognitive constraint on acting for a reason. I proceed to extract from the 
literature three general views on this question: the Knowledge View, the True Belief 
View, and the Belief View. I also recount some of the initial motivating arguments for 
each of these three views, and ask whether each of these views gives a legitimate answer to 
the question of the cognitive constraint. I observe that, so far, these views seem to have 
been motivated mostly by answering the other questions mentioned earlier, and perhaps 
should not even be counted as providing a distinct view on the cognitive constraint. So, in 
sections two, I devote some time thinking about the issue of the cognitive constraint 
independent of other issues in action theory. In section two, I argue that conceptual 
analysis of the notion of acting for a reason gives us some reason to think that the Belief View 
is correct, and no reason to think that any of its competitors is correct. I also argue that an 
initial analysis of cases is strongly suggestive of the Belief View: while its competitors seem 
to suffer from counterexamples, what would be a counterexample to the Belief View turns 
out to be an incoherent case. 
The arguments from section two, I think, are enough to establish the Belief View 
as the intuitive view. But in sections three and four, I consider arguments that the 
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intuitive view is, alas, not the correct view. I first consider arguments that the Belief View 
is too weak. Specifically, I consider arguments that the factivity of acting for reasons and 
the nature of action explanation compel us toward a stronger cognitive constraint (such as 
the Knowledge View). I argue that even the best versions of these arguments should not 
compel us to give up the Belief View. In section four, I turn to arguments that even the 
Belief View is too strong. Although this possibility has not been given much consideration, 
I believe that there are examples that put pressure on even the Belief View. I argue that 
ultimately we have good theoretical reason not to weaken the cognitive constraint beyond 
belief, and that the apparently troubling examples can be explained away. 
So, I conclude that, at least until further argument is presented, we should endorse 
the Belief View on the question of the cognitive constraint. In the fifth and final section, I 
end by asking whether the truth of the Belief View should give us cause to reconsider 
some views on other questions in action theory. I answer in the affirmative, and tend to 
one example: I argue that if the Belief View is true, then the view that reasons for acting 
are psychological states (often called Psychologism) is implausible. 
CLEARING GROUND FOR THE QUESTION OF THE COGNITIVE CONSTRAINT 
The central question of this chapter is what cognitive relation some agent A must 
stand in to some reason r in order for A to perform some action Φ for the reason that r. 
Those who provide a positive answer to this question will offer what I will call a 
cognitive constraint on acting for a reason. There is a circle of current discussion 
that hovers around this issue. It deals explicitly with the suggestion that in order for A to 
Φ for the reason that r, A must know that r. Jennifer Hornsby has said, for example, that 
“a condition of Φ-ing for the reason that p, when one believes that p, is that one knows 
that p.” This position has come to be known as the Knowledge View. Against this 
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thought, some, like Jonathan Dancy, endorse the Belief View, that “one can run for that 
reason [that the train is leaving] so long as one believes the train to be leaving.”48 
Why, then –– given these explicit statements on what I am calling the cognitive 
constraint –– do I imply that this central question has not been given thorough 
independent treatment, and characterize this debate as only hovering around the question? 
The answer is in the manner in which these interlocutors frame the issue of the cognitive 
constraint. Almost without exception, the issue of the cognitive constraint has been seen 
as a part of (or depending on) either the discussion about the ontology of motivating 
reasons, the explanatory nature of reasons, or else the factivity of acting for a reason. For 
example, Hornsby’s now well-known argument for the Knowledge View is really a part of 
a larger argument for a “disjunctive” conception of acting for reasons on which “there are 
cases and cases of acting for reasons; and not all of them conform to the conception that 
philosophers have of them when they think of actions as explained by beliefs and desires.” 
The well-known argument centers around just the case we spent the previous chapter 
examining. It concerns 
Edmund who believes that the ice in the middle of the pond is dangerously thin, having 
been told so by a normally reliable friend. But Edmund’s friend didn’t want 
Edmund to skate in the middle of the pond (never mind why), so that he had told 
Edmund that the ice there was thin despite having no view about whether or not 
it actually was thin. Edmund, then, did not keep to the edge because the ice in the 
middle of the pond was thin… The fact that ice was thin does not explain 
Edmund’s acting, even though Edmund did believe that it was thin, and even 
though the fact that it was thin actually was a reason for him to stay at the edge. 
This is supposed to show that a “reason has to have registered with an agent if they are to 
have acted on it. We see now what this amounts to. A condition of Φ-ing for the reason 
that p, when one believes that p, is that one knows that p.” 
                                                
48 See See Hornsby [2008: 251] and Dancy [2011: 345], respectively. 
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The structure of this argument is not immediately apparent.49 But one thing that 
is apparent is that this argument for the Knowledge View depends almost entirely on –– if 
not simply amounts to –– an argument for a particular view of action explanation (on which 
A’s Φing cannot be explained by the reason that r unless A knows that r). This is apparent 
in that the heavy lifting in the argument is accomplished by the observation that a would-
be candidate for Edmund’s reason for acting is ruled out by its not being capable of 
figuring in a certain kind of ‘because’ claim, or of explaining Edmund’s action. There 
seems to be a move here directly from the thought that Edmund does not know that the 
ice in the middle is thin, to the claim that Edmund does not keep to the edge because the 
ice is thin. This is strongly suggestive of the thought that what Edmund’s ignorance of 
whether p precludes, in the first instance, is a certain way of explaining his action via p. 
Those who give arguments against the Knowledge View also seem to weave the 
issue together with others. Here is Jonathan Dancy, summarizing one of his recent papers 
in which he argues against the Knowledge View. 
This paper considers and rejects arguments that have been given in favor of the view that 
one can only act for the reason that p if one knows that p. This paper contrasts it 
with the view I hold, which is that one can act for the reason that p even if it is not 
the case that p. 50 
As the summary suggests, what Dancy’s project here depends on (and perhaps ultimately 
amounts to) showing that acting for a reason is not factive. The exercise of arguing 
against the Knowledge View is taken up as a part of that project. Ultimately, Dancy 
seems primarily concerned (like Hornsby) to argue for a certain framework for explaining 
                                                
49 See Hornsby [2008: 244, 251] for the passages here. 
50 See Dancy [2011: 345] 
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action. Indeed, he proceeds: “I will begin by elaborating the two fringe positions, starting 
with my own. There is more than one way of explaining an action…” 
For my part, I find this way of setting things up to be puzzling; and I invite you to 
be puzzle with me. Here is Dancy again, laying out a bit more of the terrain. 
This Discussion of the relation between knowledge and acting for a reason has become 
much more complicated recently. Here are some views which it is well worth 
keeping apart: 
1. You can act for the reason that p without knowing that p, but if you do so you are 
in breach of a norm. 
2. You cannot act for the reason that p if you do not know that p. 
3. You can only act for the reason that p if it is the case that p. Otherwise your 
reason will be something else, probably that you believe that p. 
4. You can act for the reason that p whether it is the case that p or not, so long as you 
believe that p. 
5. You can only be guided by the fact that p if you know that p. Otherwise you are 
merely treating p as a premise, and to do that you do not need to know or even 
believe that p.51 
These five views are included in a discussion ostensibly concerning what I have called the 
cognitive constraint on acting for a reason. Dancy characterizes them explicitly as being 
positions in the “discussion of the relation between knowledge and acting for a reason.” 
But only one of the five views mentioned here –– the second view –– seems to be directly 
and genuinely engaging with the question of the cognitive constraint. Indeed, it is not 
clear that there is any single question on which all five of these views provide a clear 
answer. The first view is really concerned to argue for some normative constraint on acting 
for a reason. The third view seems not to even approach the question of the cognitive 
constraint; it instead discusses the factivity of acting for a reason, as well as the ontology of 
                                                
51 See Dancy [2014: 81]. 
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reasons. The fourth view is the view discussed in the previous quote, which advocates the 
Belief View only incidentally. Finally, the fifth view does not transparently discuss acting 
for a reason (though it does discuss two other phenomena which may be similar to acting 
for a reason). 
What is the Issue of the Cognitive Constraint? 
I take the manner in which Hornsby and Dancy proceed to be representative of 
the contemporary debate concerning the cognitive constraint. Now, allow me to cancel 
any implicature that these philosophers are deeply misguided in their arguments, or that 
they are mistakenly connecting issues that are obviously unrelated:52 the issue of the 
cognitive constraint clearly is related to these other issues. At the very least, they all 
concern the nature of acting for a reason. But it is also an interesting and important 
subject in its own right; and what I am suggesting here is that it has not been treated as 
such. I am also suggesting that philosophers sometimes unwarily alternate between these 
issues; and I think that this incautiousness sometimes leads to serious mistakes. I want to 
suggest, in the interest of avoiding such mistakes, that there are a handful of questions 
which, despite their being related (some more intimately than others), are well worth 
keeping apart: 
 
1. What cognitive relation must A stand in to r in order for A to Φ for the reason that 
r? 
2. What cognitive relation must A stand in to r for r to play a role in explaining A’s 
Φing? 
                                                
52 Allow me also to cancel any implicature that Dancy is somehow responsible for these convolutions. His 
original target, I take it, was what he called Psychologism about reasons. Dancy [2000] argued against this 
view in part by arguing that a motivating reason was not a belief that something is the case, but instead, a 
thing believed to be the case. Acting for the reason that r, on this view, obviously requires believing that r. 
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3. Can A Φ for the reason that r if it is not the case that r? 
4. Can the reason that r play a role in explaining A’s Φing if it is not the case that r? 
5. Can A Φ for the reason that r if r does not favor A’s Φing? 
6. Can r be a reason for (that is, count in favor of) Φing if it is not the case that r? 
7. Can r play a role in explaining A’s Φing if r does not favor A’s Φ? 
 
It is the first question here that is of central interest to this chapter. This question is clearly 
important in its own right. But, as one can see in the passages above, this question is often 
addressed as a byproduct of answering others. 
As I said, all of these questions, though distinct, are related. So, despite the 
unfortunate state of the current discussion, theorists have managed to offer views that in 
some sense should count as answers to the first question. With some work, I think we can 
extract from Dancy’s list what are presently the three main competitors on the question of 
the cognitive constraint. The first, which is most prominently defended by Dancy himself, 
is the 
 
Belief View: in order for A to Φ for the reason that r, A must believe that r.53 
 
Of the three main views, the Belief View advocates the weakest cognitive constraint. A 
second, stronger cognitive constraint is the 
 
True Belief View: in order for A to Φ for the reason that r, A must believe that 
r, and it must be the case that r. 
                                                
53 See Dancy [2000; 2011; 2014]. For a relevant endorsement of the Belief View for reasons for belief in 
particular, see David Enoch [2010: 981ff]. 
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I think it is safe to say that this second view is held by the majority of theorists who have 
considered the nature of acting for a reason. This is perhaps partly in virtue of the Factive 
ViewM being in the clear majority. For there is another kind of Factive ViewM, called the 
 
Knowledge View: in order for A to Φ for the reason that r, A must know that r. 
 
The majority of those who endorse the Factive View, it seems to me, reject the 
Knowledge View in favor of something like the True Belief View.54 The Knowledge 
View, like the Belief View, is a minority view –– though it is not so far in the minority as 
the Belief View. Nonetheless, it has several prominent defenders, including Jennifer 
Hornsby, John Hyman, John McDowell, Peter Unger, and Timothy Williamson.55 
 It is worth clarifying that none of these views purports to be telling the whole story 
about how an agent comes to act for a reason. Each of these views only claims that the 
cognitive constraint in question places a necessary condition on acting for a reason. As 
such, the Knowledge View will entail both the True Belief View and the Belief View 
(according to the orthodoxy which tells us that “A knows that p” entails both “A believes 
that p” and “P”); and the True Belief View will entail the Belief View. 
                                                
54 At least initially, we can put those who subscribe to a picture roughly following Davidson in this camp; 
but as we will see, those who hold that motivating reasons are psychological states will ultimately have to 
reject any cognitive constraint on acting for a reason. 
55 See Hornsby [2008], Hyman [1999; 2011; 2015], McDowell [2013], Unger [1975], and Williamson 
[201X]. Littlejohn should perhaps be mentioned, along with, according to Dancy [2011: 346-348], H. A. 
Prichard [2002]. Alvarez [2010: 132fn9] seems prepared to admit that Hyman’s view might be correct, and 
thinks that her view could accommodate that possibility. 
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What’s Truth Got to Do With It? 
Despite its being the mainstream view on the issue, it strikes me as odd to take the 
True Belief View as a view about the cognitive constraint. The constraint advocated by 
the True Belief View has two aspects. The first is A’s believing that r; the second is its 
being the case that r. This second constraint is already represented in this essay as an 
independent view of its own. It is the 
 
Factive ViewM: in order for A to Φ for the reason that r, it must be the case that r. 
 
The oddity of the True Belief View qua position on the cognitive constraint is in this 
second aspect of the constraint. The oddity is that, simply put, truth is not a cognitive 
relation. In fact, it is not immediately clear what the Factive ViewM has to do with the 
question of the cognitive constraint. The above list can be of use here. Recall that the 
question of interest is just: What cognitive relation must A stand in to r in order for A to Φ 
for the reason that r? We should be quite puzzled by anyone who responded to this 
question by saying, “Well, it must be the case that r.” Indeed, one who responds in this 
way seems clearly to be providing an answer to the third question above –– the question of 
whether acting for a reason is factive. The Factive ViewM answers this question in the 
affirmative, but seems not to provide any answer to the question of the cognitive 
constraint. What is more, the Factive ViewM does not seem to even imply a particular 
answer to the question of the cognitive constraint. Indeed, the Factive ViewM seems to me 
consistent with every plausible view on the issue. Obviously, the Factive ViewM is 
inconsistent with the view that, for example, in order for A to Φ for the reason that r, A 
must falsely believe that r. But no one even entertains such a view. If we limit our focus to 
the three main views of the cognitive constraint just mentioned, it is clear that the Factive 
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ViewM does not imply the truth of any of them. We can see this easily: for any r, its being 
the case that r simply does not entail that A believes that r, that A truly believes (that is, 
has a true belief) that r, or that A knows that r. 
It is true that the truth of the Knowledge View entails the truth of the Factive 
ViewM (again, under the orthodox assumption that knowledge is factive). This might lead 
one to think that, if the Factive ViewM is true, then the Knowledge View enjoys the 
advantage of being able to explain this fact in a way that neither the Belief View nor the 
True Belief View can. Furthermore, if, as I argued in the previous chapter, the 
Nonfactive ViewM is correct, then neither the True Belief View nor the Knowledge View 
can be correct. I will address this thought in the third section here. For now, it is enough 
to observe that the Factive ViewM itself provides no answer, either directly or indirectly, 
to the question of the cognitive constraint. This observation is more dialectically 
significant than it might first appear. For we are now in a position to see clearly that True 
Belief View is really a packaging of two different views on two different questions. One of 
these is the Factive ViewM, which constrains acting for a reason by saying that the reason 
must be something that is the case. But, as we have just seen, this constraint neither is nor 
implies any cognitive constraint on acting for a reason; and we saw in the previous chapter 
that it can be given extensive treatment independent of any consideration of the cognitive 
constraint. Now, the other aspect of the True Belief View –– A’s believing that r –– does 
place a genuinely cognitive constraint on acting for a reason. But that constraint is just 
identical to the Belief View: it says that in order for A to Φ for the reason that r, A must 
believe that r. 
So the True Belief View is just the conjunction of the Factive ViewM and the 
Belief View. The Factive ViewM provides no answer to the question of the cognitive 
constraint, while the Belief View does. What all of this shows, I think, is that, so far as the 
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question of the cognitive constraint is concerned, the True Belief View just collapses into 
the Belief View. So there are really only two genuine competitors on this issue: the Belief 
View and the Knowledge View. Somewhat surprisingly then, what is often considered the 
mainstream view on the cognitive constraint should actually be excluded from the 
discussion –– and that is more or less what I will do for the remainder of this chapter. 
Before beginning my defense of the Belief View, though, I want to address one tempting 
thought about the dialectic here. Given what I have just said about the True Belief View, 
one might be tempted to also declare that the Knowledge View is also not genuinely a 
view on the cognitive constraint of acting for a reason. On what grounds? The suspicion 
might be that knowledge is not purely a cognitive state, as belief is. Recall that our question 
is: what must be going on cognitively in A such that A can Φ for the reason that r? Now 
suppose for a moment that knowledge is just justified true belief. On this conception, the 
Knowledge View can be seen as having three aspects, just as the True Belief View can be 
seen as having two aspects. One of these aspects –– truth –– is neither here nor there with 
respect to the cognitive constraint; the truth of the Factive ViewM does not imply, for 
example, that the Knowledge View is true and Belief View is false. Channeling Putnam, 
we can say: the cognitive constraint is about what is going on inside an agent’s head, and 
truth just ain’t in the head.56 
Putting the factive aspect of the Knowledge View aside, then, we can consider the 
other two aspects of the view. These aspects might be captured by what we can call the 
 
Justified Belief View: in order for A to Φ for the reason that r, A must believe 
that r, and A must have justification for believing that r. 
                                                
56 Hilary Putnam [1973: 704], of course, made his memorable remark about meaning. 
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The Justified Belief View, like the True Belief View, appears to be a package of two views. 
One view is the Belief View, which I think everyone will acknowledge as a purely 
cognitive constraint on acting for a reason –– belief surely is in the head. The other is the 
 
Justification View: in order for A to Φ for the reason that r, A must have 
justification for believing (or be justified in believing) that r. 
 
The Justification View, as with the Factive ViewM, might seem to be silent on the 
question of the cognitive constraint, at least in the following way. Supposing that we ask a 
theorist whether A is Φing for the (motivating) reason that r, we would be quite puzzled if 
the theorist pursued this inquiry thusly: “Well, let us see. Does A have justification for 
believing that r?” At least initially, we might think this theorist has changed the subject. It 
is of course possible to hold that if A is not justified in believing that r, then A cannot Φ for 
the reason that r without breaching some norm of action. This seems to be the position of 
John Hawthorne and Jason Stanley, for instance.57 But in considering this thought we 
shift away from the issue of the cognitive constraint toward another issue (perhaps that 
identified by the first view on Dancy’s earlier list). Furthermore, it is clear that one can 
bear a number of significant cognitive relations to r (including belief) without having 
justification for standing in that relation to r. We can generalize here, and observe that 
there are a number of significant cognitive states (belief included) that simply contain no 
normative element whatsoever. Finally, it is not clear that having justification is itself a 
cognitive state. So we might be inclined to think that justification, like truth, just ain’t in 
                                                
57 See Hawthorne and Stanley [2008]. 
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the head –– and so it cannot possibly be a necessary element of any cognitive constraint on 
acting for a reason. 
The Justification View, then, does not obviously provide a a cognitive constraint 
on acting for a reason, and it is separable from the only aspect of the Knowledge View 
that does clearly provide such a constraint (the Belief View). Does this not create a 
predicament for the Knowledge View similar to that of the True Belief View? After all, 
we are now in a position to say that the Knowledge View is really a package of three 
views –– the Factive ViewM, the Belief View, and the Justification View –– each of which 
seem to place three different constraints on acting for a reason. But neither the Factive 
ViewM nor the Justification View seem to provide cognitive constraints on acting for a 
reason. Should we not then say, just as we did with the True Belief View, that so far as 
the question of the cognitive constraint is concerned, the Knowledge View really just 
collapses into the Belief View? 
I do not think that things are quite that simple. I offer two softening considerations 
that I believe should allow the Knowledge View to stay in the game, as it were. The first 
softening consideration I offer is that this predicament for the Knowledge View, as I have 
raised it, might rely on adopting a certain view of epistemic justification. The Factive 
ViewM seems uncontroversially separable from the Belief View in a way that the 
Justification View is not. Whether my belief is true seems to be answerable to something 
over and above what is going on in me cognitively. But it might not be so for whether my 
belief is justified. On certain views of epistemic justification, whether my belief is justified 
might be answerable only to other cognitive facts about me; I need no cooperation from 
the external world in order to have a justified belief. Justification might be just in the head. 
If this is true, then it is not clear that the Justified Belief View is not a genuine answer to 
the question of the cognitive constraint. 
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The second softening consideration I offer is that this predicament for the 
Knowledge View, as I have raised it, relies on analyzing knowledge as justified true belief. 
But this once-orthodox view has fallen somewhat out of favor, with some going so far as 
to deny that knowledge has any true analysis. Perhaps it is true, as Williamson says, that 
Knowledge is merely a state of mind. This claim may be unexpected. On the standard 
view, believing is merely a state of mind but knowing is not, because it is factive: 
truth is a non-mental component of knowing. 
Factive mental states are important to us as states whose essence includes a 
matching between mind and world, and knowing is important to us as the most 
general factive stative attitude. 
The factive mental states are as genuinely mental as any states are.58 
 
On this view, the factivity (and perhaps the justification) of knowledge is constitutive of the 
kind of mental state that it is. If this conception of knowledge is correct, then it would be 
incorrect to characterize the Knowledge View as merely cobbling together the Factive 
ViewM, Belief View, and Justification View. Rather than being a kind of belief, knowledge 
might be a genuinely cognitive state in its own right, completely distinct from belief. This 
can be true, of course, even if “A knows that p” entails that “A believes that p”. A similar 
remark applies to justification. Even those who deny that there is any true analysis of 
knowledge will be quite tempted to hold that claims of the form “A knows that p” entail 
claims of the form “A has justification for believing that p.” So the truth of the Knowledge 
View will rest on the truth of both the Justification View and the Belief View. But this 
does not show that knowledge is a kind of justified belief. For it might be that justification 
and belief are partly constitutive of knowledge, which is a mental state, genuinely cognitive 
in its own right. 
                                                
58 See Williamson [2000: 20-21, 39,  53] for the three passages here. 
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In any case, the insight here is that there is a legitimate conception of knowledge 
on which the strategy of reducing the Knowledge View, vis-à-vis the cognitive constraint, 
to the Belief View would be hopeless. It is difficult to find similar grounds on which to 
resist the thought that the True Belief View is just a cobbling together of the Factive 
ViewM and the Belief View. In short, we should not like our treatment of the cognitive 
constraint to prejudge a controversial issue in the metaphysics of epistemology. In that 
spirit, I think that we should count the Knowledge View as offering a genuinely cognitive 
constraint on acting for a reason. 
 Even setting these softening considerations aside, there is anyway an important 
question about whether the Knowledge View is true, and whether there is any argument 
to advantage it over and above the Belief View. Furthermore, there is a strong current of 
thought in the literature that the Belief View and the Knowledge View are opposed on 
some philosophical question, even if it is not exactly the one I have identified here. We can 
certainly wade into that debate while registering our doubt that there is any single 
question on which the two views are directly opposed.59 With all of this in mind, I think 
that, while one might reasonably suspect that the Knowledge View is something of an 
imposter in the conversation on the cognitive constraint, it would be unreasonable to 
exclude it from the debate in the same way that I have excluded the True Belief View. 
                                                
59 I have not addressed the suggestion that the two views might be opposed on the truth of the Justification 
View. But the dialectical situation there is the same as it is with respect to the Factive ViewM. The 
Knowledge View entails the Justification View; but the truth of the Justification View does not entail the 
falsity of the Belief View. Indeed, the possibility of the Justified Belief View demonstrates this. So, while the 
Knowledge View insists on a normative constraint on acting for a reason, the Belief View is silent on such 
constraints. It seems to me much too strong to take this as grounds for declaring the two views to be directly 
opposed on the general question of the cognitive constraint. 
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AN INITIAL DEFENSE OF THE BELIEF VIEW 
So far I have tried to clear some ground around the issue of the cognitive 
constraint on acting for a reason, so that we can both see it as a significant and distinct 
issue, and also get a clear view of it. As I will further explain in this section, the issue 
homes in on a particular question about the nature of motivation: what cognitive relation 
must an agent bear to some consideration r in order to be motivated by that consideration 
to act? I have suggested that discussion of this question has often been, perhaps unwarily, 
subsumed under discussions about the factivity of acting for a reason and the nature of 
action explanation. An unfortunate result of this is that there may be some views in the 
literature (such as the True Belief View) which are merely masquerading as views on the 
cognitive constraint. These initial considerations have lead me to believe that the real 
debate over the cognitive constraint is one between the Belief View and the Knowledge 
View. In this section I will try to lend greater clarity to this debate by approaching the 
issue more directly. I begin by giving an initial and novel defense of the Belief View. My 
strategy is quite simple: I argue that both conceptual analysis of acting for a reason and a 
simple examination of cases establishes the Belief View as the intuitively correct view of 
the cognitive constraint. 
Acting for a Reason: The Very Idea 
Just as it was in considering the question of whether acting for a reason is factive, 
in looking for a cognitive constraint on acting for a reason it seems sensible to devote 
some time to examining the notion of acting for a reason. Here we can make use of some 
of the work done in the previous chapter. What I aim to show here is that, of the standard 
analyses of acting for a reason, none are suggestive of the Knowledge View, and some are 
suggestive of the Belief View. 
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I would like to start with the notion of responding to a consideration (where, as 
before, a “consideration” is understood as a thing considered). Acting for a reason is, inter 
alia, a way of responding to a consideration. What can we say of cognitive constraints on 
responding to a consideration? Now, some might find it immediately transparent that one 
cannot respond to anything that one does not believe to be the case, and also that one can 
respond to a consideration that one does not know to be the case. But a look at an 
example might shed some light on the issue for those to whom this is not so transparent.  
We can return to the example involving your friend Aria, who has called off her wedding. 
You tell me that Aria has called off the wedding, and I ask why. You might tell me that 
she has done it in view of (or in response to) her fiancé’s unfaithfulness, or alternatively, 
that she is responding to (or doing it in view of) the consideration that her fiancé has been 
unfaithful. Now it seems to me obvious that in saying any of these things, you are not 
saying or implying that Aria knows that her fiancé has been unfaithful. What you have told 
me entails absolutely nothing about what Aria does or does not know. For those in doubt, 
consider how natural and unproblematic it would be for me to respond to you by asking, 
“Well, does she know that he was unfaithful? How does she know?” If knowing that r was 
somehow conceptually connected to responding to the consideration that r, we would 
expect such questions to at least strike us as infelicitous. But they clearly do not strike us 
so. Saying that Aria is responding to the consideration that her fiancé has been unfaithful 
does, however, seem to presume or imply that Aria believes that her fiancé has been 
unfaithful. While I could unproblematically ask you whether Aria knows that her fiancé 
has been unfaithful, it would be nearly incoherent for you to continue your answer to me 
by saying, “No; she does not know. In fact, she does not even believe that her fiancé has 
been unfaithful. Nonetheless, that consideration has come to her attention, and this is 
how she is responding to it.” 
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So I think it is clear that while there might be a belief constraint on responding to a 
consideration, there does not seem to be any knowledge constraint on the phenomenon. It is 
also clear that acting for a reason is a way of responding to a consideration. Though I 
think this is suggestive, it does not strictly follow that the Belief View is true and the 
Knowledge View is false. That is because although acting for a reason reason seems 
clearly to be a way of responding to a consideration, acting for a reason and responding to 
a consideration are not identical:  acting for a reason might be something more than just 
responding to a consideration. Consider, for example, that one can respond to a 
consideration by ignoring or rejecting it; but ignoring and rejecting some thing seem to 
preclude treating that thing as a reason (and perhaps also believing that thing to be the 
case). 
What could we add to the notion of responding to a consideration to get what we think 
of as acting for a reason? A natural strategy here would be to specify either the kind of 
response or the kind of consideration that is peculiar to acting for a reason. We saw in the 
previous chapter that a common conception concerning the latter is that when A Φs for 
the reason that r, r is a consideration A takes to favor A’s Φing. So we might think that, 
whatever else acting for a reason is, it is responding to a consideration taken to favor the action in 
question. Unfortunately, I think that adding this qualification to our analysis does not do 
much to clarify the debate concerning the cognitive constraint. Take the consideration 
that rain: it is raining. Now, I take it that we all think, ceteris paribus, that the consideration 
that rain favors bringing an umbrella. But surely one need not know that rain in order to 
either take it to be the case rain, or to take it that rain favors bringing an umbrella. 
Neither does it seem that one needs to believe that rain in order to take it that rain favors 
bringing an umbrella. Indeed, it seems to me that one could even believe that it is not the 
 82 
case that rain while still taking it that rain favors bringing an umbrella.60  I know of no 
way to prove this conclusively, but I do think an analogy to logical implication is 
instructive here. Placing considerations in favoring relations seems to me to be in some 
ways similar placing them in implication relations. One can take it that p entails q without 
knowing or believing that p –– indeed, one can do this while believing or knowing that not 
p. It seems to me that the ability to take one consideration as favoring another is similarly 
insensitive to these cognitive facts. 
Now, if we are not careful here, these considerations might seem to mount the 
beginning of an argument against the Belief View. This provides an opportunity to say 
more about what I take responding to a consideration to amount to. Earlier I suggested that 
one might respond to the consideration that r by rejecting or not believing that r; this may 
seem to show that responding to a consideration does not entail believing that 
consideration to be the case. But that would be to move a bit too hastily. For our notion 
of responding to a consideration to approximate the notion of acting for a reason, we 
need it to be such that the consideration itself motivates the response in question. Now, 
what could motivate us to reject, for example, the consideration that rain? It would be 
quite a confusing character who was motivated by the consideration that rain itself to 
believe that it is not the case that rain. Instead, someone who rejects this consideration is 
probably motivated by, for example, how things look outside, what the weather report 
said, or some other such. This seems to me to be so even for considerations that are 
necessarily, self-evidently, or analytically false. What considerations motivate me to reject 
the consideration that two and two make five? Perhaps it is more tempting here to say 
that the motivation comes from the consideration itself: I consider the proposition, and 
                                                
60 Perhaps some want to say that when one believes that it is not the case that rain, one takes it that if it were 
the case that rain, then the consideration rain that would favor bringing an umbrella. I address this difference 
in the fourth chapter. 
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nothing else is required for me to be moved to reject it. But I think it is more plausible to 
say that we are motivated to reject such considerations in view of their incoherence, 
severe implausibility, or seeming incorrectness. Such features of these considerations (or 
the consideration that these considerations have such features or properties) are of course 
distinct from the considerations themselves. It is not as though, for example, its being 
necessarily false that two and two make five just is the consideration that two and two make 
five. Furthermore, it remains in such cases that I need not know, for example, that it is 
necessarily false that two and two make five in order to reject that two and two make five 
in response to the consideration that it is necessarily false. At most, I need believe it to be 
necessarily false. So I think that the notion of responding to a consideration actually 
provides us resources to more ambitiously say that the truth of the Belief View is 
suggested here, while the Knowledge View is positively not suggested. 
The earlier analogy between logical implication and the favoring relation perhaps 
brings us closer to another conception of acting for a reason which we considered in the 
first chapter. This is the conception of treating something as a premise. We saw earlier, as 
Hyman rightly remarked, that it need not be the case that r in order for A to treat r as a 
premise in practical reasoning or deliberation. Is there any connection between this 
notion and the issue of the cognitive constraint on acting for a reason? Here again is 
Hyman, invoking at once the notion of treating something as a premise and the notion of 
responding to a consideration taken to favor a response: 
A consideration that makes an action appropriate, from the agent’s point of view, need 
not be true. But it need not be something the agent believes to be true either. It is 
helpful to call it a “premise” because it is clear that we can act on premises we do 
not believe. For example, I can act on the premise that a student felt too ill to 
come to a lecture––in other words, I can assume or accept that the student felt too 
ill––even if I do not believe this to be true. 61 
                                                
61 See Hyman [2011: 360]. 
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I think Hyman is right that if acting for a reason is merely treating a consideration as a 
premise in reasoning, then the Belief View (and, a fortiori, the Knowledge View) seems 
implausible. Suppose I am wondering whether to carry an umbrella today. I might reason 
as follows: if rain, then I should carry an umbrella. Cleary, one can reason in this way 
without knowing or even believing that rain. It seems true, then, that the conception of 
acting for a reason as treating something as a premise in reasoning advantages neither the 
Belief View nor the Knowledge View. In my view, though, neither does this conception 
give us reason to doubt either the Belief View or the Knowledge View. Not every bit of 
reasoning done prior to acting straightforwardly reveals something about what one’s 
reason for acting  –– the consideration that motivated one to act –– is. For example, I 
might reason that I should carry an umbrella if it is the case that rain, but then look 
outside and notice that it is not the case that rain. I might then proceed to carry an 
umbrella to give me shelter from the sun. It would be absurd in this case to suggest that I 
am carrying an umbrella for the reason that rain, even if it would be sensible to say that 
rain was a consideration I treated as a premise in my deliberation. Hyman’s insight about 
cognitive constraints (or lack thereof) on treating something as a premise, then, do not 
seem to extend to the subject of acting for a reason. Indeed, he seems to recognize this, as 
he proceeds to argue for the Knowledge View despite his remarks about treating a 
consideration as a premise. 
 Even though we have only examined a few analyses of acting for a reason, I think 
we have done enough to spot a trend. Such analyses will sometimes reveal belief that r to 
be necessary, and will never reveal knowledge that r to be necessary, for acting for the 
reason that r. At the very worst for the Belief View, such analyses may come out neither 
helping nor hurting either view. We could examine other analyses of acting for a reason, 
such as being motivated by a consideration, or even doing that action taken to be favored by a 
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consideration. But I think that they will all continue this trend. Conceptual analysis of acting 
for a reason provides some reason to hold that the Belief View is correct, and that the 
Knowledge View is incorrect. 
Two Limiting Cases 
So I think an initial analysis of the notion of acting for a reason leads us to think 
that the Belief View is more plausible than the Knowledge View. I want in this section to 
solidify the intuitive case for the Belief View by looking at a few examples. I think that a 
quick examination of cases reveals what seem to be clear counterexamples to the 
Knowledge View, and no clear counterexamples to the Belief View. Indeed, what would 
be a counterexample to the Belief View looks to be an impossible case. 
Before looking at what I want to hold up as two limiting cases, I want to issue a 
reminder of what happened in the last section. Despite my insistence that we should try to 
set aside the question of factivity when thinking about the cognitive constraint, there are 
some connections between the two which cannot be ignored. First, the truth of the 
 
Knowledge View: in order for A to Φ for the reason that r, A must know that r. 
 
entails the truth of the 
 
Factive ViewM: in order for A to Φ for the reason that r, it must be the case that r. 
 
Second, on the other side of the same coin, the truth of the Nonfactive ViewM entails the 
falsity of the Knowledge View. I mention this because we saw in the previous chapter that 
the initial conceptual analysis and casuistry is heavily suggestive of the Nonfactive ViewM. 
 86 
So, in addition to any intuitive burdens incurred by the Knowledge View qua view on the 
cognitive constraint, it seems the Knowledge View incurs intuitive burdens qua view on 
the factivity of acting for a reason. 
That brief interjection aside, here is a useful case for thinking about the 
Knowledge View independent of the Factive ViewM. 
 
RACIST JUDGE: Judge Jerry is deliberating about whether Gil is guilty of a crime. 
Gil did indeed commit the crime in question. Jerry arrives at the verdict that Gil is 
guilty. Although he is quite confident –– nearly certain –– in his verdict, his 
having arrived at this verdict is ultimately owed to an unjustified prejudice against 
people of Gil’s race. This prejudice influenced Jerry to evaluate the evidence as 
indicating Gil’s guilt, even though the evidence did not in fact indicate this. Jerry 
is now tasked with sentencing Gil, and he takes it that the appropriate sentence for 
the crime in question is two years in prison. So, Jerry sentences Gil to two years in 
prison. 
 
Now, even without doing any sophisticated theorizing, I think that it is quite natural to 
describe this case as one wherein Jerry sentences Gil to two years in prison at least partly 
for the reason that HE DID IT!: Gil committed a crime the legally appropriate sentence for 
which is two years in prison. In case there is any doubt about this intuitive thought, 
though, we can call upon our previous analyses of acting for a reason. It also seems 
correct to say, for example, that Jerry sentences Gil to two years in light of the consideration 
that HE DID IT!; that in giving Gil two years, Jerry is responding to the consideration that 
he did it!; that Jerry takes the consideration that HE DID IT! to favor sentencing Gil to two 
years; that in deliberating about what sentence to hand down, Jerry treats the 
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consideration that HE DID IT! as a premise; and that Gil is motivated by the consideration 
that HE DID IT! to sentence Gil to two years. 
So, we can say that Jerry acts for the reason that HE DID IT!. Jerry’s belief that HE 
DID IT! is clearly unjustified, though, since it is the result of racist prejudices. So Jerry does 
not know that HE DID IT!, since, if he did know that HE DID IT!, his belief that HE DID IT! 
would be justified. However, this lack of justification seems not to have any practical 
importance. Indeed, we can imagine a reporter questioning Jerry about his perceived 
harsh sentence and asking Jerry why he sentenced Gil to two years in prison. He would 
likely respond with some appeal to the consideration that HE DID IT!. Expressing some 
doubt, the reporter might ask Jerry, “But how do you know that Gil is guilty?” to which 
Jerry might respond, “Well, I may not know that he is guilty; but that is what the evidence 
leads me to believe –– and anyway that is why I handed down the sentence that I did.” I 
take it that we would all accept this response from Jerry without much fuss. The response 
makes sense, even to those of us who know all the details of the case (including Jerry’s 
racism); no principles of charity or interpretative gymnastics are required here. Jerry is 
speaking plain English, and we all understand him. 
Suppose now that we remove from the case that Jerry’s belief that HE DID IT! is the 
result of unjustified prejudices (but is instead the result of, for example, Jerry’s training in 
jurisprudence and legally evaluating evidence). However, suppose that two eyewitnesses 
to the crime were crucial to Jerry’s finding the case the way he did. Now, though these 
eyewitnesses are extremely reliable (they have never been wrong before, we can suppose), 
they lied on the stand (never mind why) in saying that Gil committed the crime. None of 
this makes any difference. It is not as though our judgment that Jerry acts for the reason 
that HE DID IT! is now either strengthened or weakened. These changes do not, for 
example, affect our ability see how Jerry could have been motivated by the consideration 
 88 
that HE DID IT!, or our ability to understand his sentencing by appeal to the consideration 
that HE DID IT!. Whether present or absent, the justification of Jerry’s belief that HE DID 
IT! seems to be neither here nor there when considering whether Jerry acted for the 
reason that HE DID IT!. 
But all of this is at odds with the Knowledge View. If the Knowledge View is 
correct, then Jerry could not have acted for the reason that HE DID IT!. So, if the 
Knowledge View is correct, we certainly cannot accept Jerry’s report that he sentenced 
Gil for the reason that HE DID IT!. Even more striking, though, is that if the Knowledge 
View is correct, then “A Φs for the reason that r” entails or implies “A knows that r.” If 
that were the case, then Jerry’s response to the reporter would not just be false or 
inaccurate –– it is also incoherent, and should strike us as unintelligible, since we know 
that Jerry does not know that HE DID IT!. But as we just saw, Jerry’s response seems 
sensible, and even correct. It certainly does not even approach anything like 
unintelligibility. Why, then, do we see remarks to the contrary in the literature? 
According to Peter Unger, for example, “It is inconsistent to say ‘Ralph’s reason was that 
Fred’s hat was wet, but he wasn’t absolutely certain that it was.”62 
We can set aside the idiosyncratic remark about certainty, and suppose only that 
Unger had made his remark about knowledge. I think that we can treat such claims in 
just the same way that we treated in the previous chapter claims that it is paradoxical to 
say, “A’s reason was that r, but it is not the case that r.” In my view, there is nothing 
unintelligible, incoherent, or even confusing about saying “A’s reason for Φing is that r, 
but A does not know that r.” If there were anything approaching a paradox here, we 
                                                
62 See Unger [1975: 209]. I expect Williamson [201X], and perhaps also Hyman and Hornsby, would say 
something similar (perhaps replacing the notion of certainty with that of knowledge). 
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would expect the conceptual analysis surrounding the cognitive constant to bear that out. 
But the conceptual analysis does not bear it out. 
Perhaps, as with the issue of factivity, there remains an air of paradox about 
saying that “My reason for Φing is that r, but I do not know that r.” I confess that I have 
a hard time catching wind of this air, but let us grant it anyway. The air of paradox can 
be explained away, it seems to me, in a manner similar to the air of paradox surrounding 
claims of the form, “My reason for Φing is that r, but not r.” The puzzlement, if there is 
any, is owed to the fact that, “My reason is that r” implies that I believe that r. But 
asserting that “I do not know that r,” à la Moore’s paradox, is at odds with asserting that 
r. This might be due to the fact that the assertion that r strongly implies that I believe that 
r, and there is a slight awkwardness (even if it is only slight) about saying that “I believe 
that r, but I do not know that r.” So, when I say that, “I do not know that r,” there is some 
pressure not to assert either that r or that I believe that r; but if I say that, “My reason is 
that r,” this strongly suggests that I believe that r. If there is any puzzlement around 
remarks of the form, “My reason is that r, but I do not know that r,” then, it seems to me 
attributable to a tension found downstream in reports about what I believe to be the case. 
If this explanation seems to be less satisfying than the explanation of the air of paradox 
about claims of the form, “My reason is that r, but not r,” that is likely due to the fact that 
there is not as strong of an implicature from “I do not know that r” to “I do not believe 
that r” as there is from “It is not the case that r” to “I do not believe that r.” But to the 
extent that we feel that the implicature is less strong here, I suspect that we are also less 
inclined to think there is any air of paradox about claims of the form, “My reason is that 
r, but I do not know that r.” That being so, even if we think there is less of an air of 
paradox here, my conjecture that the air of paradox is due to the generation of 
apparently inconsistent belief reports may stand. 
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All of this leads me to think that the case of RACIST JUDGE (and its variation in 
which Jerry is not racist) is a clear counterexample to the Knowledge View. It is worth 
noting that the case also seems to be a counterexample to what I earlier called the 
Justification View: the view that in order for A to Φ for the reason that r, A must have 
justification for believing that r. Indeed, one might think that RACIST JUDGE is a 
counterexample to the Knowledge View in virtue of being a counterexample to the 
Justification View. Note that this may be so even if, as some believe, that knowledge 
cannot be analyzed into parts, one of which is justification. Even those who believe that 
knowledge is primitive or unanalyzable will hold that if A knows that p, then A has 
justification for believing that p. Since Jerry concludes that HE DID IT! via a biased belief-
formation process, his belief that HE DID IT! is not justified. Indeed, it is stipulated in the 
example that the evidence does not support the claim that Gil is guilty. But again, this 
seems not to matter to what we can say about what Jerry’s reason for acting is. It seems 
correct to say that Jerry acts for the reason that HE DID IT!, even though he has no good 
reason for believing that HE DID IT!. Furthermore, even if Jerry did have sufficient reason 
to believe that HE DID IT!, it is not as though this addition would somehow put to rest any 
suspicions that his reason was not really that HE DID IT!. 
I think such cases put a general kind of pressure on the Knowledge View. The 
pressure is that it is not clear whether any significant, epistemically good connection to a 
reason will be necessary for acting for that reason. Cases like RACIST JUDGE, though, 
clearly do not put any pressure on the Belief View. Jerry clearly believes that HE DID IT!, 
even if he does not know that HE DID IT!. A counterexample to the Belief View would 
have to be one in which A Φs for the reason that r but does not believe that r (showing 
that the Belief View fails to express a true necessary condition on acting for a reason). 
Here is a case that fits the bill. 
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UNBELIEVING JUDGE: Judge Jerry is presiding over the sentencing phase of Gil’s 
trial, but has neither delivered the guilty verdict in the previous phase nor come to 
any belief concerning whether Gil committed the crime in question.63 Two years 
in prison is the legally appropriate sentence for the crime in question. So, Jerry 
sentences Gil to two years. 
 
Without doing any sophisticated theorizing, I find it difficult to interpret this story in 
certain ways. Suppose we add to it, again imagining that a reporter is interviewing Jerry 
about his perceived harsh sentence. She asks him why he delivered the two-year sentence, 
and how he knows that Gil committed the crime. We could certainly understand Jerry if 
he responded, “Look, I am not sure whether HE DID IT!. In fact, I have no view on the 
matter. Nonetheless, he was convicted of the crime, and I was charged with administering 
the appropriate sentence for a person convicted of such a crime.” However, we would 
have a hard time understanding Jerry if he responded, “Oh, I do not know whether HE 
DID IT!. In fact, I do not even believe that HE DID IT!. I have no view about that. But 
nonetheless, I sentenced him to two years for the reason that HE DID IT!.” Indeed, even if 
Jerry did say something like this, I think we would be forced, out of charity, to try to 
interpret him as meaning the first response (which does not imply that he believes that Gil 
committed the crime). Alternatively, we might try to understand both answers as Jerry’s 
telling us that his reason for giving the two-year sentence was that Gil was convicted of a crime 
the legally appropriate sentence for which is two years in prison. In any case, as the 
audience of Jerry’s statements, we would likely go to great lengths to avoid supposing that 
                                                
63 If for some reason this strains the imagination, we could suppose, for example, that Jerry is taking over 
for another judge, who already issued guilty verdict for Gil. 
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Jerry is saying anything of the form, “My reason is that r, but I do not believe that r.” For 
such an assertion is near incomprehensible, but we feel that we understand perfectly well 
what Jerry is doing. 
Though this is only one case, I think it demonstrates a pre-theoretical bent toward 
the Belief View. If necessary, we can, as we did before, revisit different conceptual 
analyses of acting for a reason. I do not think we can intelligibly say, for example, that 
“Jerry is responding to the consideration that HE DID IT!, but Jerry does not believe that 
HE DID IT!.” Now, there is nothing peculiar about this case, and it has the ingredients 
required for concocting a counterexample to the Belief View taken as a necessary 
condition on acting for a reason. I think this should lead us to believe that it will be at 
least difficult, if not impossible, to find a counterexample to the Belief View. 
The argument of this section is built on two claims. The first is that intuitive 
conceptual analysis of the notion of acting for a reason provides no support for the 
Knowledge View, but it does lend some support to the Belief View. The second is that a 
brief examination of cases finds apparent counterexamples to the Knowledge View, but 
no counterexample to the Belief View –– indeed, this examination suggests that a 
counterexample to the Belief View will not be found. On the basis of these two claims, I 
think we should conclude that the Belief View is the intuitive view on the issue of the 
cognitive constraint; and it should be the jumping off point for further theorizing on the 
issue. 
ACTING IN IGNORANCE 
With this in mind, the next two sections of this chapter will ask whether there are 
any arguments compelling enough to draw us away from the Belief View –– either 
toward the Knowledge View, toward some other view discovered along the way, or 
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toward agnosticism about the cognitive constraint. I will take these suggestions in turn; 
and in this section, I will address three arguments in favor of the Knowledge View. The 
first of these amounts to the suggestion that the Knowledge View has a theoretical 
advantage over the Belief View, since it can explain (while the Belief View cannot 
explain) why acting for a reason is factive. The second of these comes to the claim that in 
cases where A does not know that r, we cannot explain A’s Φing by supposing that A Φs 
for the reason that r. The third, and in my view strongest, argument is that the Belief 
View does not have theoretical space for what John McDowell has called acting in the light 
of a fact. I think that all three of these arguments fail, and so advocates of the Knowledge 
View are without compelling argument in their favor. There is no good argument that it 
is impossible to, as I will say, act in ignorance. 
What’s Truth Got to Do With It? 
As I illustrated in the first section, many theorists take the debate over the 
cognitive constraint to be wrapped up in the debate about whether acting for a reason is 
factive. This is the debate about, whether, in order for A to Φ for the reason that r, it must 
be the case that r. The Factive ViewM answers this question in the affirmative, while the 
Nonfactive ViewM answers in the negative. Those who endorse the Knowledge View are 
often tempted to think of the Nonfactive ViewM as an opposing view, while those who 
endorse the Belief View are often tempted to think of the Factive ViewM as an opposing 
view. But, as I demonstrated earlier, the opposition here is not completely 
straightforward. Neither the truth nor the falsity of the Belief View entails either the truth 
or falsity of either the Factive ViewM or the Nonfactive ViewM; and neither the truth nor 
the falsity of either the Factive ViewM or the Nonfactive ViewM entails the truth or the 
falsity of the Belief View. Furthermore, the truth of the Factive ViewM does not entail 
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either the truth or falsity of the Knowledge View; and the falsity of the Knowledge View 
does not entail either the truth or falsity of either the Factive ViewM or the Nonfactive 
ViewM. 
As I also illustrated, though, these issues are not entirely unrelated. The truth of 
the Knowledge View does entail the truth of the Factive ViewM; and the truth of the 
Nonfactive ViewM entails the falsity of the Knowledge View. Notice, though, that 
notwithstanding these connections, there are no resources for a deductive argument 
straight from a position on the factivity of acting for a reason to the truth of the 
Knowledge View. The argument would have to be more indirect than that. I think there 
is one such line of reasoning that could be thought to support the Knowledge View. The 
reasoning goes as follows. Suppose the Factive ViewM is true. The Knowledge View 
contains an explanation of this fact, while the the Belief View does not. So, the 
Knowledge View has an explanatory advantage over the Belief View, ceteris paribus. 
This line of reasoning, which I will call the Argument from the Factivity of 
Acting for a Reason (hereafter, “AFAR”), might seem initially plausible or tempting to 
some. But AFAR suffers from several serious problems which, in my view, prevent it from 
being an argument we should take seriously. I will address only three. The first, and most 
obvious, is that the truth of the Factive ViewM is contentious; but AFAR only weighs in 
favor of the Knowledge View if the Factive ViewM is true. To the extent that the Factive 
ViewM is controversial, the force of AFAR is to that extent weakened. I argued in the 
previous chapter that we should think that the Factive ViewM is independently 
implausible. Furthermore, if the Nonfactive ViewM is correct, some might even think that 
the line of reasoning represented by AFAR works against the Knowledge View. For, since 
the Knowledge View entails the Factive ViewM, one who finds the Nonfactive ViewM 
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more plausible might have good reason to privilege the Belief View over the Knowledge 
View. 
The second problem with AFAR is that, although the Belief View does not come 
loaded up, as it were, with an explanation of the truth of the Factive ViewM, it is certainly 
not incompatible with the Factive ViewM; nor is it in principle incapable of being 
supplemented with an explanation of the truth of the Factive ViewM, or even with the 
Factive ViewM itself. The possibility of the True Belief View –– the mainstream view in 
action theory –– is clear evidence of this. So, even if the Factive ViewM were true, and 
there were some explanatory advantage to be gained by the theory accounting for this 
fact, it is unclear that this would immediately create an explanatory advantage for the 
Knowledge View not enjoyed by the Belief View. 
The third, and in my view most glaring, problem is that AFAR is predicated on 
the assumption that the Belief View and the Knowledge View are otherwise equally 
plausible. But we just saw that the Belief View seems to be the more intuitively appealing 
view. The fact that the truth of Knowledge View would explain the truth of the Factive 
ViewM is surely not reason enough to abandon the intuitive view –– especially since the 
Belief View is perfectly compatible with both with other theories that might explain the 
truth of the Factive ViewM, and with the Factive ViewM itself. It seems, then, that AFAR 
must be accompanied by other argument for the Knowledge View if it is to have a real 
impact on the debate. 
 This is an opportune time to put a bow on a dialectical point I began to develop 
earlier. In the first section of this chapter, I complained that the issue of the cognitive 
constraint was problematically intertwined with the issue of the factivity of acting for a 
reason. We are now in an even better position to see why this is intertwining is 
problematic. The question of the factivity of acting for a reason has only a shaky 
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connection to the question of the cognitive constraint; and what shaky connection there is 
does not seem to be one that can be of any help to the Knowledge View. The only clear 
move from the former issue to the latter is from the truth of the Nonfactive ViewM to the 
falsity of the Knowledge View –– but of course, that is of no use to advocates of the 
Knowledge View. Although the truth of the Knowledge View does entail the truth of the 
Factive ViewM, this connection does not itself provide strong evidence (if any) in favor of 
the Knowledge View or against the Belief View. Two subsections of this chapter have 
asked about the issue of the cognitive constraint: What’s truth got to do with it? I hope I 
have at this point illustrated the rhetorical force of this question –– or at least that, if there 
is a serious answer to the question, that answer is: not very much at all. 
Knowledge and Reasons-Explanations 
So, if there is a good enough argument to persuade us away from the intuitive Belief 
View, and toward the Knowledge View, the resources for such an argument will not be 
found exploring the issue of the factivity of acting for a reason. A better argument might 
be found in the nature of action explanation. We can begin here by recalling the pivotal 
move in Hornsby’s analysis of the well-known case of Edmund, who does not know that 
THIN ICE: the ice in the middle of the pond is thin. According to Hornsby, 
Edmund, then, did not keep to the edge because the ice in the middle of the pond was 
thin… The fact that ice was thin does not explain Edmund’s acting, even though 
Edmund did believe that it was thin, and even though the fact that it was thin 
actually was a reason for him to stay at the edge. 
Hornsby goes on to claim that this directly demonstrates the truth of the Knowledge 
View. Though the specific structure of this argument is opaque, the path to the 
conclusion does have two clear steps. One step is from the claim that Edmund does not 
know that thin ice to the claim that Edmund did not keep to the edge because thin ice. 
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Another step is from this claim to the claim that Edmund did not act for the reason that 
THIN ICE. This is supposed to lead us to the Knowledge View, since Edmund’s not 
knowing that THIN ICE appears to prevent him from acting for the reason that THIN ICE. 
The implication is that any reasons-explanation of an action entails that the agent 
performing the explained action has knowledge of the reason explaining the action. 
Let’s take a closer look at this kind of reasoning. The second step here might seem 
sensible in view of our now-familiar axiom of 
 
REASONS-EXPLANATIONS: a motivating reason is the kind of thing that can play a 
role in explaining an agent’s action (when the action is one the agent does for a 
reason). 
 
This axiom reveals some wisdom in supposing that there is a connection between the 
claim that A Φd for the reason that r and the claim that A Φd because r. A telling 
commonality is that both claims can serve as good answers to the question, “Why did A 
Φ?” Why does this matter? A natural thought, we have seen, is that answers to “Why?” 
questions are explanations. Another natural thought, then, might be that both of these 
claims are of the right kind to be explanations of A’s Φing. In wondering why people do 
the things that they do, we often prefer that the answers to the relevant “Why?” questions 
offer the reasons for which the agents did what they did. The claim that A Φd for the 
reason that r and the claim that A Φd because r both seem capable of accomplishing this. 
Indeed, we might even take these two claims to be, at bottom, the very same explanation 
articulated in different ways. If true, this would establish quite an intimate connection –– 
one even more intimate than sharing the common feature of simply offering an 
explanation of A’s Φing. I think it not outlandish, then, to make the second step of 
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Hornsby’s argument for the Knowledge View here. It is not obviously misguided to think 
that if Edmund could not have acted because THIN ICE, then he could not have acted for the 
reason that THIN ICE. 
It is not obviously misguided, but it is misguided –– or so I argued in the previous 
chapter, and will continue to argue in the next chapter. We simply cannot read the facts 
about the availability of claims of the form, “A Φd for the reason that r” off of the 
availability of claims of the form, “A Φd because r.” So any argument in the spirit of 
Hornsby’s, I think, needs to face up to the points of the previous chapter. At this juncture, 
though, I want to focus on the first step of Hornsby’s argument. Why should we expect 
there to be a connection between claims about A’s cognitive relation to r and explanatory 
claims concerning A’s Φing? Consider the following case. 
 
INCONSIDERATE EDMUND: Edmund is skating on a pond, keeping to the edge as 
he skates. You are on a nearby hill, observing the skaters on the pond. You notice 
that Edmund is skating only on the edge of the pond. As you prepare to skate on 
the pond, you approach Edmund and ask him whether the ice in the middle of the 
pond is thin. Edmund responds by saying that he had not considered whether the 
ice in the middle of the pond was thin. 
 
Now, these details do not explicitly disclose Edmund’s reason for skating near the edge of 
the pond. But it would be quite unnatural, I think, to describe Inconsiderate Edmund as a 
case in which Edmund skates near the edge for the reason that THIN ICE. Suppose you 
continue the conversation with Edmund: “Oh… well, then, why are you skating only 
near the edge of the pond?” –– to which he replies that THIN ICE. You would hardly 
receive this answer. Indeed, I think any of us would struggle to even understand this 
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answer, and that is because such an answer is at odds with Edmund’s previous claim that 
he had not considered whether THIN ICE. Here we can recall some of our earlier analyses 
of acting for a reason. It strains the imagination to suppose that Edmund could have 
responded to a consideration that he did not consider; that he treated as a premise in 
deliberation a claim that he did not consider; and so on. It is difficult to suppose that that 
one could be motivated by a consideration to which one bears no cognitive relation at all. 
So, I think we should allow that, in general, the kind of move made in the first step 
of Hornsby’s argument for the Knowledge View is legitimate. The explanatory role of 
motivating reasons clearly limits what we can say about agents’ cognitive relations to their 
reasons, and vice versa. The question, then, is whether the particular move that Hornsby 
makes is legitimate; the question is how, specifically, the explanatory role of reasons and 
the cognitive constraint bear on one another. Hornsby’s argument gives us a well-defined 
target. Is the connection here such that if A does not know that r, then we can conclude 
that A could not have Φd because r? 
I think not; let me explain why. The argument proceeds immediately from the 
idea that Edmund does not know that THIN ICE to the claim that Edmund does not keep 
to the edge because THIN ICE. But it is not at all clear what the connection here is supposed 
to be. It is certainly not apparent that the claim that Edmund does not know that THIN 
ICE entails the claim that Edmund does not act because THIN ICE. Indeed, there seem to 
be obvious counterexamples to the view that claims of the form “A does not know that r” 
entail claims of the form “A does not Φ because r.” Suppose, for example, that Edmund 
only skates near the edge because he has an extreme fear of drowning; he would skate all 
over the pond if not for this fear. Suppose also, though, that Edmund has repressed any 
memory of the traumatic near-death experience which brought about this fear, such that 
he does not even know that he has an extreme fear of drowning. He is not the slightest bit 
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aware of this fear. This seems to make no difference to whether we can say, truly, that 
Edmund skates near the edge because he has a fear of drowning. The very same point 
applies to the claim that “What explains Edmund’s skating near the edge is that he has an 
extreme fear of drowning.” The fact that Edmund does not know that he has this fear 
does not preclude the truth of this explanatory claim. 
Now, one might reasonably object here that the explanatory claim targeted by 
Hornsby’s argument (A Φd because r) does not employ just any sense of ‘because’ or 
‘explains’. Rather, it employs the rational sense. This is correct, but it is not clear how this 
kind of argument for the Knowledge View can make use of this idea. Suppose the 
argument goes as follows: 
 
[1] If A does not know that r, then A cannot Φ because r. 
[2] If A cannot Φ because r, then A cannot Φ for the reason that r. 
[3] Therefore, if A does not know that r, then A cannot Φ for the reason that r. 
 
We have already seen, in chapter one (and we will see even more so in chapter three), 
how claim [2] here might be challenged. We are presently focused on claim [1]. The 
criticism is that it is not obvious why anyone should believe [1]. It is hardly self-evident, 
and there does not seem to be any entailment relation that could underpin it. Indeed, it 
seems to suffer counterexamples of the sort just mentioned. So, we have come to a 
strategy for fending off such counterexamples. The strategy is to point out that the 
counterexamples trade on one sense of ‘because’, but the argument for the Knowledge 
View employs another sense –– the rational sense. But this clarification is of no use. For 
what someone like Hornsby might mean by “rational sense” here is that “because” could 
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be glossed as “for the reason that.”64 There is nothing wrong with this claim in itself; 
indeed, I should like to allow that this is one legitimate use of “because." But allowing this 
glossing to qualify claim [1] results in the argument’s being clearly question begging: 
claim [1] would then be identical to claim [3], and claim [3] is exactly what is at issue. 
 So, while it seems sure that there is a general connection between the cognitive 
constraint and reasons-explanations of actions, the particular connection that this 
Hornsby-style argument seems to rely on is dubious. Without any further argument or 
explanation as to why this connection holds, we should reject this argument for the 
Knowledge View. In particular, we should require of advocates of the Knowledge View 
an argument for the view that the claim that A does not know that r secure the claim that 
A does not Φ because r (or that A’s Φing cannot be explained by r, or some other such). 
Acting in the Light of (What is Believed to Be) a Fact 
Of those who have tried to provide an account of this connection, I think John 
McDowell has made the most compelling case. In trying to explain how he thinks the 
Hornsby-style argument is supposed to work, McDowell says that, in cases like that of 
Edmund, 
… we know that [the agent] takes the relevant fact to obtain, and we know that it does 
obtain. But in knowing only that much, we do not know whether its obtaining is 
anything but a happy accident in relation to her cognitive position. [This] version 
of acting in the light of a fact is not sensitive to the difference between cases in 
which the obtaining of the fact is, and cases in which it is not, a mere happy 
accident in relation to the agent’s cognitive position… If, but only if, the obtaining 
of the fact by virtue of whose obtaining the relevant belief is true is not a happy 
accident in relation to the agent’s cognitive position, we can say that the fact itself 
is exerting a rational influence on the agent’s will; we can say that in doing what 
[he] is doing the agent is responding rationally to the fact itself. 65 
                                                
64 Indeed, Hornsby [2008: 250] says as much. 
65 See McDowell [2013: 16-17]. 
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. 
 
 
 
For my part, this is the most promising line of argument in favor of the Knowledge View 
in the literature. It makes it clear why one might think that if A does not know that r, A 
cannot Φ for the reason that r. The idea here seems to be that if A does not know that r, 
then r cannot be used in a reasons-explanation of A’s Φing; and the idea there is that that if 
A does not know that r, then A’s cognitive relation to r might be a mere accident. But if A’s 
responding to r is a mere accident, McDowell seems to suggest, we cannot explain A’s 
Φing by saying that A responded rationally to r (or that A Φd for the reason that r). 
Though what McDowell says here is an improvement on the original Hornsby-
style argument, I think these remarks do not do enough to clarify or make successful the 
argument for the Knowledge View as it has so far been discussed. I do think, though, that 
McDowell’s remarks allow us to make room for insights captured by the Knowledge View 
in a way that does not impugn the Belief View. I will begin by focusing on what I take to 
be two fatal flaws in the argument if it is taken to support the Hornsby-style Knowledge 
View. The first is that it is simply not clear what is meant when McDowell says that if the 
agent does not know that r, then the agent cannot be responding to the “fact itself.” For 
this notion to pull any real weight in the argument, there must be some deep difference 
between cases in which A Φs in response to the consideration that r and it is a fact that r, 
and cases in which A Φs in response to the-fact-that-r. For if there is no deep difference 
here, the Belief View could dodge the argument simply by endorsing the Factive ViewM; 
so the argument would not really be an argument in favor of the Knowledge View per se. 
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It is worth keeping in mind Hornsby’s own remark about how this sort of argument is 
supposed to work. 
Edmund is a familiar sort of character in epistemology. Such characters are usually used 
to show that justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge. Edmund here is 
used to show that someone’s having a true belief (even a justified one) which 
explains their acting is not sufficient for them to have acted for an (F)-type 
reason.66 
It is clear, then, that this kind of argument for the Knowledge View is not one which is 
supposed to be capable of being sidestepped by endorsing the Factive ViewM (or the 
Justification View). Indeed, per McDowell, 
It does not add to the explanatory power of explanations given… if things are as the 
agent relevantly takes them to be. If things are that way, that is just an extra fact 
about the situation; the action would have had the same intelligibility… if the 
agent had been wrong in taking things to be that way. 67 
The deep gulf between responding to the consideration that r and responding to the-fact-
that-r, then, cannot be bridged by adding to the former that r is a fact. 
But what, exactly, could the deep difference here be? The difference cannot be 
located in the character or content of the consideration to which the agent responds, since 
it is the same consideration –– THIN ICE, for example –– in both kinds of cases. Neither 
can the difference be in the agent’s response to the consideration: for in both cases, the 
agent might respond in the same way (by skating near the edge of the pond, for example). 
But the consideration and the response to the consideration seem to be the only two relata 
involved in Φing for the reason that r. If both relata are the same in both kinds of cases, it 
is not clear what the important difference here could be; there certainly does not seem to 
be any difference which could make one of these a case of Φing for the reason that r while 
precluding the other from being a case of Φing for the reason that r. 
                                                
66 See Hornsby [2008: 251]. 
67 See McDowell [2013: 19]. 
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One could at this juncture add a new detail: in the second case where A Φs in 
response to the-fact-itself, A Φs in response to the known fact that r –– and this is what 
distinguishes cases of the second kind from cases of the first kind. Another way of putting 
this is that, while perhaps the two-place relation of Φing for the reason that r does not 
imply knowledge that r, the three-place relation of A’s Φing for the reason that r does 
imply such knowledge (on the part of A). But such a move would be infelicitous. For what 
we were looking for in the first place was a distinguishing feature of responding to the-fact-
itself such that the agent should have to know the fact in order to achieve this feat. It 
clearly will not do, then, to stipulate that in cases of responding to the-fact-itself, the agent 
knows the fact, and that this is the distinguishing mark of the phenomenon. The 
inappropriateness of such a move is even more apparent when we consider the broader 
context. We are trying, à la Hornsby, to find a significant difference between cases in 
which A has, say, a justified true belief that r, and those in which A knows that r, such that 
the latter could count as acting for a reason while the former could not. Such a difference 
might give us reason to prefer the Knowledge View as a cognitive constraint on acting for 
a reason. But if the suggestion is that cases of acting for a reason are distinguished as cases 
of responding to the-fact-itself, then the phenomena of responding to the-fact-itself had 
better not itself be underpinned only by or grounded only in the fact that the agent knows 
the fact in question. For then the overall argument would threaten to collapse into the 
suggestion that only in cases where A knows that r does A act for the reason that r, because 
only in those cases does A know that r. 
So, although McDowell seems to make some importance out of the notion of 
responding to the-fact-itself, it is not clear what could distinguish this notion in a way 
advantageous to the Knowledge View. The second flaw in McDowell’s argument is not 
an unclarity but rather an intuitively false premise. The premise is that in order for A to 
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respond rationally to the fact that r, A must know that r. This seems to me clearly false 
upon the briefest examination of examples. For consider the case in which Edmund has 
good reason to believe the fact that THIN ICE, and then responds to this fact by keeping to 
the edge of the pond when he skates. Now, if one takes it that the ice in the middle of the 
pond is thin, it is surely rational to keep away from the middle of the pond. In skating 
near the edge of the pond, then, Edmund is responding to the consideration that THIN 
ICE, his response is rational, and it is a fact that THIN ICE. So it seems undeniable to me 
that Edmund is responding rationally to the fact that THIN ICE. Furthermore, we can say 
this without saying anything about whether Edmund knows that THIN ICE. Indeed, we 
could even add to the story that he does not know that THIN ICE. This makes no 
difference; we can still say that Edmund responds rationally to the fact that THIN ICE. But 
if this is right, then, one of the crucial points in McDowell’s argument is false. 
At this point advocates of the Knowledge View might object that I have 
misunderstood their position, and the arguments motivating it. Here is Maria Alvarez, 
aptly summarizing things: 
If there is a fact in virtue of which her belief is true, then she acts in the light of that fact, 
or is guided by that fact, only if she knows that fact. If the agent does not know the 
fact, then we cannot say that she was guided by it (Hyman), or that she was 
responding to it rationally (McDowell). If the agent does not know the fact, the 
argument goes, the relationship between the agent’s acting as she did and the fact 
is fortuitous, a matter of luck or coincidence, and hence not sufficient for the fact 
to be her reason for acting. And this, they argue, is so even in cases where an 
agent acts motivated by a belief that is both true and justified… 
Their point is that there is a notion of acting for a reason––arguably, the central 
notion––that involves the idea of being guided by a fact. This notion requires not 
mere belief but knowledge of the fact that is a reason.68 
 
                                                
68 See Alvarez [2016: 28]. 
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There are two suggestions here. The first is that any accidental connection between the 
motivating consideration and the action impugns that consideration’s status as a reason 
for acting. The second is that there is a distinct and important notion –– that of acting in 
the light of a fact –– which is not captured by the Belief View. 
The second point can be dealt with using resources already available to us. We 
have seen that there is nothing in the conceptual analysis of Φing for the reason that r 
which suggests that r must be a fact. Now, once we are rid of this assumption of factivity, 
what reason do we have to suppose that there is a distinct and central variety of acting for 
a reason, being guided by a fact –– and what is its distinguishing feature? The Belief View 
allows that, often when A Φs for the reason that r, it is the case that r. In such a case, A’s 
Φing is motivated by the (true) consideration that r. What is the difference between this 
and A’s Φing in the light of the fact (or A’s being guided by the fact) that r? One option is 
to say that there is something special about responding to r, the-fact-itself (to be 
distinguished from responding to r, which is a fact). But we have just seen that it is opaque 
what the distinguishing feature of that phenomenon could be. Another option is 
connected to the first point Alvarez observes. The option is to say that there is a variety of 
Φing for the reason that r such that, when it is the case that r, the connection between r 
and A’s Φing is not “fortuitous” (or, as McDowell would say, a “happy accident”). 
One question that immediately arises concerning this second option is: in what 
sense is the connection not fortuitous, such that it has remedied a fortuitousness in the 
case where A does not know that r? We can approach the question by again noticing what 
can be said using only the resources available to the Belief View. On this view, Edmund 
may skate near the edge of the pond for the reason that the ice in the middle of the pond 
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is thin, so long as he believes that the ice is thin. Now, once we grant that Edmund takes it 
that THIN ICE, there is one clear sense in which the connection between the consideration 
that THIN ICE and Edmund’s skating near the edge of the pond is not a mere happy 
accident. The sense is this: given that THIN ICE is a thing considered by Edmund (and 
taken to favor skating near the edge of the pond), it is no accident that he skates as he 
does. Evidence for this is that we could satisfactorily explain his skating near the edge by 
saying that “In skating that way, he is responding to the consideration that THIN ICE.” 
Advocates of the Knowledge View may respond, “Ah –– but it remains a happy 
accident, given only that THIN ICE, that Edmund skates as he does. Evidence for this is that 
we could not explain his skating by saying that he is skating that way because THIN ICE.” I 
make two points in response. The first is that, if we allow that “because” may here be 
glossed as “for the reason that THIN ICE,” then this line of argument begs the question in 
favor of the Knowledge View in the manner observed in the previous section. On the 
other hand, if we say that “because” here is the more general “because,” then (as we also 
saw in the previous section) the idea that we cannot say that Edmund is skating as he is 
because THIN ICE seems to endorse a general view about the connection between 
knowledge claims and because claims that is subject to counterexample. 
The second point of response here is that, even if adding that Edmund knows that 
THIN ICE in some sense makes the connection between THIN ICE and his skating near the 
edge less fortuitous, it is still unclear in what sense this is so. Even if Edmund knows that 
THIN ICE, it may still remain a happy accident, given only that THIN ICE, that Edmund 
skates as he does. Perhaps, for example, he only knows about the ice because he decided 
to go out in the first place, but he did that only on a whim. Perhaps he only inspected the 
ice because Edna, who is known to play tricks on him, said that the ice was thin. Perhaps 
Edmund thinks that THIN ICE favors his going to the center of the pond and stomping 
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vigorously. There is an unending set of such circumstances that could seemingly 
reintroduce any possible fortuitousness supposedly dissolved by the introduction of 
knowledge on the part of the agent. So on this front we should like to hear much more 
from one offering the Hornsby-McDowell-style argument in favor of the Knowledge 
View. 
At this point the dialectic has perhaps been mudded; allow me to try to lend some 
clarity. We began this section asking whether there is compelling argument to reject the 
intuitive Belief View in favor of the Knowledge View. We noticed that the Hornsby-style 
argument seemed to assume a connection –– an entailment, perhaps –– between the 
claim that A does not know that r and the claim that A does not Φ because r. We saw that, 
insofar as this argument relies on a claim about a connection between knowledge and 
reasons-explanations of action, it either begs the question in favor of the Knowledge View 
or contains an implausible premise. We then encountered a suggested improvement on 
the argument from McDowell, which seemed to take us away from the issue of 
explanation and back toward the conceptual analysis of acting for a reason. We saw that 
this argument seems to rely on a dubious distinction between responding to the 
consideration that r (which is a fact) and responding to r, the-fact-itself. Finally we arrived 
at an attempt to legitimize this distinction via the notion that when an agent responds to 
the-fact-itself, the connection between the fact that r and A’s Φing is not a mere happy 
accident. But we were immediately confronted with the question of what is the sense in 
which the connection is not a happy accident; and we struggled to answer that question in 
a way that gave advantage to the Knowledge View. 
 The overall point, then, has been that advocates of the Knowledge View seem not 
to have sufficient resources for clearly demarcating the supposedly central notion of acting 
in the light of a fact without begging the question in their own favor. Unless these problems 
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can be worked out, I think we should say that even McDowell’s improvements are not 
enough to create a successful argument for the Knowledge View. I am doubtful that any 
forthcoming amendment to either AFAR, the Hornsby-style argument depending on a 
connection between knowledge and action explanation, or the McDowell-style argument 
depending on carving out a distinct notion of acting in the light of something known will 
succeed. This is because, at bottom, each of these arguments is committed to implausible 
claims about either the nature of action explanation or the concept of acting for a reason. 
ACTING IN UNBELIEF 
Aside from a bit of conceptual analysis and casuistry, I have not yet provided any 
extended defense of the Belief View. I have only argued that the Belief View is the 
intuitive view, and that the arguments usually given for the Knowledge View should not 
persuade us that it is preferable to the Belief View. In arguing that the Belief View is the 
intuitive view, I attended to the case of UNBELIEVING JUDGE. I argued that this case 
suggests that whatever the correct cognitive constraint is, it cannot be weaker than belief. 
I take it that this is a point of unanimous agreement in the literature. No one, to my 
knowledge, has argued for anything other than the Belief View or the Knowledge View, 
and no one has so much as suggested that the constraint might be any weaker than 
belief.69 In this section, though, I want to address an apparent counterexample to the 
Belief View. I will argue that although the example is cause for some initial concern, it 
can be shown not to be a counterexample to the Belief View. Furthermore, I will argue 
that there is very good theoretical reason to resist any apparent counterexample to the 
Belief View, as any theory of acting for reasons which weakens the cognitive constraint 
beyond belief will have serious shortcomings. 
                                                
69 Jonathan Dancy has told me that he has occasionally wondered about this, though not in print. David 
Sosa, too, has registered his doubts about the Belief View in conversation. 
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The case I am interested in is that of  
 
CURBSIDE CHRIS: Chris is waiting to be picked up from his hotel by his friend 
Larry. Chris and Larry were once the best of friends, but unfortunately, Chris’s 
trust in Larry has gradually eroded; Larry has become unreliable to the point that 
Chris no longer believes that Larry will do as he says. But Larry, in a last-ditch 
effort to restore Chris’s trust in him, has promised to provide transportation for 
Chris on this particular occasion. Chris has packed his bags and is waiting 
curbside to be picked up by Larry, but he does not actually believe (or disbelieve) 
that Larry is coming to pick him up. When the hotelier asks Chris why he is 
waiting curbside, he responds by saying that his friend Larry is coming to pick him 
up. 
 
What should we say about Chris?70 If any of us were the hotelier, we would certainly 
think that Chris was waiting curbside for the reason that his friend Larry is coming to pick 
him up. Even if Chris disclosed to us that he did not really believe that Larry was coming, 
we would still be able to make sense of his response. If he told you the whole story of 
CURBSIDE CHRIS, for example, and one of the other employees at the hotel asked you 
what was going on with Chris, I think you would not struggle to come up with something 
like, “He is waiting for his friend Larry to come pick him up.” This would surely be an 
informative answer, and one that we should count as a good reasons-explanation of what 
Chris is doing. 
                                                
70 In formulating this kind of case I am indebted to Chris Simpson, Brian Cutter, and Dan Bonevac. 
Bonevac put to me a case involving a baseball player who has been called out trying to run to the next base. 
Though the team manager does not believe he was out, he calls the next batter, plausibly for the reason that 
the other player is out. 
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I find the case of CURBSIDE CHRIS to be a fairly compelling counterexample to 
the Belief View. It might appear sensible –– even correct –– to say that Chris is waiting 
for the reason that Larry is coming to pick him up, even while holding that Chris does not 
believe that Larry is coming to pick him up. If this is correct, then the cognitive constraint 
on acting for a reason is weaker than belief. Perhaps, for example, the correct constraint 
is one of lacking disbelief: in order for A to Φ for the reason that r, A must at least not 
believe that not r. Perhaps the correct constraint is a matter of credence, confidence, or 
some estimation of likelihood with respect to the motivating consideration. Or perhaps 
the correct constraint involves a disjunction of more complex attitudes that are 
distinguishable from belief. Perhaps, for example, the case of Curbside Chris only makes 
sense because, while Chris does not believe that Larry is coming to pick him up, he hopes 
that he is; and he is, as it were, acting on that hope. 
While I think all of this has some plausibility to it, I think we can give a 
satisfactory account of the case of Curbside Chris without abandoning the Belief View. 
Two accounts that naturally suggest themselves are that Chris is waiting curbside for the 
reason that Larry might pick him up, and that Larry said he would pick him up. Both of 
these claims are consistent with Chris not believing that Larry will pick him up, and they 
also make for perfectly intelligible explanations of what Chris is doing. I think that in 
general, though, we should hesitate to make such moves. We are not commonly 
incredulous with respect to the reports others give us about what their reasons for acting 
are. Furthermore, one could sensibly ask why one should allow such a move here, but not 
for the cases of RACIST JUDGE, UNBELIEVING JUDGE, INCONSIDERATE EDMUND, and so 
on. So I think I should say something to motivate this treatment of the case. 
Consider familiar cases in which we follow directions from strangers. In these 
familiar cases, we sometimes form beliefs about how to get to our destinations on the basis 
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of testimony. But often times we form no such belief; we only get so far as the belief that, 
for example, she said that it was just around the corner. To make a clear connection to the 
case of CURBSIDE CHRIS, consider the following case. 
 
TRICKY TOWN: Travis is in a new town, and he is looking for the local grocery 
store. He has had no luck finding it, so he resolves to ask a stranger how to get to 
it. Travis has heard, however, that the current residents of this town resent visitors 
and new residents; and they have colluded to make things unpleasant for such 
people in a number of ways, chief among them being to give such people bad 
advice and misleading directions. Nonetheless, Travis has resolved to ask a 
stranger for directions to the local grocery store. She tells him that it is just around 
the corner. Travis then goes around the corner. 
 
Now, sometimes, we trust the testimony of strangers to the point that we come to believe 
what they say. But TRICKY TOWN seems obviously to be a case in which one would not 
do this. Travis would likely not form the belief that the store is just around the corner; he 
would more likely restrict himself to forming the belief that she said that the store is just 
around the corner. Now, for what reason does Travis go around the corner? It seems to 
me that, even if Travis says that “The grocery store is just around this corner,” we should 
not take this to be a precise specification of his reason. This is because Travis is plainly not 
acting in the light of the consideration that the store is just around the corner –– this 
consideration is not what motivates Chris to go around the corner. Rather, it seems that 
the consideration he is responding to is that she said that the store is just around the 
corner, or perhaps that the store might be around the corner. We need not settle on the 
positive account as to what Travis’s motivating reason is. All that is required for my 
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present point is that there is nothing forcing us to say that Travis’s reason is that the store 
is just around the corner, and also that it is plausible that his reason could just as well be 
that she said that the store is around the corner. These possibilities are made salient by 
the fact that Travis explicitly doubts the truth of the claim that the store is around the 
corner. 
It seems to me that Travis and Chris are in similar situations, since Chris is also 
acting on the testimony of someone he does not take to be reliable. The only difference is 
in what is the most natural way for these two agents to specify their reasons in 
conversation. So I think we can plausibly say that Chris, like Travis, does not act for the 
reason that r, but rather his reason is something like it might be the case that r, or he said 
that r. 
I hope that this is enough to illustrate how proponents of the Belief View can 
plausibly deal with a case like CURBSIDE CHRIS. To shore up this position, I want to point 
out that there are cases in which not believing that not r, for example, seems quite far off 
the mark from enabling the agent to Φ for the reason that r. The earlier case of 
INCONSIDERATE EDMUND demonstrates this. It is nearly unintelligible for Edmund to 
say, for example, “The consideration that the ice in the middle of the pond is thin never 
occurred to me, and I am keeping to the edge for the reason that the ice in the middle of 
the pond is thin.” Clearly, in order for Edmund to act for the reason that THIN ICE, his 
cognitive relation to THIN ICE must be stronger than this. How much stronger? It seems 
to me that belief is a good candidate; it is at least not clear to me what weaker relation 
might get the job done. 
Where does all of this leave us? I hope to have established several points. First, the 
Belief View is the intuitive view of the cognitive constraint on acting for a reason. Second, 
the best arguments in favor of the Knowledge View are not strong enough to persuade us 
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that knowing that r (or any other cognitive relation stronger than belief) is necessary for 
Φing for the reason that r. Third, the Belief View has the resources to address examples 
that might initially seem to show that belief that r is not necessary for Φing for the reason 
that r. Fourth, the constraints suggested by apparent counterexamples seem not to be 
sufficient cognitive conditions for Φing for the reason that r. Finally, outside of these 
(merely) apparent counterexamples, believing that r does seem a good candidate for what 
is necessary and sufficient (qua cognitive constraint) for Φing for the reason that r. I think 
that these considerations should lead us to believe that, while it is possible to (as I say) act 
in ignorance, it is not possible to act in unbelief. 
ARE REASONS BELIEFS? 
I now want to, supposing that the case has been made for the Belief View, 
consider what implications this might have for other theories of reasons. To keep things 
brief, I want to consider just one quite popular position in the theory of reasons which 
seems to me to be at odds with the Belief View. Now, it may seem obvious, after the 
discussion of this chapter, that agents who act (or believe) for reasons must bear some 
cognitive connection to those reasons. Though we have seen that some think that the 
specific cognitive connection required is knowledge, most everyone holds that at least 
belief is required. A superficially similar view has been put forth –– and gained significant 
favor –– about the ontology of reasons. This view, often called Psychologism, holds that 
the reasons for which agents act are psychological states of (or psychological facts about) 
those agents. I want to conclude this chapter on the cognitive constraint by showing that 
there is a deep tension between the Belief View and Psychologism, such that one cannot 
plausibly subscribe to both. I proceed to argue that the best way to resolve this tension is 
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to reject Psychologism. In so doing, I hope to be offering a novel argument against this 
well received theory. 
The course of the section is as follows. First, I recount the basic picture and appeal 
of both the Belief View and Psychologism. Second, I illustrate the tension between these 
two views by demonstrating that any theory of reasons that incorporates both of them will 
be committed to an implausible analysis of acting for a reason. In the third section, I 
make the case for resolving the tension by rejecting Psychologism. What ultimately 
emerges is that Psychologism is at odds with the thought that there is any cognitive 
constraint on acting for a reason. Rather than give up that extremely plausible thought, I 
conclude in the fourth section, we should reject Psychologism. 
Two Common and Appealing Views 
As I said, it seems obvious that agents who act for reasons must bear some 
significant cognitive connection to those reasons; there must be some cognitive constraint 
on acting for a reason. Put differently, we can say that there must be a significant answer 
to the question: what cognitive relation must some agent A stand in to some reason r in 
order for A to perform some action Φ for the reason that r? We have seen that the two 
main competing answers to this question are as follows. 
 
Belief View: In order for A to Φ for the reason that r, A must believe that r. 
Knowledge View: In order for A to Φ for the reason that r, A must know that r. 
 
There has been much recent discussion between proponents of these two views of the 
cognitive constraint, and I have spent the bulk of this chapter arguing that the Belief View 
is the more plausible cognitive constraint on acting for a reason. But for present purposes 
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we can leave this debate undecided; my argument in this section will succeed whether it is 
the Belief View or the Knowledge View that is ultimately correct. Since it is the Belief 
View that is much more widely received, though, I will center my discussion around it. 
The idea that the cognitive constraint on acting for a reason must be at least as 
strong as belief has the status of something like an assumption among theorists.71 That 
being the case, not much has been said explicitly in its favor (except in addressing the 
competing Knowledge View). We were able to see some of the intuitive appeal of the 
view earlier, though. A common analysis of acting for a reason is acting in the light of a 
consideration. Put less metaphorically, we can say that acting for a reason is a way of 
responding to a consideration. For those who do not find it immediately transparent that one 
cannot respond to anything that one does not believe to be the case, we saw, we can 
attend to cases like that of 
 
UNBELIEVING EDMUND: Imagine that you are about to go skating, and you see 
Edmund skating on the nearby pond. You notice that when he skates, Edmund 
keeps to the edge of the pond. As you are about to begin skating, you ask Edmund 
why he is skating only around the edge of the pond. He responds by saying, “My 
reason is that the ice in the middle of the pond is thin.” When you thank him for 
warning you about the thin ice, he says, “Oh –– I was not saying that the ice in 
                                                
71 Although this is widely assumed, there might be ways in which it is contentious. For example, Nomy 
Arpaly [2003: 37-65] may be committed to denying the claim –– but only by taking a somewhat 
idiosyncratic stance on what we might call “Freudian” cases: cases in which the agent’s motivating reason 
for acting is obscure to the agent. Notice, though, that the conceptual analyses I provide here put such cases 
to the side (since A cannot respond to r, in the relevant sense, without taking it to be the case that r). 
Furthermore, the mere existence of Freudian cases does not challenge the Belief View; that A does not 
know or believe that A’s reason is that r does not show that it is not the case that A believes that r (or that r is 
A’s reason for acting). 
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the middle of the pond is thin. In fact, I do not even believe that it is. Nonetheless, 
that is the consideration I am responding to in skating near the edge of the pond.” 
 
There seems to be some tension in the reports Edmund provides –– one as to the 
consideration he responds to in acting (and to his reason for acting), and the other as to 
what he believes to be the case. Our puzzlement here is plausibly attributed to a tacit 
assumption that there is a tight conceptual connection between responding to the 
consideration that r and believing that r. Similarly, it is almost Moore-paradoxical to say, 
“My reason for acting is that r, but I do not believe that r.” If the Belief View is true, then 
each of Edmund’s claims cannot be true at once; and so something like a tacit 
endorsement of the Belief View easily explains our puzzlement at Edmund’s remarks. 
So the Belief View, even if not ultimately correct, at least has some strong initial 
appeal. My initial aim here is to show that this view is at odds with another view, which 
has been called 
 
Psychologism: whenever A Φs for the reason that r, r is a psychological fact 
about A. 
 
The main competitor to Psychologism, Non-Psychologism, is just the denial of 
Psychologism. Psychologism is a theory of reasons with a large and enthusiastic following, 
in no small part due to the work of Donald Davidson.72 It is worth noting, though that if 
                                                
72 See Davidson[1980]. Too many to name subscribe to the view, but Smith [1998; 2010], Alfred Mele 
[1997; 2013], and Michael Bratman [1999] are perhaps also worth mentioning. John Turri [2009] has 
explicitly defended Psychologism about reasons for belief, while Clayton Littlejohn [2012] seems to resist it. 
 I count Alvarez [2010: 131-135], Dancy [2000: 98-120], Hornsby [2008], Hyman [1999: 442-446; 
2011], and Raz [1975] among those Non-Psychologists who have given compelling arguments against the 
view, but I will not revisit those arguments here. In epistemology, Enoch [2010: 981-986] and Williamson 
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Psychologism is true, much of our ordinary talk around reasons is, strictly speaking, 
incorrect. To see why, consider the following case. 
 
FLORENCE’S FLOWERS: Florence’s mother is in a funk. To cheer her up, Florence 
decides to buy her some flowers. So, she goes to the store to get some flowers. 
Taking it that roses are her mother’s favorite flowers, she picks out some roses. As 
she checks out, the cashier asks her, “Why are you buying roses –– what’s the 
occasion?” Florence responds by saying, “I am trying to cheer up my mother, and 
roses are her favorite flowers.” 
 
I think we all find it natural to interpret this story as one in which Florence buys roses for 
the reason that roses are my mother’s favorite flower, or perhaps, that roses will cheer up my mother. 
But Psychologism would say of Florence that she cannot be buying flowers for either of 
these reasons. For such claims incorrectly imply that Florence’s reason is a state of affairs 
in the (external) world. Rather, Psychologism tells us that Florence is acting for the reason 
that, for example, she believes that roses will cheer up her mother. I say “for example” here 
because, strictly speaking, all that is necessary for Psychologism to say in this example is 
that Florence’s reason is some psychological fact (or state) or another. It need not involve 
belief. It could be, for example, that Florence wants to cheer up her mother. I center my 
discussion around belief because it is (rightly) thought to be the most plausible candidate. 
It may help to note that the more traditional Psychologism, according to which reasons 
are belief-desire pairs, will include the “B-Psychologism” I focus on shortly. In any case, 
                                                                                                                                            
[2000; 201X] have also expressed Non-Psychologistic sympathies.know or believe that A’s reason is that r 
does not show that it is not the case that A believes that r (or that r is A’s reason for acting). 
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according to Psychologism, Florence’s reason is not a state of the world, but rather a state 
of her psychology. 
Offense to our natural ways of speaking notwithstanding, Psychologism itself (like 
the Belief View) also possesses some intuitive appeal. For we could just as easily imagine 
FLORENCE’S FLOWERS as a story in which Florence gives her reason by saying, “Well, I 
am trying to cheer up my mother, and I think that roses will make her happy.” Though it 
is natural to say that Florence’s reason is that roses will cheer up her mother, it is perhaps 
just as natural to say that Florence’s reason is that she believes that roses will cheer up her 
mother. 
Both the Belief View and Psychologism enjoy widespread support among theorists 
of reasons. The advantages and disadvantages of both views have been well documented 
and discussed by many, and I shall not attempt at this point to thoroughly present 
anything like a complete case for or against either view. My purpose here is to develop a 
novel, and in my view devastating, argument against Psychologism. The argument is 
fairly simple: I will argue that if the Belief View is true, then Psychologism is false. Before 
moving to the substance of the argument, I want to raise a dialectical query.  Given that 
these two theories enjoy the widespread support that they do, one might think that my 
strategy should be met with some suspicion. It might be thought puzzling, if these two 
views are so widely discussed and received, that my argument against Psychologism has 
not yet been raised.73  But I think that there is a good explanation for this state of affairs –
– and one which will help to elucidate my central argument. The explanation is that it 
might initially seem that Psychologism either includes, is a variant of, or otherwise agrees 
with the Belief View. As Alvarez puts it, 
                                                
73 Although the thought that something like the Belief View and Psychologism are opposed has perhaps 
been in the air –– see, for example, Alvarez [2010: 124-130] and Enoch [2010: 981-986]. 
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Most if not all accounts of acting for a motivating reason require as a condition that the 
agent be in some kind of epistemic relation to the reason that motivates her. And 
we also saw that a widespread view is that this epistemic relation is one of belief: 
for an agent to act for the reason that p, the agent must believe that p. It is this 
thought that led many to endorse the view that reasons are mental states (often as 
part of the “desire-belief” conception of reasons for action described above).74 
Now, where Non-Psychologism says that A Φs for the reason r, Psychologism will say that 
A Φs for the reason that A believes that r. Consider, then, the superficial similarity 
between the Belief View and Psychologism when they are expressed slightly differently 
from before: 
 
B-Psychologism: Whenever A Φs for the reason that r, r is the fact that A 
believes that p.75 
Belief View: Whenever A Φs for the reason that r, r is something A believes 
(namely, p). 
 
It is not difficult to see how these two views could appear to be in agreement. In 
FLORENCE’S FLOWERS, one might think, both B-Psychologism and the Belief View 
centrally feature Florence’s belief that ROSES: Roses will cheer up my mother. They will 
both say, for example, that Florence’s belief that ROSES is essential to her acting as she 
does. They both also imply that any good reasons-explanation of Florence’s buying the 
roses relies on the supposition that Florence believes that ROSES. Without too much 
                                                
74 See Alvarez [2016: 27]. 
75 There is, of course, the alternative rendering: “r is A’s belief/believing that p.” This option might be 
preferred by those Psychologists who insist that it is the agent’s psychological state –– not a fact about what 
the agent’s psychological state is –– that is the reason for which the agent acts. I think, however, the 
problems that I will introduce for Psychologism are only augmented by this statist articulation of the view. 
This is because, at bottom, the problem is that Psychologism must somehow accommodate the thought that 
motivating reasons are things capable of being believed to be the case; but it is much more awkward to see 
how a psychological state itself (rather than the content of that state, or the fact that the agent is in that state) 
could be a thing believed to be the case. 
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thought, one might think not only that these two views are in agreement; one might also 
think that they are ultimately the same view differently articulated. 
But these thoughts are mistaken. There is a deep difference between B-
Psychologism and the Belief View. Consider once more that, where Non-Psychologism 
will hold that Florence acts for the reason that roses, B-Psychologism holds that Florence 
acts for the reason that ROSES *: I believe that roses will cheer up my mother. When we 
keep this in mind, the difference between B-Psychologism and the Belief View becomes 
clear. The main difference can be seen in the ontological commitments of the two views. 
B-Psychologism says that Florence’s reason is identical to or perhaps constituted by the fact 
that she believes that ROSES. But the Belief View makes no such commitment. The Belief 
View says that Florence’s believing that ROSES is a necessary condition on her acting for the 
reason that ROSES. Indeed, the Belief View is compatible with Non-Psychologism: one 
who holds the Belief View can also hold that the reason for which Florence buys roses is 
some non-psychologistic entity. But B-Psychologism is, by definition, inconsistent with 
Non-Psychologism. So B-Psychologism and the Belief View are clearly not the same view, 
and are possibly at odds. 
Can Psychologism Accommodate the Belief View? 
But might they be made not to be at odds? Given the plausibility of the Belief 
View, any Psychologistic theory of reasons should aim to accommodate it if possible. So 
let us imagine a theorist who, taking it that the Belief View is both distinct from and 
perhaps equal in plausibility to B-Psychologism, attempts to combine the two theories in 
building a more general theory of acting for reasons. Call this combination of these two 
theories BB-Psychologism. 
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What would BB-Psychologism say about Florence? We have already seen that B-
Psychologism tells us that Florence buys roses for the reason that ROSES *. The Belief 
View tells us that in order for Florence to Φ for the reason that ROSES *, Florence must at 
least believe that ROSES *. So the B-Psychologist, to accommodate the Belief View, must 
claim that Florence believes that she believes that roses will cheer up her mother. There is no 
logical barrier to such a view –– there is no internal inconsistency in the conjunction of 
these claims. But there is certainly a serious implausibility. To see why, consider a slight 
alteration of the previous case. 
 
UNREFLECTIVE FLORENCE: Florence’s mother is in a funk. To cheer her up, 
Florence decides to buy her some flowers. So, she goes to the store to get some 
flowers. Taking it that roses are her mother’s favorite flowers, she picks out some 
roses. As she checks out, the cashier asks her, “Why are you buying roses –– 
what’s the occasion?” Florence responds by saying, “I am trying to cheer up my 
mother, and roses are her favorite flowers. The cashier then asks Florence 
whether she believes that roses will cheer up her mother. “Obviously,” Florence 
replies, growing impatient. The cashier then asks Florence whether she believes 
that she believes that the roses will cheer up her mother. She responds with 
puzzlement, and says, “I guess I had not really thought about whether I believed 
that I believed that.” 
 
I wish to make two points about this case. The first point is that the case of 
UNREFLECTIVE FLORENCE is clearly coherent. The story makes sense, and Florence 
appears to be a normal –– even reasonable –– character here. But if BB-Psychologism is 
true, the story should not make sense; and it certainly could not all be true. For, if BB-
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Psychologism is true, Florence must believe that she believes that roses will cheer up her 
mother. Otherwise, she cannot be acting for the reason that she believes that roses will 
cheer up her mother. But this is a clear reductio against BB-Psychologism. It is plainly false 
that, in order for Florence to be motivated to act as she does, she must believe that she 
believes that roses will cheer up her mother. 
There is a second layer to this point. Florence might, like most of us, not often 
form second-order beliefs at all –– much less every time she is motivated to act. What is 
more, though, there are agents for which it straightforwardly implausible that they could 
have the second-order beliefs that BB-Psychologism requires them to have. Consider two-
year-old Thomas, who asks to go to see the dogs in the park.76 When his father asks him 
why they should do that, Thomas says, “It’s fun to see doggies in the park.” Despite his 
unadvanced age, I think we would naturally take this as a statement of Thomas’s reason 
for going (or perhaps, wanting to go) to the park. Now, it seems highly unlikely to me that 
Thomas introspected or inquired at all about his own psychological state concerning the 
matter –– much less that he thereupon formed the belief that he believed that it would be 
fun to see dogs in the park. Indeed, he might not even have the cognitive resources to 
approach the issue of his second-order beliefs on the matter. But suppose Thomas’s father 
asks him whether he believes that he believes that it would be fun to see dogs in the park, 
and Thomas replies that he does not (or perhaps, more realistically, with a gesture that 
indicates that he is unsure how to answer). It would be quite a cruel and suspect bit of 
parenting if Thomas’s father therein found grounds to withhold the trip to the park from 
Thomas, saying, “Well, it sounds like you have no reason at all to want to go to the park!” 
                                                
76 Perhaps the dogs themselves should be considered here as well. Take Spot, who is digging over there 
because that is where his bone is buried. Does Spot believe that he believes that that is where his bone is 
buried? It does not seem likely; indeed, it is not clear that he could believe such a thing. 
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Thomas has clearly stated his reason, and his apparent lack of a second-order belief on 
the matter does not create any confusion about what that reason is. 
The trouble here is not only that BB-Psychologism implausibly commits us to 
insisting that agents have second-order psychological states where we have no real reason 
to suspect that they do have them (or where we have reason to suspect that they do not 
have them). The deeper trouble –– and my second point here –– is that BB-Psychologism 
implies that it is the having of these second-order states that enables agents to respond to 
(and be motivated by) the considerations in question. But that is surely implausible. It is 
not some strange second-order belief that allows Florence to be motivated to cheer up her 
mother. A first order psychological state, such as believing that roses or wanting to cheer 
up her mother, seems sufficient for that. This is a point on which the Belief View and B-
Psychologism, taken separately, should agree. 
Another way of seeing this point is through the lens of action explanation. The 
reasons for which agents act, common thinking holds, play a crucial role in explaining 
actions. Recall our very plausible axiom of 
 
REASONS-EXPLANATIONS: a motivating reason is the kind of thing that can play a 
role in explaining an agent’s action. 
 
Given the truth of (something like) REASONS-EXPLANATIONS, any cognitive constraint on 
acting for a reason effectively places a constraint on explaining actions done for reasons. 
If we hold the Belief View, for example, we are committed to a view on which we cannot 
straightforwardly appeal to r in a reasons-explanation of A’s Φing without supposing that 
A believes that r. Similarly, BB-Psychologism is committed to a view on which one cannot 
appeal to r in a reasons-explanation of A’s Φing without supposing that A believes that A 
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believes that r. But cases such as UNREFLECTIVE FLORENCE and two-year-old Thomas 
show such a view to be incorrect. We can easily explain Florence’s buying the roses, for 
example, by saying that “She is buying the roses for the reason that her mother is in a 
funk,” or that “She is buying the roses because she believes that her mother is in a funk.” 
Offering these explanations does not require supposing that Florence believes that she 
believes that her mother is in a funk. Furthermore, any view that insists on such a 
requirement will, I fear, be quite lacking in explanatory ability; for it will provide no 
reasons-explanation (indeed, it might insist that there is no such explanation) of any 
action for which we cannot suppose that the agent has the requisite second-order 
psychological states. Why should that be so? If BB-Psychologism is true, then whenever A 
Φs for a reason, there must be a suitable consideration which A believes that A believes to 
be the case. It follows, then, that if there is no such consideration at hand, BB-
Psychologism is committed, on pain of inconsistency, to saying that it is not the case that 
A Φs for a reason. By definition, one cannot have a reasons-explanation of A’s Φing 
without giving a reason for which A Φs. 
Psychologists might be tempted to reply by suggesting that the culprit here is the 
Belief View, and not B-Psychologism. After all, all I have shown is that the combination of 
the Belief View and B-Psychologism produces implausible results. This leaves open 
whether the best way to avoid this implausibility is to give up B-Psychologism, or instead 
to give up the Belief View. Given the plausibility of B-Psychologism, they might say, what 
we have learned here is that the Belief View cannot be the best theory of the cognitive 
constraint on acting for a reason. 
As I observed earlier in this chapter, the Belief View is not unquestioned. The 
cognitive constraint is the subject of controversy, and there are many who think that the 
Belief View does not provide the correct constraint. However, those who reject the Belief 
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View typically do so in favor of a stronger cognitive constraint on acting for a reason.77  
Recall, for example, that the only established competitor to the Belief View is the  
 
Knowledge View: in order for A to Φ for the reason that r, A must know that r. 
 
Endorsing the Knowledge View will be of no help in resolving the tension observed here. 
Indeed, it seems to make things even worse. Instead of insisting only that every instance of 
acting for a reason is accompanied and made possible by a second-order belief, the 
incorporation of the Knowledge View would force Psychologism to say that acting for a 
reason is always accompanied and made possible by some second-order knowledge; and 
also that we can give a reasons-explanation of A’s Φing for a reason only if we suppose 
that there is some r such that A knows that A believes that r. This brand of Psychologism 
would be forced to say, for example, that little Thomas knows that he believes that it would 
be fun to see the dogs in the park –– and also that Thomas’s so knowing is what enables 
him to be motivated by the consideration in question. As implausible as the combination 
of the Belief View and Psychologism is, the combination of the Knowledge View and 
Psychologism is even more implausible. 
It seems, then, that the tension observed here cannot be plausibly resolved by 
rejecting the Belief View in favor of a stronger view on the cognitive constraint. Might 
these problematic results be avoided by adopting a weaker cognitive constraint? This 
strategy is no more promising. This is partly because, as I have illustrated in this chapter, 
there is a strong independent case for the truth of the Belief View. It is plausible that 
every situation in which A Φs for the reason that r looks to be a situation in which A must 
                                                
77 The recent work of Daniel Muñoz [2017] might be an exception, though his work concerns acting for a 
purpose rather than acting for a reason. 
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(at least) believe that r. Cases like Unbelieving Edmund simply do not make sense. But 
even if the Belief View turned out to be too strong, this alone would not be enough to 
resolve the tension here. For, as I said at the outset, there must be some positive cognitive 
constraint on acting for a reason. This is, I think, all that is required for Psychologism to 
be saddled with similarly problematic results. So long as there is some cognitive constraint 
on acting for a reason, the combination of that cognitive constraint and Psychologism will 
always generate a fact of the following sort: 
 
CP-Schema: A   [cognitive relation]   that A   [psychological state]   that r. 
 
In the first slot belongs whatever cognitive constraint on acting for a reason one finds 
most attractive; in the second slot belongs whatever psychological state is centrally 
featured in the version of Psychologism one finds most attractive. It is simply not clear to 
me what plausible view of the cognitive constraint could be inserted into this schema such 
that Psychologism would avoid implausible results of the sort observed here. For, under 
the CP-Schema, no matter what view of the cognitive constraint or version of 
Psychologism is under consideration, any fact of the form “A Φs for the reason that r” 
entails that A has some second-order psychological state (suitably related to r) or other. 
The problem, of course, is that no such entailment holds; the fact that A Φs for the reason 
that r clearly does not entail that A has any second-order psychological states at all –– 
much less any particular second-order psychological states. So the prospects of resolving 
the problematic tension by rejecting the Belief View in favor of some weaker cognitive 
constraint really do not seem any more promising than those of resolving the tension by 
rejecting the Belief View in favor of some stronger constraint. It looks as though 
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Psychologism is simply at odds with the existence of any cognitive constraint on acting for 
a reason. 
Can Psychologism Do Without the Belief View? 
But Here is what I take the upshot to be so far. The combination of Psychologism 
and any cognitive constraint on acting for a reason generates unpalatable consequences. 
That being so, one has three choices. One option is to simply swallow these unpalatable 
consequences, and insist that both acting for a reason and action (reasons-)explanation is 
always accompanied and made possible by some second-order psychological state. A 
second option is to give up on the existence of any cognitive constraint on acting for a 
reason. A third option is to reject Psychologism, and admit the possibility that at least 
some reasons for acting are things other than psychological states of the agents acting (an 
option which, it is worth remembering, already has significant independent support). 
I hope that the considerations of the previous section have been effective in 
showing that the first option is quite undesirable. But, lest we give Psychologism short 
shrift, let us consider the somewhat idiosyncratic second option. Now that we are faced 
with this choice, the Psychologist might say, perhaps we should revisit the plausibility of 
the thought that there must a cognitive constraint on acting for a reason. Why should we 
think this to be a nonnegotiable maxim for theories of reasons? We can begin answering 
this question recalling the case of 
 
INCONSIDERATE EDMUND: Imagine that you are about to go skating, and you 
notice Edmund skating on a nearby pond. You notice that when he skates, 
Edmund keeps to the edge of the pond. As you are about to begin skating, you ask 
Edmund why he is skating only around the edge of the pond. He responds by 
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saying, “My reason for keeping to the edge is that the ice in the middle of the 
pond is thin.” When you thank him for warning you about the thin ice, he says, 
“Oh –– I was not saying that the ice in the middle of the pond is thin. In fact, I 
had not even considered the thinness of the ice; it had not crossed my mind. 
Nonetheless, that is my reason for skating near the edge of the pond.” 
 
Whatever one thought of UNBELIEVING EDMUND, the case of INCONSIDERATE EDMUND 
surely makes no sense. The suggestion that Edmund might have been responding to and 
acting for the reason that the ice in the middle of the pond is thin, and yet he had not 
even considered –– it had not even crossed his mind –– whether the ice in the middle of the 
pond was thin, is incomprehensible. Now, a theory that holds that there is no cognitive 
constraint on acting for a reason forgoes a principled explanation as to why this suggestion 
is incomprehensible.78 Indeed, such a theory has given up the idea that there need be 
anything strange at all going on in the case of INCONSIDERATE EDMUND. But the case 
clearly is quite strange, if it is even possible. So we find in the case of INCONSIDERATE 
EDMUND strong evidence that agents must make some cognitive connection to the reasons 
for which they act. 
One need not be convinced that there is a cognitive constraint on acting for a 
reason by one case. There is also a myriad of theoretical considerations pressuring us in 
this direction. Consider, for example, that a very common analysis of the notion of a 
motivating reason for Φing is: a consideration taken to favor Φing. How can one take r to 
favor Φing without bearing some cognitive connection to r, when taking to favor itself seems 
to be a cognitively-laden relation? Leaving aside the notion of taking to favor: how can 
                                                
78 This might assume that something like considering that r is the weakest cognitive (positive) relation one 
could bear to r. This might not be the case, but it would not be difficult to draw up an analogous case for 
whatever turns out to be the weakest cognitive relation. 
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one be motivated to act by r without making some cognitive connection to r? If 
motivating reasons are to be anything other than mere causes, this seems a difficult feat to 
say the least. Indeed, even if motivating reasons are causes, it still seems that by far the 
most likely story as to how these causes do their motivational work is that they do it by 
bringing about some cognitive event. Consider further the question of what makes 
something my reason. If the ice in the middle of the pond is thin, how does this get to be 
my reason for acting, rather than your reason –– or even just a reason? The answer that 
suggests itself is that some cognitive connection I made to the reason (such as believing it 
to be so, or taking it to favor skating near the edge of the pond) is what makes it my 
reason. Consider further still the issue of action explanation. Recall the very plausible 
idea of REASONS-EXPLANATIONS. There is a certain sense of the question, “Why is 
Florence buying flowers?” which asks for her reason for acting. How can we completely 
and satisfactorily answer such questions without saying something about what is going on 
with the agent cognitively? The list goes on. It is not just an analysis of a few cases that 
should lead us to believe there is a cognitive constraint on acting for a reason. There is a 
whole host of interesting and important philosophical questions concerning actions and 
reasons which begin to approach being unanswerable if there is no cognitive constraint. 
So taking the second option here is not easily done. It seems, generally, that any 
theory of acting for a reason that is lacking a cognitive constraint will be far less plausible 
than those that are not so lacking. Unless there is some account as to how Psychologism 
might be able to offset  or mitigate these theoretical costs, perhaps we should give up 
Psychologism (rather than the cognitive constraint). It is worth asking, then: can 
Psychologism offset the costs? We saw in the first section that Psychologism shares some 
important similarities with the Belief View. Of course, we also saw that there is a deep 
difference between these two views. But perhaps the Psychologist, in light of the 
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similarities between B-Psychologism and the Belief View, might try to persuade us that a 
view like B-Psychologism need not suffer any theoretical costs not suffered by the Belief 
View. Every side agrees, the Psychologist might say, that in the case of FLORENCE’S 
FLOWERS, any good theory must centrally feature the consideration that ROSES, the claim 
that Florence believes that roses, and be able to explain Florence’s buying the roses by 
casting it as a response to the consideration that roses. Addressing some of the theoretical 
pressures just discussed, the Psychologist might say that B-Psychologism, like the Belief 
View, holds that a belief with a certain content is necessary for rational motivation to take 
place. It can also provide an account similar to that of the Belief View as to how agents’ 
reasons get to be their reasons: this comes about by some cognitive event such as, for 
example, believing that roses. Analogous points may be made about action explanation. 
B-Psychologism can accord with the maxim of REASONS-EXPLANATIONS, for example, 
since in giving any explanation that cites a motivating reason, a Psychologistic theory 
(which holds that motivating reasons are cognitive states) will therein be telling us 
something about what is going on with the agent cognitively. And so on. Of course, none 
of this will persuade someone who simply finds cases like INCONSIDERATE EDMUND to be 
clean counterexamples to any theory without a cognitive constraint. But if the previously 
mentioned theoretical costs were really what was persuading us away from Psychologism, 
perhaps we moved to quickly; for Psychologism may be able to give an equally satisfying 
account on these fronts without adding any cognitive constraint to its theory. Granted, 
Psychologism will accomplish all of this by saying that Florence is acting for the reason 
that roses*, while the Belief View can accomplish things via a simpler Non-Psychologistic 
view, holding that Florence is acting for the reason that roses. But in light of all of the 
similarities just mentioned, we can see that these two claims really amount to the same 
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account of what Florence is doing; and suggesting otherwise is just word-smithing and 
hair-splitting over ontological minutia.79 
This is not a completely implausible line to take. I think there are two ways of 
construing this line of resistance; I shall consider them both. One way of seeing this line is 
as a sort of last-ditch effort to uphold the bold claim that there is no cognitive constraint 
on acting for a reason. Cases like INCONSIDERATE EDMUND like aside, the line goes, 
nothing of real importance is lost by (for example) endorsing B-Psychologism and 
rejecting the Belief View. On this way of taking things, though, this line of resistance can 
easily be seen off as misguided. For it does not address the real kernel of wisdom revealed 
in cases like INCONSIDERATE EDMUND. The wisdom is that it is incomprehensible that A 
might Φ for the reason that r and yet not so much as consider the idea that r. The point 
here is structural; it makes no difference whether the content of the reason is that p, or 
instead (as Psychologism insists) that A believes that p. Furthermore, the theoretical 
pressures here are only apparently relieved in the absence of a genuine cognitive constraint. 
Consider again, for example, the common analysis of what a motivating reason is. Even if 
Florence’s reason is that she believes that roses will cheer up her mother, the question 
remains how she comes to take that consideration to favor her buying flowers without so 
much as considering it. The same question arises vis-á-vis the earlier question about 
motivation. What of the individuation and possession of reasons? Even if Florence acts for 
the reason that she believes that roses will cheer up her mother, how does that 
consideration get to be her reason for acting? Saying that it happens via her believing that 
roses will cheer up her mother is vacuous. If Florence’s reason is that she believes that roses, 
then saying that this consideration comes to be Florence’s reason (or that Florence comes 
                                                
79 Thanks to David Sosa for helping me to see this point of view. 
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to have this reason) by her believing that roses amounts to saying that the reason gets to 
be hers by merely being the case. But what we were wondering in the first place was, as it 
were, how some reason goes from merely obtaining to being a reason that an agent has.  
According to the view on offer, though, Florence need not have any other cognitive state 
in order to act for the reason in question. Finally, there was the issue of action 
explanation. It is true enough that Psychologism has no trouble explaining actions. It can 
surely, for example, offer explanations of the form, “A Φd because A believed that p.” But 
given that it seems to be a bit of a mystery, on this view, how A comes to act for the 
reason that A believes that p, it is not clear how confident we should be that this brand of 
Psychologism can even offer genuine reasons-explanations –– explanations of the sort that 
would satisfy the maxim of REASONS-EXPLANATIONS. 
So I think, out of charity, we should not take this line of resistance as a wholesale 
rejection of the cognitive constraint. Indeed, I think the foregoing show that all parties to 
the debate should concede that any plausible theory of acting for a reason needs 
something to at least fill the theoretical role of a cognitive constraint. Here, then, might be 
the second (and more charitable) way of seeing the current line of resistance: as trying to 
persuade us that Psychologism, in a way, itself offers a cognitive constraint on acting for a 
reason. While the Belief View provides a cognitive constraint by making A’s belief that r a 
necessary condition on A’s Φing for the reason that r, however, Psychologism does so by 
making A’s belief that r a constitutive condition on A’s Φing for the reason that r. Seeing 
things though this lens, one might think that there is ultimately not much to choose 
between the two theories in question. 
I think, however, that there is a clear choice between these two theories. Let us 
suppose that the Psychologist has convinced us that a view like B-Psychologism is just as 
plausible as the Belief View. The resulting view still suffers a serious, and in my view 
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unacceptable, cost. What we are supposed to be persuaded of here is that the theoretical 
role of the Belief View can be filled by a view like B-Psychologism. The need for a 
cognitive constraint, this way of thinking goes, is satisfied by Psychologism. But this is 
tantamount to claiming that the notion that whenever A Φs for the reason that r, r is 
something A believes (namely, p), can be reduced to the notion that whenever A Φs for 
the reason that r, r is the fact that A believes that p. This brand of Psychologism tells us 
that endorsing this latter claim is (inter alia) really a way of endorsing the former claim. As 
such, the resulting theory is one that has no room for a legitimate distinction between A’s 
Φing for the reason that r and A’s Φing for the reason that A believes that r. But there 
clearly is a distinction here, as Jonathan Dancy has so compellingly observed: 
Someone who believes that there are pink rats living in his shoes may take that he believes 
this as a reason to go to the doctor or perhaps a psychoanalyst. This is quite 
different from the person who takes (his belief) that there are pink rats living in his 
shoes as a reason to call the pest control officer. Such contrasts show that we will 
distort what we have been calling the light in which the agent acted, or the agent’s 
reasons, if we insist that they are [all] properly specified as ‘that he believed that 
p.’).80 
This example illustrates the clear and important difference between Φing for the reason 
that r and Φing for the reason that one believes that r. In most cases, the difference can be 
located in what these two considerations are taken to favor. There being pink rats in my 
shoes seems to favor calling the pest control officers; my believing that there are pink rats in 
my shoes seems to favor calling my psychiatrist (or taking a moment to rub my eyes, 
collect my thoughts, or what have you). Any theory of acting for a reason that cannot 
countenance these facts, or the distinction undergirding them, should be thrown out. 
                                                
80 See Dancy [2000: 125]; and also Alvarez [2010: 48-49], Anscombe [1989: 381], Hyman [1999: 444-
446], and Joseph Raz [1999] for corroborating treatments of similar examples. I am not here implying, as 
many do, that such examples show directly that Psychologism is false. Instead, I claim only that such cases 
illustrate an obvious distinction. 
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It is worth noting here, as it was in the previous section, that these problems are 
not confined to theories that endorse the Belief View (rather than some other cognitive 
constraint). For the general underlying problem here is a kind of conflation of the idea 
that agents must bear some significant cognitive relation to any consideration in order to 
be motivated by it with the idea that the considerations which motivate agents are their 
cognitive or psychological states. Any theory that attempts to reduce a cognitive 
constraint on acting for a reason to a psychologistic ontology of reasons will be guilty of 
such a conflation. This might not be grounds for rejecting Psychologism if every plausible 
theory of reasons were bound to make this conflation. But a theory that accepts a 
cognitive constraint on acting for a reason (such as the Belief View or the Knowledge 
View), while rejecting Psychologism, need not be guilty of such conflation. This is easily 
shown by considering what such a view would say about Dancy’s case involving the pink 
rats. If A’s reason is that there are pink rats in my shoes, the Belief View says that A can act for 
that reason (and call, for example, the pest control officer) so long as A believes it to be so. 
If A’s reason really is that I believe that there are pink rats in my shoes, the Belief View says that 
A can act for that reason as well (and call, for example, the psychiatrist) –– so long as A 
believes that to be so. Such a view clearly has no trouble respecting the distinction 
between placing a cognitive constraint on acting for a reason and conceiving of a reason 
for acting as a cognitive state. Now, one might reasonably think that there is not much to 
choose, all else equal, between the view that 
 
Whenever A Φs for the reason that r, r is the fact that A believes that p; 
 
and the view that 
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Whenever A Φs for the reason that r, r is something A believes (namely, p). 
 
But there is surely an easy choice between a theory that recognizes the difference between 
these two views and a theory that does not. 
Summary Remarks 
Where does all of this get us? We started out by observing that there are two 
seemingly plausible views in the theory of reasons: the Belief View and B-Psychologism. 
We then observed that when we try to combine these two views, the resulting view is 
deeply implausible. That being the case, we were left with three choices. The first choice 
is to simply endorse the resulting view despite its serious shortcomings. The second choice 
was to give up the idea that there is any cognitive constraint on acting for a reason –– that 
when A Φs for the reason that r, A must bear some cognitive connection to r. The third 
choice was to give up Psychologism, and admit that motivating reasons for acting might 
be things other than the psychological states of agents. 
 I think that the picture of acting for a reason discussed in subsection one shows 
that the first option is to be avoided if at all possible. It is simply not plausible that acting 
for a reason or action explanation is always accompanied and made possible by second-
order psychological states. The second option is shown to be implausible, at least initially, 
by cases like Inconsiderate Edmund. It is simply not clear how such cases could be 
possible. We are also pressured away from the second option in view of how difficult 
questions about motivation, the individuation and possession of reasons, and action 
explanation become without any cognitive constraint. Though Psychologism may not be 
able to counter the hard intuition that cases like Inconsiderate Edmund are not possible, 
it might be able to go some way toward satisfying concerns about these theoretical 
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pressures. In doing so, however, Psychologism must effectively collapse a distinction that 
any plausible theory should be able to countenance. The conflicting Belief View, on the 
other hand, can preserve the distinction. I take this to show, all together, that the second 
option is also not the most preferable. The best way to resolve the tension between these 
two views, I conclude, is to give up Psychologism, and preserve the commitment to the 
cognitive constraint on acting for a reason (whatever the correct view of that may be). 
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Chapter Three:  Arguments from Error 
At this point, I hope to have made the case for two main thoughts, which are 
answers to central questions in theorizing about action and reasons. The first is that in 
order for an agent to act for a reason r, it need not be the case that r. The second is that in 
order for an agent to act for the reason that r, the agent need only believe that r. I have 
also argued that a byproduct of this second thought is that it is not plausible that 
whenever an agent acts for the reason that r, r is a psychological state of (or fact about) the 
acting agent. For each of these two main claims I have tried to present the intuitive case, 
and then defend them from what I take to be the best objections. In this chapter I want to 
build on the work of the previous two chapters. I think that we can extract an important 
lesson from the discussion surrounding these two issues (the factivity of acting for a 
reason, and the cognitive constraint on acting for a reason). This lesson is one that can 
give us insights as to the nature of action explanation, such that we can construct better 
overall theories of acting for a reason. 
As may be apparent by now, it is a common thought among philosophers that 
theorizing about a certain class of cases, which have been called “error cases”, is crucial 
to settling some important and central debates. These cases are those, roughly, in which 
the agent errs in some way in arriving at a view about the way the world is, and then acts 
in the light of that view of the world. Theorists divide on how they respond to error cases. 
But despite their differences, many theorists claim to glean motivation for their views 
from these cases; and many do so in the same way. They claim that while their theory has 
no trouble giving good reasons-explanations of actions in such cases, other theories are 
explanatorily deficient. 
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My primary purpose in this chapter is to show that this kind of argument is 
flawed. Interestingly, the most problematic occurrences of this strategy are seen within 
arguments that have played a large role in gaining certain views the popularity they 
currently enjoy. I will examine several of these arguments and demonstrate that they fail; 
I will then demonstrate that we can abstract away from the particulars of each argument 
to see that this kind of argument is flawed, and so each instance of it is bound to fail. The 
fatal flaw is that there is quite a large gap between what can be said about error cases 
themselves and the quite general claims about acting for reasons that theorists claim the 
cases establish; and this gap is one that can only be bridged by unmotivated and 
implausible claims about the nature of action explanation. 
The course of the chapter is as follows. In the first section, I review and present a 
general sketch of the  kind of reasoning that is supposed to take us from error cases to 
some well-received views in action theory. I separate error cases into two kinds, which I 
will call “factual” error cases and “procedural” error cases. In the second section I treat 
arguments based on factual error cases; in the third section I treat arguments based on 
procedural error cases. In each of these two sections, I demonstrate that in each instance 
of the argument from error, the most crucial moves are not warranted –– at least, not 
without the aid of some auxiliary constraint on action explanation. Problematically, the 
needed constraints are rarely made explicit by advocates of the arguments in question; 
but I show that once they are made explicit, it is clear that they should be rejected. In the 
fourth section, I return to the project I postponed at the end of the first chapter, and try to 
lay out a fuller picture of action explanation compatible with a packaging of the 
Nonfactive ViewM, the Belief View, and Non-Psychologism. I conclude in the fifth section 
with some remarks about where all of this might leave theorizing about acting for a 
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reason. Since one might take analyses of error cases to be the deciding factor for these 
debates, I briefly inquire as to where else we might look. 
In making these points I hope to encourage some reevaluation of the current 
landscape in action theory –– but  I also hope for more than that. Clearly, the points 
made in this chapter are directly applicable to theorizing about the general nature of 
explanation, and I hope to stimulate further thought on that front. Furthermore, given 
the ease with which claims about reasons are transplanted from one normative domain to 
the next, I hope that the points made here also provoke thought in epistemology and 
ethics –– about what it is to believe for a reason, about the nature of evidence, about 
responding to moral reasons, and more. I say more on that front in the fourth chapter. 
THE USE OF ERROR CASES IN ACTION THEORY 
As I said, much of these current debates revolves around accounting for what can 
be called error cases: cases wherein the agent errs in arriving at a view about how the 
world is, and then acts in the light of that erroneous view of the world. As we will soon 
see, the debates around error cases actually involve two different kinds of error cases. But 
what I want to illustrate in this first section is how error cases are generally used to 
pressure theorists away from otherwise intuitive and appealing views. Supposing that (as I 
have argued) the intuitive package of views combines the Nonfactive ViewM, Non-
Psychologism, and the Belief View, one way of seeing things is that there is a train of 
thought involving error cases which pushes us to abandon each of these views in 
succession. 
The train of thought begins with the more common of the two types of error 
cases, which I will call factual error cases. These are cases in which the agent comes 
to an erroneous view about the way the world is, and acts in the light of that erroneous 
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view of the world. There is a plain variation of our case of Edmund that fits this 
description. We can imagine that Edmund has gone out skating, taking it that the ice in 
the middle of the pond is thin. So, when he skates, Edmund keeps to the edge of the 
pond. In fact, the ice in the middle of the pond is not thin. In such a case, Edmund is 
simply wrong about the way the world is; he has made an error in taking it that thin ice: 
the ice in the middle of the pond is thin. That notwithstanding, we have also seen that it is 
natural –– even plausible –– to accord with the Nonfactive ViewM and take the case as 
one in which Edmund acts for the reason that thin ice. However, we have also seen that 
there is an influential argument against this natural reaction. For convenience, here is the 
earlier passage from Jonathan Dancy explaining how factual error cases are supposed to 
cause trouble. 
This Edmund example faces us with an inconsistent triad:                                                 
1. We explain an action by giving the reason for which it was done.                        
2. Edmund’s reason for keeping to the edge was that… the ice in the middle was 
thin                                
3. That the ice in the middle was thin is not (any part of) what explains Edmund’s 
keeping to the edge. 
This is now recognizable as one variation of the Argument from the Factivity of 
Explanation (AFE) that was addressed in the first chapter. These three claims, the 
argument goes, are jointly inconsistent. Since the first and third claims are articulations of 
the axiomatic reasons-explanations and factive explanations, we are forced to give up the 
otherwise plausible Nonfactive ViewM in favor of some kind of Factive ViewM. 
 As I have suggested, the argument, in a nutshell, comes to the claim that the 
Nonfactive ViewM is incompatible with giving satisfying reasons-explanations in factual 
error cases. Notice, though, that this argument (even if successful) only tells us what 
Edmund’s reason could not have been; it does not tell us what Edmund’s reason is or must 
have been. But we do not want our theorizing to stop at just robbing Edmund of (what he 
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and we took to be) his reason for acting. After all, he does not seem to be doing anything 
very strange, and we do not want our theory to make him out to be unintelligible. So we 
should replace thin ice with some other reason –– ideally, one that would help us to make 
sense of what Edmund is doing. This theoretical gap is thought to give an opening to 
Psychologism. How so? Again for convenience, here is the earlier passage from James 
Lenman explaining how such cases might be used to motivate Psychologism. 
It is after all extremely natural to explain the agent’s fleeing the building by reference not 
to his belief that there was a fire but to the fact that there was a fire. Or, when we 
ask, Why does Angus punch his boss? we naturally reply, Because he has been 
fired; not, Because he believes he has been fired. It’s the fact to which the belief 
answers, not the belief itself, to which the explanation of such actions naturally 
refers… 
The biggest headache for anti- psychologists such as Dancy however is furnished 
by cases where the agent’s belief is false. The fact of Angus’ being fired is naturally 
adduced to explain his punching his boss in cases where he has indeed been fired. 
But in cases where Angus punches his boss, believing mistakenly that he has been 
fired, it seems quite wrong to say he so acts because he has been fired. In such a 
case we surely must retreat to a psychologised explanation if we are to have a 
credible motivating reason explanation at all. 
The core of the argument here is quite similar to the previous argument for the Factive 
ViewM. It assumes that reasons for acting play an explanatory role, and that action 
explanation is factive. On those grounds, the argument goes, we must dismiss the idea 
that a motivating reason could be something that is not the case. But what then could it 
be? What feature of these cases could accord with these axioms and plausibly be 
considered a motivating reason? It might seem that the only good candidate is some fact 
about the agent’s psychology. Instead of saying that Angus punches his boss for the 
reason that fired: he has been fired, we should say that Angus punches his boss for the 
reason that fired*: he believes he has been fired. 
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 So one can see how factual error cases might lead one to abandon the intuitive 
Nonfactive ViewM and Non-Pyschologism in favor of some Psychologistic Factive ViewM. 
Furthermore, it is worth noting, if my argument at the end of the previous chapter is 
correct, the truth of Psychologism all but rules out the truth of the Belief View. 
I said a moment ago that there are two different kinds of error cases. We have so 
far only looked at one kind; but it is the second kind that is often instrumental in moving 
from Psychologism to a view often called 
 
Disjunctivism: If A Φs for the reason that r, then: 
  either A knows that r, and so Φs for the reason that r; 
or A Φs for the reason that A believes that r. 81 
Disjunctivism, in a sense, incorporates the wisdom of Psychologism. But it is perhaps 
more flexible than Psychologism. Like Psychologists, Disjunctivists are impressed by the 
arguments involving factual error cases. They think that Angus’ reason, for example, 
could not have been that he was fired. They also think that the best explanation of what 
he is doing is a psychologized one, such as the claim that he believes that he was fired. But 
while Psychologism holds all reasons to be psychological facts about agents, Disjunctivism 
appears to allow that some reasons may be located outside the agent. Pairs of cases are 
often illustrative here. Compare Angus with Agnes, who has been fired. Agnes knows that 
her boss has fired her; so, when she is packing up her things to leave the office, she 
punches her boss. Psychologism holds that both Angus and Agnes act for the reason that 
                                                
81 Here I have given what I hope to be a fair rendering of Hornsby’s [2008: 252] account. Her account uses 
“because” where I have “for the reason;” but she explicitly states that her “because” should be understood 
in that way. As Dancy [2008] demonstrates, it takes a bit of work to formulate the account as both 
disjunctive and as about acting for reasons. Admittedly, the view is not shared in exactly this form by all 
who identify as “Disjunctivist”. For example, Hyman [2011] distinguishes between being guided by the fact 
that r and treating r as a premise (which does not count as acting for a reason); McDowell [2013] prefers to 
talk of acting in the light of a fact. 
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fired*. Disjunctivism, contrastingly, can say that Agnes acts for the reason that fired while 
Angus acts for the reason that fired*. The trigger for the alternative (psychologized) gloss, 
of course, is lack of knowledge on the part of the agent. 
Notice that this way of advocating for Disjunctivism over Psychologism must 
include an argument for what I have been calling the Knowledge View. As we saw, there 
is a debate between those who endorse the Knowledge View and those who endorse the 
Belief View. Like Psychologists and Factivists, adherents of the Knowledge View think 
that error cases give their view a decisive advantage over their opponents. But adherents 
of the Knowledge View are interested in a different kind of error case than Psychologists 
and Factivists. Here again is Jennifer Hornsby, laying out the kind of argument that has 
won the Knowledge View an increasing amount of favor: 
Edmund… believes that the ice in the middle of the pond is dangerously thin, having 
been told so by a normally reliable friend. But Edmund’s friend didn’t want 
Edmund to skate in the middle of the pond (never mind why), so that he had told 
Edmund that the ice there was thin despite having no view about whether or not 
it actually was thin. Edmund, then, did not keep to the edge because the ice in the 
middle of the pond was thin… The fact that ice was thin does not explain 
Edmund’s acting, even though Edmund did believe that it was thin, and even 
though the fact that it was thin actually was a reason for him to stay at the edge…  
Edmund here is used to show that someone’s having a true belief (even a justified 
one) which explains their acting is not sufficient for them to have acted for an (F)-
type reason. We saw that an (F)-type reason has to have registered with an agent if 
they are to have acted on it. We see now what this amounts to. A condition of Φ-
ing for the reason that p, when one believes that p,  is that one knows that p. 
Notice This reworked example of Edmund involves a different kind of error from the 
ones we encountered in the arguments over factivity and Psychologism. Edmund’s error 
(if it can be called that) is not a pure factual error –– indeed, Edmund has a true belief 
about whether the ice in the middle of the pond is thin. Rather, this is what I will call a 
procedural error case: a case wherein the agent in some way errs in the process of 
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coming to a view of the world, and then proceeds to act in the light of that view of the 
world. Edmund has arrived at his belief that thin ice in such a way that his belief does not 
amount to knowledge. In that sense Edmund’s belief-forming process is erroneous, and he 
is acting in the light of an erroneous view of the world. 
As we have seen, advocates of the Knowledge View hold that this makes it 
impossible for Edmund to act for the reason that thin ice. The style of argument here is 
often similar to that of the argument for the Factive View and for Psychologism. 
Advocates of the Knowledge View observe that reasons for acting play an explanatory 
role, and that explanation is factive. On the one hand, the Disjunctivist is impressed by 
the arguments for the Factive View and Psychologism in factual error cases. But what about 
cases in which the agent makes no factual error? One might think there is little motivation 
to psychologize reasons in such cases, since there will be no tension between the falsity of 
the agent’s reason and the temptation to use the reason to explain the agent’s action. But 
procedural error cases are supposed to show us that, at least outside of factual error cases, 
the agent must know her reason for acting; otherwise we cannot give a reasons-
explanation of her action. Disjunctivism, its advocates claim, is the only view that 
captures both of these truths. 
In this section I have revisited and given a rough sketch of three influential 
arguments for popular views about acting for reasons. I have also illustrated how theorists 
might progress in their analyses of error cases, and shown how these influential arguments 
might be connected. All three of Psychologism, Disjunctivism, and the Knowledge View 
might rely on the argument in favor of the Factive ViewM; Disjunctivism further relies on 
the arguments for Psychologism and the Knowledge View.82 Although these views are 
                                                
82 I think that what I say here is true for a standard sort of Disjunctivism. Two possible exceptions worth 
noting are Alvarez [2010] and McDowell [2013], who might both be counted as Disjunctivist in some 
sense. But both Alvarez and McDowell refuse arguments for Psychologism, and Alvarez herself does not 
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different (even occasionally at odds), the main arguments for these views share a common 
core: they all claim that error cases pose an explanatory challenge that only one view can 
face up to. The challenge, specifically, is to reserve a significant explanatory role for 
reasons in error cases. All competing views, theorists who employ these arguments claim, 
are explanatorily deficient in error cases. But is that true? 
ARGUMENTS FROM FACTUAL ERROR 
In this section, I will continue my argument that it is not true –– or at least, that 
such claims are not earned by the lines of reasoning just laid out. I say that I will continue 
(rather than begin) my argument because some of the necessary work was completed in 
the first two chapters. What I hope to show out now, drawing on the work from the 
previous two chapters, is this. All arguments from error have in common a two-step 
structure. The first step in such arguments is what I will call reason-robbing: the 
argument is first supposed to establish what the agent’s reason could not have been. We 
are supposed to be able to infer on this basis that certain views of acting for a reason are 
false. The second step in arguments from error is what I will call reason-replacing: the 
argument is then supposed to establish what the agent’s reason must have been (if not the 
thing of which the agent was just robbed). In what follows, I will argue that both crucial 
steps rely on implausible constraints on action explanation. I will focus my critique on just 
the first step, and demonstrate that arguments from error do not even get so far as to 
warrant the reason-robbing that they purport to do. 
 There are some who have already criticized the use of similar arguments 
in action theory. Maria Alvarez says that 
                                                                                                                                            
explicitly endorse the standard arguments for the Knowledge View. Furthermore, as we will see, it may be 
possible to understand McDowell’s argument for the Knowledge View as not relying on any argument for 
the Factive ViewM. 
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It can be argued that reasoning from error cases to a general conclusion about what 
motivating reasons are is a form of the ‘argument from error’ and that argument 
is, at best, unreliable. For, as has been pointed out, if critical examination of cases 
of error or failure… leads to some conclusion regarding what to say about those 
cases, it does not follow that we must say the same about the veridical or success 
cases. 83 
I agree with Alvarez that even if an argument from error showed (for example) that 
Psychologism gives the correct verdict in error cases, it would not follow that Psychologism 
is generally true. But I want to argue that arguments from error do not even give us the 
correct diagnoses in error cases; and I want to do so in what I take to be a novel way. 
Since factual error cases are more common to the discussion of the major issues in 
the area, I will start with those. As a first step, here is a rough pass at laying out the the 
argument from factual error cases for both the Factive ViewM and Psychologism. 
 
[1] Whenever A Φs for the reason that r, we can explain A’s Φing by giving r. 
[2] If it is not the case that r, then r cannot be any part of what explains anything. 
[3] So, whenever A Φs for the reason that r, r cannot be something that is not the 
case. 
[4] In some cases, A appears to Φ for the reason that r, though it is not the case 
that r. 
[5] In such cases, A at least believes that r. 
[6] The fact that A believes that r can explain A’s Φing. 
[7] In such cases, there is no other fact that can explain A’s Φing. 
[8] So, in such cases, the fact that A believes that r is A’s reason for Φing. 
 
                                                
83 See Alvarez [2010: 135-136]. See also Dancy [1995: 423-428]. 
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Here claims [1]-[3] are an attempt at representing the influential argument for the 
Factive ViewM (laid out earlier from Jonathan Dancy). They are supposed to accomplish 
the reason-robbing step of teaching us that Edmund’s reason for acting could not have 
been anything that is not the case. Claims [4]-[8] are an attempt at representing the 
influential argument for Psychologism (laid our earlier from James Lenman). They are 
supposed to accomplish the reason-replacing step of teaching us that Edmund’s reason for 
acting must have been a psychological fact about him. 
The progression from [1] to [3] provides a nice starting point, because the 
inference there represented is in danger of being fallacious. It also includes a claim –– 
claim [2] –– which we have seen no theorist really accepts. Our discussion in the first 
chapter equips us to see what needs to happen here: either [1] or [2], or possibly both, 
needs to be revised. There is a logical gap created by the phrases “we can explain A’s 
Φing by giving r” in [1] and “r cannot be any part of what explains anything” in [2]. I 
suggested in the first chapter that this style of argument has nonetheless managed to 
persuade many who have not noticed the subtle ambiguities (and here, equivocation) in 
the notion of being explanatory. In illustrating the intuitive appeal of certain nonfactive and 
non-psychologistic views, for example, Lenman expresses the axiom of REASONS-
EXPLANATIONS by saying that we “explain… by reference” to the reason, that the 
“explanation… naturally refers” to the reason, and that the reason is “naturally adduced 
to explain” the action in question. In noting the supposed problem that the case of Angus 
poses for certain views, though, Lenman expresses the axiom by saying that “it seems 
quite wrong to say he so acts because he has been fired”. The first, intuitive way of 
capturing the axiom is perhaps adequately expressed by one or more of our 
disambiguations from chapter one. Consider, for example, 
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[1a] A reason is the kind of thing that can be given in an answer to a “Why?” 
question. 
 
It also seems consistent with the explanatory role I have suggested the Nonfactive ViewM 
could reserve for false motivating reasons: such reasons are legitimately explanatory in 
that the action can be explained by specifying them. 
But Lenman’s second way of stating the axiom would be more precisely expressed 
by some other disambiguation. Plausible candidates might include the following. 
 
[1a*] A reason is the kind of thing that can be given as an answer to a “Why?” 
question. 
[1b] A reason is the kind of thing that can replace q in a claim of the form “P 
because q”. 
[1c] A reason is the kind of thing that can be the explanans of an action. 
 
Now, as saw in the first chapter, this second group of claims is importantly different from, 
and possibly at odds with, claim [1a]. Furthermore, for claim [1a] to be used in a reason-
robbing move, we also saw, it would need to be accompanied by the claim that 
 
[2a] Anything that can be given in an answer to a “Why?” question must be a 
fact. 
 
This is the variation of FACTIVE EXPLANATIONS that must be paired with [1a] to logically 
rule out the possibility of false motivating reasons. But claim [2a] is deeply implausible 
(and endorsed by no one, so far as I know). As such, it presents  an uncontroversial 
 150 
example of the general kind of lesson I want to draw about arguments from error. Why, 
exactly, is claim [2a] implausible, and not endorsed by anyone? It is so because it places 
an incredibly implausible constraint on action explanation, which we can call 
 
NO FALSE THAT-CLAUSES: if some claim q explains some other claim p, then q 
cannot contain any false that-clauses. 
 
This claim is clearly implausible, and should be rejected by everyone. Though FACTIVE 
EXPLANATIONS may be true, NO FALSE THAT-CLAUSES clearly does not capture the sense 
in which this is so. Psychologized explanations illustrate why. If the NO FALSE THAT-
CLAUSES constraint holds, then in error cases we cannot explain the agents’ actions via 
their false beliefs. But such psychologized explanations are extremely promising. More 
importantly, as the passage from Lenman pointed out, factual error cases are the very 
cases for which psychologized explanations are most appealing. Indeed, the most 
common move for those who wish to rob Edmund of his reason that THIN ICE is to then 
replace it with the reason that THIN ICE*: he believes that the ice in the middle of the 
pond is thin. If we accord with REASONS-EXPLANATIONS (thinking that explanatory 
claims must at least include the contents of the agent’s reason for acting), then this move 
will lead to psychologized explanations like the one just given. But in factual error cases, 
then, reasons-explanations are bound to include a falsehood, and therefore violate the NO 
FALSE THAT-CLAUSES constraint. The lesson here is not that we should disregard such 
reasons-explanations as unsuccessful. Instead, what we can take from all of this is that any 
argument from error in which the reason-robbing strategy is held up by NO FALSE THAT-
CLAUSES is shown to be quite unpromising. 
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Much of this has been by way of review, as it were. But I hope now to be moving 
from specific points about particular arguments to general lessons about theorizing in the 
area. Error cases by themselves present no threat to intuitive views such as the Nonfactive 
ViewM. Even when we know that Edmund is being motivated by a false consideration, 
that fact alone might not persuade us that that consideration could not be his motivating 
reason. What I am now calling arguments from error are supposed to take us from the 
data of error cases to certain views about acting for a reason. Now, we saw in the first 
chapter that some such arguments trade on implausible premises, such as [2a]. But what I 
hope to reveal now is that these implausible premises also imply, entail, or simply amount 
to implausible views about the nature of and rules governing either action explanation or 
explanation in general –– views such as NO FALSE THAT-CLAUSES. My claim, then, is that 
arguments from error in general depend on implausible views about explanation; without 
these views, it is quite difficult to develop arguments from error cases which threaten the 
intuitive positions of the Nonfactive ViewM, Non-Psychologism, or the Belief View. The 
NO FALSE THAT-CLAUSES constraint presents an easy target as far as all of this goes. I now 
turn my attention to more difficult targets. 
The Explanatory and Explanantia 
The second grouping of claims above points toward one such target. For 
convenience, here is that group of claims once more. 
 
[1a*] A reason is the kind of thing that can be given as an answer to a “Why?” 
question. 
[1b] A reason is the kind of thing that can replace q in a claim of the form “P 
because q”. 
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[1c] A reason is the kind of thing that can be the explanans of an action. 
 
We saw in the first chapter that various arguments from error may rely on one or more of 
these claims. For example, we saw that someone might try to argue for the Factive ViewM 
as follows. 
 
[1c] A reason is the kind of thing that can be the explanans of an action. 
[2c] Anything that can be the explanans of an action is a fact. 
[3c] Therefore, all reasons are facts. 
 
Such an argument would purport to underpin a reason-robbing move in any case where 
the agent appears to act for the reason that r but it is not the case that r. It might also 
gesture toward a reason replacing move: whatever else r is, it must be a fact. 
Now, [1a*], [1b], and [1c] perhaps imply different ontologies about what it is to 
be an explanans –– a thing that explains. That notwithstanding, they seem to share a 
common thread: when an agent acts for a reason, the reason itself is what explains the 
agent’s action. This thought is explicit in [1c]. Under the framework suggested by [1a*], 
one might hold that the explanans is the answer to the relevant “Why?” question. Under 
the framework suggested by [1b], one might hold that the explanans is whatever can be 
substituted for q. Each of these points toward the more general thought that 
 
EXPLANANTIA ARE REASONS: in any reasons-explanation for which the 
explanandum is A’s Φing, the explanans must be A’s reason for Φing (r). 
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We can imagine how a principle like this might underly some reason-robbing moves, like 
that implied in [1c]-[3c]. After all, if the explanans of any action done for a reason just is the 
reason, then the reason for acting can never be a falsehood. For then we strictly violate 
our commitment to FACTIVE EXPLANATIONS, which plainly states that nothing that is not 
the case can explain anything. Here is Jonathan Dancy, illustrating (perhaps 
unintentionally) how parties on multiple sides of the debate have relied on something like 
this principle. 
Sentences of the form ‘his reason for V-ing was that p’ can be true even when it is not the 
case that p… This led me to think that these explanations of action are not factive, 
since ‘his reason for V-ing was that p’ does not entail p. And this raised the 
bewildering question how something that is not the case can be what explains 
something that is the case. Some thinkers are so put off by this question that they 
resort to different accounts of the agent’s reason for any case where the agent has 
made a mistake. The most popular account is [Psychologism]. 84 
We can see here how something like EXPLANANTIA ARE REASONS can underpin both 
reason-robbing arguments and responses to those arguments. 
The trouble, though, is that it is not plausible that EXPLANANTIA ARE REASONS. 
Here again is Jonathan Dancy, revealing some of the insight as to why. 
If we stick to this thought [that we explain an action by specifying the reason for which it 
was done], the only possible resolution is that the explanans is not identical with 
the reason for which the action was done… we can say that what explains the 
action is that it was done for the reason that p, without committing ourselves to 
saying that what explains the action is that p. 85 
In Dancy’s framework for action explanation, the sentences of the form “A’s reason for 
Φing is that r” are reasons-explanations of actions in the sense that these sentences are 
what explain the actions. As I indicated in chapter one, it seems wholly undeniable to me 
that sentences of this form present at least one kind of action explanation. I am also 
                                                
84 See Dancy [2014: 89]. 
85 See Dancy [2014: 90]. 
 154 
inclined to agree with Dancy that such explanations work without entailing that r is the 
explanans of A’s Φing. 
So I think that Dancy’s remarks nicely show one way in which EXPLANANTIA ARE 
REASONS might simply be false. More important, though, is what this principle implies 
about the  general nature of explanation. This principle implies that the explanatory role 
of something (a reason, for example) consists in being the explanans of some explanandum. 
But this deeper constraint on explanation seems to me deeply implausible. In view of the 
fact that the Nonfactivist may be better off not saying that motivating reasons are 
explanantia, Dancy seems to shy away from saying that reasons themselves do any significant 
explanatory work. He says that, in doing this, he has “yielded to a barrage of criticism” 
from many, including Wayne Davis. 86 As Davis puts it, 
We need to distinguish the claim that actions can be explained by reference to reasons from the 
claim that reasons are what explain the action. The former is true, the latter is false. 
The statement that my reason for saving was that my son will need money for 
college does explain why I saved. But it does not follow, and it is not true, that my 
reason explains my action… my action would have the same explanation even if I 
were wrong in thinking that my son will be going to college. The claim that 
motivating reasons are things that explain actions is undermined by the fact that 
motivating reasons are intentional objects. To think of reasons themselves as 
explanatory is to treat instances of "that p” as referential terms. 
I think that the distinction marked by Davis is a genuine and important one. I also think, 
however, that Davis’ distinction admits of another distinction: that between explaining 
the action and being what explains the action. I want to suggest that, even when they are not 
explanantia (again, conceiving of an explanans in such ways as the answer to the question 
“Why?”, the proposition that substitutes in for q in “P because q;” the whole set of sentences 
that accounts for the explanandum; or some other such), there is a legitimate sense in which 
reasons explain actions. 
                                                
86 See Dancy [2014: 90] and David [2003: 456]. 
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I gestured in the first chapter at why I think this. Some things –– some contents, 
for example –– seem to me to make indispensable contributions to explanations without 
themselves being the thing that explains the explanandum. They can, in this way, explain 
without being what explains. Let us all grant that one good explanation of Edmund’s 
skating near the edge of the pond is that he believes that THIN ICE: the ice in the middle of 
the pond is thin. Let us also suppose that the explanans is either Edmund’s believing that 
THIN ICE or the fact that he believes that THIN ICE. In my view, the consideration (or 
proposition, state of affairs, or content, if you like) that THIN ICE itself makes an 
indispensable explanatory contribution here. One indication of this is that the 
explanation of Edmund’s action, even when routed through Edmund’s belief, seems to be 
hopeless without this content. We could not very well hold that the explanans is Edmund’s 
belief that black briefcases are better than brown briefcases, for example. The reason we 
could not plausibly hold this is that this belief does not have a content suited to figure in 
an explanation of Edmund’s skating near the edge of the pond (at least, not without 
adding quite a bit more to the story). Once we have observed that the contents of reasons 
–– whatever reasons may be, ontologically speaking –– are indispensable to good reasons-
explanations of actions, I think we need good reason to refuse the idea that the contents 
themselves do some of the explanatory work. 
I address two natural responses to this way of suggesting that something can 
explain without being the explanans. As we saw in the first chapter, it will do no good to 
respond here that THIN ICE cannot by itself –– that is, in isolation –– do anything to explain 
Edmund’s skating near the edge. For it is not generally true that for some thing Φ to be 
able to explain some other thing Ψ, Φ must be able to explain Ψ on its own. A better 
response is that what explains Edmund’s skating, for example, is perhaps the compound 
entity of Edmund’s mental state (belief) and the consideration in question (THIN ICE). 
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When these two things are combined in the right way (namely, when THIN ICE is what 
Edmund believes), we get something that explains Edmund’s action, and which is also the 
explanans. But it is only the whole, and neither of the parts, that explains his action. We 
can say something similar for the sentences we hold to be explanantia. Perhaps “ice” is also 
indispensable to any good explanation of Edmund’s action; but we are not tempted to say 
that “ice” in any way explains Edmund’s action. Rather, it is the whole sentence of which 
“ice” is a part (thin ice) that explains Edmund’s action; and this whole is also the explanans. 
On this way of thinking I have three things to say. The first is that I am certainly 
not claiming that every part of every explanans itself does some explaining of the 
explanandum. Second, to the extent that we are influenced by this remark about parts and 
wholes, I suspect it is because we are smuggling in a causal model of explanation. It seems 
ridiculous to say, for example that the non-obtaining state of affairs THIN ICE causes 
anything at all; but Edmund’s belief that THIN ICE surely might cause him to skate near 
the edge. The problem here is that in giving reasons-explanations of actions, we are not in 
the business of giving (merely) causal explanations. What we want to know is what 
motivated, in the rational sense, the agent to do what he did. I am inclined to agree with 
the Non-Psychologists that, even in cases like Edmund’s, what plays this role is THIN ICE 
rather than Edmund’s belief that THIN ICE. Third, even the imposition of a causal model 
of explanation does not force us to say that, for any whole Φ and part Ψ, when Φ 
explains some fact p (in being the explanans vis-à-vis p), then Ψ does not explain p. It might 
be the complex of there being sufficient oxygen in the room, the match being dry, and the 
match being struck on the matchbox that is the explanans of the match being lit. But here I 
find no reason to deny that there being sufficient oxygen in the room at least partly 
explains (or even causes) the match being lit. Of course, it does not by itself or in isolation 
explain the match being lit; but we have dealt with that misguided thought already. 
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There being sufficient oxygen in the room explains the match being lit only as a part of 
the whole complex, which is the explanans; still, it is true that there being sufficient oxygen 
explains the match being lit. In an analogous way, I think that we can say that the 
consideration thin ice explains Edmund’s skating near the edge of the pond, even if it only 
explains as a part of some whole complex which is the explanans. Examples of such 
explanantia might include “His reason is that THIN ICE,” and “He believes that THIN 
ICE.”87 
So, I think that we can say, for example, that THIN ICE itself explains Edmund’s 
skating near the edge of the pond. It so explains, and is enabled to so explain, by being 
the consideration which motivates Edmund to skate near the edge. If we allow that we 
can give the agent’s reason for acting by specifying the consideration which motivated the 
agent to act, and also that something can explain an action by being the reason for which 
the action is done, all this really amounts to is a restatement of the axiom of REASONS-
EXPLANATIONS. Here we follow Anscombe and Davidson: 88 
The question, “What is meant by the relevant sense of ‘Why?’” and “What is meant by 
‘reason for acting’?” are one and the same. 
What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains the 
action by giving the agent’s reason for doing what he did? We may call such 
explanations rationalizations, and say that the reason rationalizes the action. 
There is a type of action explanation (which I have been calling reasons-explanation) 
which is simply defined by its explaining via the reason for which the agent acted. Of 
course, what may be controversial is sticking to this way of thinking when the reason 
                                                
87 There are some who think that, in addition to normative and motivating reasons, there is a separate class 
of explanatory reasons. Adherents to this taxonomy include Alvarez [2010], Baier [1958] and Hieronymi 
[2011]; and perhaps also Smith [1994], Darwall [2003], and Mantel [2014]. As Alvarez [2010: 33-39] 
reveals, though, at least some of the motivation for distinguishing this third class of reasons comes from 
something like an argument from error I treat here. To the extent that the explanatory framework I offer 
here is feasible, such motivation is weakened. 
88  See Anscombe [1957: 9] and Davidson [1963: 685]. See also Setiya [2007: 23, 42]. 
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appears to be a falsehood. Now, if there is independent reason to think that A cannot Φ 
for the reason that r when it is not the case that r, then that could certainly be brought the 
bear here. But we examined that controversy in the first section, and found the case for 
the Factive ViewM wanting. Once we have on board that A can Φ for the reason that r 
even when it is not the case that r, I think that we should stick to our guns and say that in 
such cases r still plays an explanatory role with respect to A’s Φing. This comes down to 
simply remaining steadfast in our commitment to REASONS-EXPLANATIONS. The subject 
of controversy should be rather in what sense a false motivating consideration can explain 
an action, and, in the light of our answer to that question, in what sense FACTIVE 
EXPLANATIONS remains intact. As Bernard Williams observed, there is some pressure not 
to have our explanatory framework altered for error cases: 
If there are reasons for action, it must be that people sometimes act for those reasons, and 
if they do, their reasons must figure in some correct explanation of their action (it 
does not follow that they must figure in all correct explanations of their action). 
The difference between false and true beliefs on the agent’s part cannot alter the 
form of the explanation which will be appropriate to his action.89 
So I think that, if possible, we should reserve the same explanatory role for motivating 
reasons in error cases as we do in the so-called good cases. What I have been suggesting is 
that the distinction between playing an explanatory role and being the explanation can 
help achieve this uniformity. 
In general, then, I think it is not true that (i) motivating reasons must always be 
capable of being the explanans of some action; that (ii) in reasons-explanations of actions, 
the explanans must always be identical to the agent’s reason for acting; or that (iii) the only 
way something can explain some other thing is by being the explanans of that thing. In 
general, it is not plausible to suppose that we are only in the business of seeking out an 
                                                
89   See Williams [1981: ]. See also Dancy [1995: 426; 2008: 267-268]. 
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explanation if we are in the business of identifying the explanans; and it is also not plausible 
to say that we are only in the business of giving explanations if we are stating truths. Any 
argument from error in which the reason-robbing move relies on one of these thoughts 
(or any other thought relevantly similar to EXPLANANTIA ARE REASONS or NO FALSE 
THAT-CLAUSES) will fail. Such arguments assume or imply implausible constraints on 
explanation. 
ARGUMENTS FROM PROCEDURAL ERROR 
So far I have extracted and criticized as implausible at least two possible 
constraints on action explanation that might underpin arguments from factual error. In 
this section I want to turn my attention to what I identified earlier as the second group of 
arguments from error: arguments that focus on cases of procedural error. They focus on 
cases wherein the agent’s shortcoming is procedural or perhaps normative: even if the agent 
happens to arrive at an accurate view of the world (and so makes no factual error), he has 
done so in a problematic way. Such is the case for characters like Hornsby’s Edmund, 
who is a familiar sort of character in philosophy. He has arrived at an accurate view of 
the world –– and he even has good reason for holding the view that he does –– but 
intuitively, there is something imperfect about his connection to the way the world 
actually is. Intuitively, he does not know that the ice in the middle of the pond is thin. 
Now, on some views, this precludes Edmund from acting for the reason that the ice in the 
middle of the pond is thin. Why? Here again is the core of the argument from Hornsby, 
after having laid out the details of the case sufficient for establishing that Edmund does 
not know that THIN ICE: 
Edmund, then, did not keep to the edge because the ice in the middle of the pond was 
thin… The fact that ice was thin does not explain Edmund’s acting, even though 
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Edmund did believe that it was thin, and even though the fact that it was thin 
actually was a reason for him to stay at the edge… 
As I said earlier, the structure of this argument is not completely clear. But some aspects 
of how the argument is supposed to work are familiar from the arguments from factual 
error. It is clear that central to the argument is a judgment about a claim of the form “P 
because q.” We cannot truly say, those offering this sort of argument declare, that 
“Edmund is keeping to the edge because the ice in the middle of the pond is thin;” and this 
is supposed to indicate to us that THIN ICE cannot explain Edmund’s action. But, unlike 
arguments involving factual error, the ‘because’ claim in question is not false because the 
explanans is false (indeed, it is true). Rather, the ‘because’ claim in question is supposed to 
be false because the (apparent) explanans is not something that Edmund knows. 
Putting these elements together, here is a rough pass at capturing the line of 
reasoning here: 
 
[9] In some cases where A appears to Φ for the reason that r, A does not know that 
r. 
[10] If A does not know that r, then A cannot Φ because r. 
[11] If A cannot Φ because r, then r cannot be what explains A’s Φing. 
[12] So, in such cases, r cannot be what explains A’s Φing. 
[13] Whenever A Φs for the reason that r, r can be what explains A’s Φing. 
[14] So, in such cases, A cannot Φ for the reason that r. 
[15] So, in order for A to Φ for the reason that r, A must know that r. 
 
Though such arguments are centered around a different kind of error, the basic structure 
is the same as in arguments from factual error: the first step [9]-[14] is to complete a 
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reason-robbing inference as to what the agent’s reason could not have been, and the 
second step [14]-[15] is to complete a reason-replacing inference as to what the agent’s 
reason must have been. As I did in the previous section, I would like to focus on the 
reason-robbing move in this argument. Implicit in this sort of reason-robbing move is 
something like one of the variations of the Argument from the Factivity of Explanation 
we critiqued in the first chapter: 
 
[1b] A reason is the kind of thing that can replace q in a claim of the form “P 
because q”. 
[2b] Anything that can replace q in a claim of the form “P because q” is a fact. 
[3b] Therefore, all reasons are facts. 
  
To the extent that the reason-robbing argument here does rely on this variation of AFE, 
it will suffer the criticisms pointed out in the first chapter. Also implicit in the reason-
robbing move here is something like the idea that EXPLANANTIA ARE REASONS. This 
constraint seems to make an appearance in securing claims [13] and [14]. To the extent 
that the argument here relies on such a constraint, it will suffer the criticisms pointed out 
in the previous section. 
Explanations and Accidents 
At this point, though, I should like to focus more on the picture of explanation 
that seems to be in the background of this Hornsby-style argument. We can begin by re-
raising the question as to why anyone should follow the progression from claim [9] to 
claim [11]. Why should we think that Edmund’s not knowing that THIN ICE precludes 
THIN ICE from explaining his action? After all (in this version of the case), it is true that 
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thin ice, despite Edmund’s not knowing it. So it is not our commitment to FACTIVE 
EXPLANATIONS that is creating trouble here. Furthermore, even though Edmund does 
not know that THIN ICE, Edmund is significantly cognitively connected to THIN ICE: he 
believes it, and perhaps believes it for good reason. Importantly, this is the kind of 
cognitive connection that we would expect to make a difference to the way that Edmund 
acts. What intentional actions an agent performs seems to be at least partly determined by 
what the agent believes. Finally, Edmund is doing exactly what we would expect any 
rational agent to do, given that he believes that THIN ICE. Indeed, any of us, if asked in 
place of Edmund why we are skating near the edge of the pond, would likely respond 
with some appeal to THIN ICE. All of this seems to cast serious doubt on our arrival at 
claim [11], and on any reason-robbing inference there involved. Intuitively, it does not 
seem to matter that Edmund does not know that THIN ICE; his merely believing it and 
being motivated by it seems to put it in a position of explanatory power with respect to his 
action. 
As we saw in the previous chapter, John McDowell gives us a way to see why this 
Hornsby-style might be appealing. Here again is what I take to be the revealing passage. 
… we know that [the agent] takes the relevant fact to obtain, and we know that it does 
obtain. But in knowing only that much, we do not know whether its obtaining is 
anything but a happy accident in relation to her cognitive position. [This] version 
of acting in the light of a fact is not sensitive to the difference between cases in 
which the obtaining of the fact is, and cases in which it is not, a mere happy 
accident in relation to the agent’s cognitive position… If, but only if, the obtaining 
of the fact by virtue of whose obtaining the relevant belief is true is not a happy 
accident in relation to the agent’s cognitive position, we can say that the fact itself 
is exerting a rational influence on the agent’s will; we can say that in doing what 
[he] is doing the agent is responding rationally to the fact itself …90 
                                                
90   See McDowell [2013: 16-17]. 
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The suggestion here, it seems to me, is that though a character like Edmund might be 
cognitively connected to THIN ICE in a significant way, his being connected to the-fact-that- 
THIN ICE seems to be a mere “happy accident.” The accidental nature of this connection 
compromises the ability of thin ice to play an explanatory role with respect to Edmund’s 
skating near the edge of the pond –– it compromises our ability to explain Edmund’s so 
skating by casting it as a rational response to THIN ICE. 
In the previous chapter I registered doubts about the legitimacy of the notion of 
the-fact-itself. I also began to put pressure on the idea that Edmund’s fortuitous connection 
to THIN ICE precludes it from being the consideration that motivates him to act as he 
does. McDowell might be right that Edmund’s being significantly cognitively connected 
to THIN ICE is in some sense a “happy accident.” But, given that Edmund is cognitively 
connected to THIN ICE in the way that he is –– given that he believes it for good reason, 
and takes it to favor keeping to the edge of the pond –– it is certainly no happy accident 
that he acts as he does. That notwithstanding, McDowell insists that the accidental nature 
of Edmund’s cognitive connection to THIN ICE prevents it from playing an explanatory 
role vis-á-vis his action, as something to which Edmund responds rationally. According to 
McDowell, 
There is an intelligible interpretation of the claim that Edmund is keeping to the edge 
because the ice is thin, on which the claim is not true in [Hornsby’s] story, 
because [Edmund does not know that the ice is thin], even in the version of the 
example in which the ice was indeed thin… there is another form in which 
propositions like ‘the ice is (was) thin’ can––sometimes, but not in the case 
[Hornsby] considers––be brought into explanatory connection with the 
statements about what people are doing or have done.91 
 
 
                                                
91   See McDowell [2013: 18]. 
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This reveals, in combination with the previous passage, that underneath the Hornsby-
McDowell-style argument for the Knowledge View is something like the principle that 
 
NO HAPPY ACCIDENTS: in any explanation, the connection between the explanans 
and the explanandum cannot be a mere happy accident. 
 
So, for example, in order for a claim of the form “P because q” or “What explains p is that 
q” to be true, the connection between p and q cannot be a “mere happy accident.” 
Something like this constraint could explain why the Knowledge View is preferable to the 
Belief View, since the Belief View allows reasons (and therefore things explanatory of 
actions done for reasons) to be things merely believed by the agent. 
Unfortunately, those who might rely on NO HAPPY ACCIDENTS do not do much to 
explain what it means for a connection to be accidental. There is a way of taking the 
constraint such that it appears to rule out the possibility of any contingent relation being 
an explanatory relation. Consider a case of normal causal explanation. 
 
THE VASE AND THE VAN: Vance is in a heated argument with his wife. In a fit of 
rage, Vance throws a vase –– one of his wife's prized family heirlooms –– at the 
wall near where his wife is standing. Vance misses the wall, though, and the vase 
flies out the window of their third-floor apartment onto the street below. In a bit 
of bad luck, a van is driving by at just that time; the van runs over the shattered 
vase, inflicting a flat tire which sends the van out of control into a nearby 
streetlamp. 
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It seems clear to me that in this case, it is true that the van crashed into the streetlamp 
because Vance threw the vase, and that Vance’s throwing the vase explains the van’s 
crashing into the streetlamp. It is also clear, though, that it is a mere (un)happy accident 
that the van crashed into the streetlamp given that Vance threw a vase. After all, Vance 
was aiming for the wall; the van happened to be driving by a just the time that Vance 
threw the vase; the van was driving just so that one of its tires ran over the shattered vase; 
and so on. But the accidental nature of the connection between Vance’s throwing the 
vase and the van’s crashing into the streetlamp does not give us any pause in saying that 
the former explains the latter. 
So if there is any sense in which NO HAPPY ACCIDENTS is true, it had better not be 
one which rules out the general possibility that contingent relations might be explanatory 
relations. I do not think that this is what Hornsby or McDowell intend. Perhaps this kind 
of argument for the Knowledge View is intended to constrain only the explanation of 
action in particular. Since we could set up a case just like THE VASE AND THE VAN in 
which an action replaces the van’s crashing into the streetlamp, I think we should also say 
that the constraint is meant to apply only to the rational explanation of action (or reasons-
explanations of action). Here another case might be helpful. 
 
THE VASE AND THE VISITOR: Vance is in a heated argument with his wife. In a fit 
of rage, Vance throws a vase –– one of his wife's prized family heirlooms –– at the 
wall near where his wife is standing. Vance misses the wall, though, and the vase 
flies out the window of their third-floor apartment  onto the street below. In a bit 
of good fortune for a visitor looking for a place to stay, the smashing of the vase 
draws her attention to a sign indicating that there is a vacancy at the local motel. 
So, the visitor walks over to the motel. 
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Though this case includes an action done for a reason, and perhaps even some knowledge 
on the part of the actor, it seems to me relevantly similar to THE VASE AND THE VAN in at 
least the following ways. We can explain the visitor’s walking over to the motel by saying 
that she walked there because Vance threw a vase. But of course, the connection between 
these two is utterly accidental. We can also explain the visitor’s walking over to the motel 
by citing her reason, which is perhaps that the “vacancy" sign was illuminated (or even 
just that there was a vacancy). It is true that the visitor walks over because the sign is 
illuminated, even though her knowing that the sign is illuminated is a (happy) accident. In 
the same vein, we can say that the visitor walks over because there is a vacancy at the 
motel. 
So we have found another understanding of no happy accidents such that it is not 
plausible: the fact it is an accident that the agent knows that r does not preclude r from 
being able to explain the agent’s action, even as the agent’s reason for acting. Still, 
though, I do not think we have arrived at the sense in which Hornsby and McDowell 
might endorse no happy accidents. Here is a case which might point more toward their 
sense. 
 
THE VASE AND THE VACANCY: Vance is in a heated argument with his wife. In a 
fit of rage, Vance throws a vase –– one of his wife's prized family heirlooms –– at 
the wall near where his wife is standing. Vance misses the wall, though, and the 
vase flies out the window of their third-floor apartment onto the street below. In a 
bit of good fortune for a visitor looking for a place to stay, the smashing of the vase 
draws her attention to a sign indicating that there is a vacancy at the local motel. 
So, the visitor walks over to the motel, and upon inquiring, acquires one of the 
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vacant rooms. Unbeknownst to the visitor, though, the “vacancy” sign is only 
illuminated because the motel owner accidentally flipped the switch when leaning 
against the wall. 
 
We saw in THE VASE AND THE VAN  that we could say that Vance’s throwing the vase 
explains the van’s crashing even though the connection between the two is highly 
contingent. We then saw in THE VASE AND THE VISITOR that we could say that Vance’s 
throwing the vase explains the visitor’s walking over to the motel, even though that 
connection was also highly contingent. Furthermore, we could also say that the visitor 
walks over to the motel because the sign is illuminated, or even because there is a vacancy 
at the motel. But can we say the same in THE VASE AND THE VACANCY? There is certainly 
some awkwardness in saying that the visitor walks over to the motel because there is a 
vacancy; and so we might also think that we should not say that there being a vacancy 
explains the visitor’s walking over. The best account of this awkwardness might be, as 
Hornsby and McDowell diagnose, the visitor’s fortuitous connection to the fact that there 
is a vacancy –– her cognitive connection to that fact does not amount to knowledge. It is a 
mere happy accident that she truly believes that there is a vacancy. 
However, to the extent that these considerations make us hesitant to say that the 
visitor walks over because there is a vacancy, I suspect that this is because we are once 
again smuggling in a causal conception of explanation. Since the vacancy itself is no part 
of the causal chain bringing about the visitor’s walking over, it does indeed seem incorrect 
to say that the fact that there is a vacancy causes the visitor to walk over to the motel. But 
as we have observed several times now, in wondering whether the consideration that 
there is a vacancy could, qua motivating reason, explain the visitor’s walking over, we were 
never wondering what caused anything. We were wondering what consideration motivated 
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the visitor to do what she did –– what consideration cast walking over in a favorable light 
for the visitor. Indeed, as Hornsby admits, the ‘because’ of interest “can be glossed with 
‘for the reason that’;” and we are to understand such claims to “rule out cases where the 
‘because’, of ‘because p’ and ‘because they believed that p’, is not the ‘because’ of a 
reason-explanation.”92 
So we should sift out the claim that “The visitor’s walking over was caused by 
there being a vacancy” from the claim that “The visitor walked over because there was a 
vacancy,” and rather focus only on the sense of the ‘because’ claim that could be 
rendered as “The visitor walked over for the reason that there was a vacancy.” Once we 
have done this, though, it seems completely correct to say that the visitor walked over 
because there was a vacancy; and it is not at all clear what difference lack of knowledge on 
the part of the visitor should make. Those making the Hornsby-McDowell-style argument 
for the Knowledge View might like to say something like: 
 
If the visitor knows there is a vacancy, we can say that it is no accident, given that 
there is a vacancy, that the visitor walks over to the motel. 
 
Though this is true, it gives us no grounds on which to perform a reason-robbing move 
on the visitor who merely believes that there is a vacancy. For what we are interested in is 
the explanatory connection between there being a vacancy and the visitor’s walking over. I take it 
no one would want to claim, in such a case, that the explanatory relation between these 
two things holds all on its own. Rather, the explanatory relation is enabled by a cognitive 
fact about the visitor (namely, that the visitor knows that there is a vacancy). The sense in 
                                                
92   See Hornsby [2008: 251-252]. 
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which the explanatory relation is enabled is not that it makes it possible that there being a 
vacancy causes the visitor to walk over, but rather that it makes it possible that there 
being a vacancy is something which could have served as the visitor’s reason for walking 
over. But with this in view, it seems clear that defenders of the Belief View could, in just 
the same way, say 
 
If the visitor believes there is a vacancy, we can say that it is no accident, given 
that there is a vacancy, that the visitor walks over to the motel. 
 
As above, one making this claim need not hold that there is some bare, unsupported 
explanatory relation between there being a vacancy and the visitor walking over to the 
motel. Rather, the explanatory relation is enabled by a cognitive fact about the visitor 
(namely, that the visitor believes that there is a vacancy). Just as above, the sense in which 
this explanatory relation is enabled is the rational sense. It will of course do no good to 
object at this point that in cases like THE VASE AND THE VACANCY, it is the visitor’s believing 
that there is a vacancy (and not there being a vacancy) that really explains her walking 
over –– since just the same observation could be levied against the account involving 
knowledge. 
So it seems clear that there is a legitimate sense in which things merely believed by 
agents can, when they motivate agents to act, stand in an explanatory relation to the 
actions of those agents. McDowell is one who seems happy to concede this. But he also 
wants to reserve a special (that is: distinct, and perhaps elevated) role for the case in which 
the agent acts in the light of a fact. As we have seen, it is not clear what grounds there is for 
distinguishing acting in the light of a fact (where “fact” refers to “the-fact-itself”) from 
acting in the light of a consideration which is a fact. Before putting aside NO HAPPY 
 170 
ACCIDENTS as implausible, though, I want to consider one more way that McDowell tries 
to establish the distinction. I think it is the examination of this final point that will 
elucidate why no argument from error based on a thought like NO HAPPY ACCIDENTS is 
likely to give advantage to the Knowledge View over the Belief View. McDowell says that  
Even though it is a fact, in that version of the example, that the ice in the middle of the 
pond is thin, we cannot explain his keeping to the edge by saying that that fact is 
weighing with him… or that in keeping to the edge he is responding to that fact… 
But suppose we change the example to one in which… Edmund can count as 
knowing… Now we can explain his keeping to the edge as his rational response to 
the fact that the ice is thin. 
There is no need to deny that an explanation in one of the forms [the Belief View] 
countenances can provide some understanding of an action. But if we have only 
that understanding, we do not yet know the answer to a question that should 
concern us if we are interested in how the action manifests the agent’s practical 
rationality at work. We do not yet know, and we ought to want to know, whether 
the action can be understood as a rational response to the fact in question. 
We do not have to choose between the non-factive and knowledge-requiring 
forms, as if each were a candidate for capturing the whole truth about how we 
understand actions when we see them as the agent’s rationality at work. The point 
is that if… we know only something we can express in one of the forms [the Belief 
View] explains, we know some, by all means, but only some of what there is to 
know about the rational intelligibility of the action we are considering. There is a 
question about its rational intelligibility that we are not yet in a position to answer: 
the question whether the agent, in acting as she does, is rationally responding to 
the fact in virtue of which her relevant belief is true.93 
There is much to like and take on board in McDowell’s insightful remarks here. 
Summarizing, I take McDowell to be making at least the following points. First, there is 
no flaw, per se, in the reasons-explanations that explain A’s Φing by appeal to a motivating 
consideration which the agent merely believed. Second, these reasons-explanations are 
compatible with those that require the agent to know her reason. Third, there is a 
                                                
93   See McDowell [2013: 19-20]. 
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significant sense in which if A does not know that r, we cannot explain A’s Φing by casting 
it as a practically rational response to r. 
 I make no complaint about the first two points. Instead, I take issue with the third 
point. As I said in chapter one, it seems clear that we can indeed say that, in skating near 
the edge of the pond, Edmund is responding rationally to the consideration that THIN 
ICE. This seems to me undeniable; and whether Edmund knows that THIN ICE, or indeed 
whether it is even true that THIN ICE, is irrelevant to this fact. Insofar as casting something 
as a rational response implies an explanatory relation, as McDowell seems to hold, then it 
is also clear that we can place THIN ICE in an explanatory relation to Edmund’s skating. 
McDowell claims, though, that if Edmund does not know that THIN ICE, then the 
fortuitousness of the connection between THIN ICE and Edmund’s action somehow 
prevents us from understanding Edmund’s action as “manifesting his practical rationality 
at work.” Furthermore, this fortuitousness also prevents us from knowing everything there 
is to know about the “rational intelligibility” of Edmund’s action. So, while there may be 
some explanatory role to be played by motivating considerations merely believed to be 
the case, there is a further explanatory role only to be played by motivating 
considerations known to be the case. 
At this point, I think we need to acknowledge that we can (and should) separate 
the rational intelligibility, explanation, and even evaluation of Edmund’s skating near the 
edge of the pond from that of his believing that the ice in the middle of the pond is thin. 
This separation has nothing to do with the oft-supposed divide between belief and action, 
or between so-called “practical” and “epistemic” rationality. The separation is rather the 
result of simply recognizing that skating near the edge and believing that the ice is thin are two 
different things done by Edmund, as responses to different considerations. Our account of 
the latter need not infect our account of the former; and the rational intelligibility of the 
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latter makes no difference to that of the former. We need not know anything about why 
or how Edmund came to take that THIN ICE. Once we know that he does so take it, we 
are in a position to explain his action by casting it as a response to THIN ICE. We can of 
course say that, in some sense, the case in which A Φs for the reason that r, A knows that 
r, and A’s Φing is the proper response to the consideration that r, is the exalted case of 
acting for a reason to which we all aspire. But it is difficult for me to locate any sense in 
which adding that A knows that r to the fact that A Φs for the reason that r somehow 
makes A’s Φing more of a case of acting for a reason. McDowell claims that we can see 
that certain accounts of the rational intelligibility of Edmund’s action are missing 
something by the fact that, if Edmund does not know that THIN ICE, we cannot on those 
accounts answer the question as to whether Edmund is rationally responding to the fact in 
virtue of which his belief that THIN ICE is true. But what distinguishes this question from 
the question of whether Edmund rationally responds to the consideration that THIN ICE, 
which is a fact that he believes? One might want to say that there is a difference between 
responding to the consideration that THIN ICE and responding to the truth of the consideration 
that THIN ICE (or its being the case that THIN ICE). But insofar as there is a significant 
difference here, on all accounts Edmund responds to the former and not the latter. 
Anyway, I suspect that this distinction is not quite what a McDowell-style Knowledge 
View has in mind. Ultimately, I instead suspect that the distinction between my two 
questions, according to this kind of Knowledge View, is propped up by the supposed 
distinctness of the mysterious notion of the-fact-itself. 
Summary Remarks 
We began this section conjecturing that something like NO HAPPY ACCIDENTS 
might underpin certain reason-robbing moves in arguments from error, which are 
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supposed to teach us that there is an important sense in which A cannot Φ for the reason 
that r unless A knows that r. On some understandings, NO HAPPY ACCIDENTS is 
implausible just as a constraint on explanation. On at least one of the plausible 
renderings, its plausibility relies on restricting ourselves to a purely causal notion of 
explanation. Once we notice these two facts, we struggle to find an understanding of NO 
HAPPY ACCIDENTS that could aid us in completing the reason-robbing move supposed to 
indict the Belief View and pressure us toward the Knowledge View. While it seems true 
that there is a difference between the cases where the agent knows her reason and merely 
believes her reason, the difference seems wholly to do with the agent’s cognitive state 
rather than her acting. 
VARIATIONS IN EXPLANATION 
At this point we have examined at least three constraints on explanation which 
certain arguments from error might rely on. In this section I want to consider two more 
constraints on action explanation that tend to hover even farther in the background. 
While principles like NO FALSE THAT-CLAUSES, REASONS ARE EXPLANANTIA, and NO 
HAPPY ACCIDENTS seem useful only to some particular arguments from error, I suspect 
the two constraints examined in this section are much more widely relied on. 
Translatability 
I start with that of the two constraints more relevant to the material of the 
previous section. Recall that one argument from error goes as follows. 
 
[1b] A reason is the kind of thing that can replace q in a claim of the form “P 
because q”. 
[2b] Anything that can replace q in a claim of the form “P because q” is a fact. 
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[3b] Therefore, all reasons are facts. 
 
We saw that something like this argument might be thought to favor the Factive ViewM, 
Psychologism, or even the Knowledge View. In the first chapter, I resisted claim [1b] on 
the grounds that it implies that playing an explanatory role can be reduced to playing a 
role in a ‘because’ claim. In doing so, I anticipated a kind of resistance based on the 
following remarks from John Hyman and Constantine Sandis. 94 
Reasons can be stated or given; and the canonical form of a sentence stating or giving a 
person’s reason for doing or believing something is ‘A Φed because p’. 
All reasons-statements must be translatable (without change of meaning) to any of 
the standard forms of explanation, on pain of failing to qualify as explanatory. 
In conjunction with the argument above, these considerations might be thought to exert 
some real pressure toward Factive ViewM, Psychologism, or the Knowledge View. If, 
whenever A Φs for the reason that r, there must be a true explanatory claim of the form 
“A Φs because r,” the axioms of REASONS-EXPLANATIONS and FACTIVE EXPLANATIONS 
threaten to all but rule out views like the Nonfactive ViewM, Non-Psychologism, or the 
Belief View (by some kind of argument from error). 
There are two issues raised by remarks such as Hyman’s and Sandis’. The first 
concerns what is the canonical form of reasons-explanation; the second concerns what we 
might call the principle of 
 
TRANSLATABILITY: for any two legitimate forms of reason-explanation, it must be 
possible to translate between them without any change of meaning. 
 
                                                
94 See Hyman [1999: 443] and Sandis [2013: 38], respectively. 
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To get a fuller idea of what this constraint on action explanation entails, here is some 
more of the context for the Sandis passage above. 
There is an obvious objection to my line of argument so far, namely that when asked to 
explain our actions we tend to simply state the considerations we (take ourselves to 
have) acted upon. Similarly, when we explain the acts of others we frequently do 
so by directly stating their reasons, as follows: 
  (b) He did it because it would increase his pension. 
Are these not instances of explaining an action by stating the reason itself and not 
through some further statement about what one’s reasons are? Not if (b) is 
elliptical… as John Hyman supposes… Dancy (2011) acknowledges the ‘factive 
pressure of the word “because”,’ but denies that this factive way of giving a 
reasons-explanation exhausts the possibilities, rightly complaining that ‘the 
election of one rather than another way of giving a reasons-explanation as 
canonical seems [to be] arbitrary and tendentious’. But the fact that no one form 
is canonical does not entitle us simply to ignore the form given above, for it is not 
a question of favoring the factive form over the teleological (or vice-versa). Rather, 
all reasons-statements must be translatable (without change of meaning) to any of 
the standard forms of explanation, on pain of failing to qualify as explanatory. 
Now, I am inclined to agree with Dancy that debates over the canonical form of reasons-
explanations are not likely to be fruitful or enlightening. But if Sandis (or the principle of 
TRANSLATABILITY) is correct, which form is canonical might make no difference. Indeed, 
views about which explanatory forms are canonical might be completely irrelevant 
without some such constraint. On this way of thinking, once something is established as at 
least being a standard form of reasons-explanation, any additional candidate form can be 
(partly) tested for legitimacy by whether it can be translated into that standard form. 
One can see how this principle might be used to eliminate explanatory resources 
useful to opponents of the Factive ViewM, Psychologism, or the Knowledge View. In 
addressing the argument given by [1b]-[3b], for example, I suggested in the first chapter 
that one might refuse [1b] in favor of 
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[1b*] A motivating reason is the kind of thing the content of which can replace r 
in a claim of the form, “A’s reason for Φing is r.” 
 
The truth of [1b*] might be thought to do damage to, say, the Factive ViewM, since if 
[1b*] is true, one cannot plausibly use FACTIVE EXPLANATIONS to argue that reasons are 
factive. For the Nonfactive ViewM on offer might hold that the explanation of A’s Φing is 
the (true) claim that A Φs for the reason that r. Though there may here be a violation of a 
principle like NO FALSE THAT-CLAUSES, there is no violation of any plausible 
understanding of FACTIVE EXPLANATIONS. But is the claim that “A Φs for the reason that 
r” a legitimate reasons-explanation of A’s Φing? Perhaps not, if the principle of 
TRANSLATABILITY is correct. For we know that “A Φs because r” is a standard 
explanatory form; but we may not be able to translate a claim of the form “A Φs for the 
reason that r” into such a ‘because’ claim without any change in meaning. A hint that this 
is so is that, on their presently intended uses, one of these forms requires that r be true, 
while the other does not. But if we cannot translate “A Φs for the reason that r” into the 
standard “A Φs because r,” then by the TRANSLATABILITY constraint the former claim 
cannot be counted among the legitimate explanatory forms. Furthermore, since we only 
thought of “A Φs for the reason that r” as an explanatory claim due to the thought that 
we can explain A’s Φing by giving the reason for which A Φd, perhaps we should walk 
this line of thought all the way back and reject the idea that it can even be true that A Φs 
for the reason that r when it is not the case that r. 
I think that this way of reinforcing various arguments from error is flawed. I give 
two reasons why. The first is built on considerations I raised in the first chapter. It seems 
to me undeniable that at least one standard reason-giving form is: A Φs for the reason that 
r. As I said, it might simply be an analytic truth that claims of this form give agents’ 
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reasons for acting. Combining this fact with the axiom of REASONS-EXPLANATIONS, it 
seems hard to deny that such reason-giving claims are also in the business of giving 
reasons-explanations. Denying this would seem to commit us to denying that we can 
explain an action by giving the reason for which it is done. For if “A Φs for the reason 
that r” is a standard reason-giving form, and we can explain an action by giving the 
reason for which it is done, it seems to follow that “A Φs for the reason that r” should also 
be considered a standard form of reasons-explanation. Is suspect that an analogous line of 
reasoning will be available for many other explanatory forms not friendly to arguments 
from error, such as 
 
An answer to the question of why A is Φing is: for the reason that r. 
The consideration that r is what motivated A’s Φing. 
The reason for which A is Φing is that r. 
In Φing, A is responding to the consideration that r. 
A is Φing in light of the consideration that r. 
 
I think that these should all be considered standard forms of reasons-explanations –– and 
unobjectionably so, in part due to reasoning of the sort just laid out. They are all standard 
forms of reason-giving claims. If these claims are not inter-translatable either among 
themselves or with other standard reason-giving forms (such as A Φs because p), then we 
should say: so much the worse for TRANSLATABILITY. 
The second flaw in propping up an argument form error with thoughts about 
translatability is that the principle of translatability seems to me implausible even 
independent of considerations about standard reason-giving forms. To see this, we should 
first observe that, on any plausible view, the list of standard forms of reasons-explanation is 
 178 
surely longer than one entry. I take it that no one wants to say that the only legitimate 
form of reasons-explanation is “P because q.” Instead, any complete and agreeable list is 
likely to include at least: 
 
A Φd because p. 
What explains A’s Φing is that p. 
The reason why A is Φing is that p. 
 
More controversially, we might add: 
 
P is what caused A’s Φing. 
A Φd because A believed that p. 
A Φd because A wanted to Ψ. 
 
Now, there is already a serious question about whether TRANSLATABILITY rules out some 
of these forms (and if so, which ones can be ruled out non-arbitrarily). But for a clear-cut 
example, we can attend to the earlier thoughts from Scott Sehon and G. F. Schueler 
(respectively), and also from Arthur Collins: 95 
 [Common-sense] explanations [of action] are not causal; instead, I claim that they are 
teleological. A teleological explanation explains by citing the purpose or goal of the 
behavior in question… The paradigmatic form of a teleological explanation is A 
Φd in order to Ψ. 
Explanations of actions in terms of the agent’s reasons, I want to claim, work by 
citing the purpose or purposes for which the person who performed the action 
actually acted. 
                                                
95 See Sehon [2005: 13] for what comes before the ellipses and [2005: 149] for what comes after; see 
Schueler [2003: 56] for the second passage, and Arthur Collins [1984: 315-316] for the third. 
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Those explanations that Davidson called “rationalizations,” the explanations for 
which he said that “primary reasons” can be given, appear to fit the pattern of 
teleological [i.e. purposive] explanation quite readily. 
These remarks suggest –– and I am inclined to agree –– that one standard form of a 
reasons-explanation is: A Φd in order to Ψ. 
Now, can we reliably translate claims of the form “A Φd because p” into claims of 
the form “A Φd in order to Ψ“ without any change of meaning? I think not. It seems 
obvious that, whether or not we can translate infinitival clauses into that-clauses (as we 
considered in the first chapter), the following two claims simply do not have the same 
meaning. 
 
Edmund skates near the edge because he believes there is thin ice in the middle. 
Edmund skates near the edge in order to avoid thin ice in the middle. 
 
In any attempt to translate, the fact that both claims include the clause “Edmund skates 
near the edge” seems a promising start. But despite the great deal these two claims have 
in common, I cannot see any principle of translation, which does not amount to the bald 
assertion of a brute rule, that would allow us to translate between them. By what rule 
might we translate “because” into “in order to” or “he believes there is thin ice in the 
middle” into “avoid thin ice in the middle”? Even if we thought that, for example, that 
the “in order to” clause was somehow elliptical for something like, “his purpose is to 
avoid thin ice in the middle,” this would not help. For it is no more plausible that 
 
“Edmund skates near the edge because he believes there is thin ice in the middle” 
 
is a legitimate translation of 
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“Edmund skates near the edge because his purpose is to avoid thin ice in the 
middle,” 
 
or vice versa. Given the great deal of commonality, we might have thought this should be 
an easy case of translation –– much easier, anyway, than examples like 
 
Edmund skates near the edge because he believes there is thin ice in the middle. 
Edmund skates near the edge in order to avoid drowning. 
 
It seems to me clear that there is little to no hope of performing any translation between 
these two explanatory claims. But that does not in any way lessen our confidence that 
they are both perfectly adequate qua explanatory claims. 
One might object that, as in some other situations, my critical example has been 
purposive, and that purposes are not reasons. I myself find it somewhat appealing to hold 
that reasons and purposes belong to the same ontological category. But the ontology is 
irrelevant here. The implication of this objection is that purposive explanations are in the 
business of identifying purposes; and since purposes are not reasons, then purposive 
explanations should not be counted as reasons-explanations (much less as standard reasons-
explanations). However, as I argued in the first chapter, reasons-explanations are not 
necessarily in the business of identifying something to be equated with the agent’s reason 
for acting. It is no more plausible that purposive explanations are necessarily in the 
business of identifying something to be equated with the agent’s purpose (and therefore, 
not the agent’s reason). Furthermore, as I also pointed out in the first chapter, the 
(purported) fact that purposes are not reasons does not entail that claims of the form “A 
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Φd in order to Ψ” are not reason-giving. Indeed, it seems undeniable that “A’s reason 
was to Ψ” is a standard reason-giving claim. So, by the same reasoning as given earlier, it 
seems to follow that such claims should also be counted as reasons-explanations. Anyway, 
it is independently plain to see that purposive explanations are in the business of doing 
exactly what reasons-explanations are: they reveal the good the agent saw in doing what 
she did, and specify the considerations or features that motivated her to act as she did.96 
With these considerations in mind, I cannot see why any claim about an ontological 
difference between reasons and purposes should lead us to believe that purposive 
explanations are not reasons-explanations. 
Perhaps there is some suspicion that the difficulty here is created by the fact that 
purposive explanations include infinitival clauses, while the other standard forms do not. 
In view of that, one might want to endorse a more modest TRANSLATABILITY claim; for 
example, one might want to claim only that we should be able to translate between any 
two standard propositional reasons-explanations. This might help defenders of the Factive 
ViewM, Psychologism, or Knowledge View sidestep any opposing considerations based on 
purposes, purposive explanations, or infinitival clauses. A Factivist might concede, for 
example, that there can be no factive constraint on infinitival clauses. After all, it is not 
even clear that infinitival clauses accept truth-values. But, so long as we are in the 
business of giving reasons or reasons-explanations in propositional form, the propositions 
picking out the agents’ reasons must be true. The more modest TRANSLATABILITY 
constraint might be applied here, and pressure us away from the possibly non-factive “A’s 
reason is that r” by appeal to the certainly factive (and standard) “A Φd because p.” 
                                                
96 See Collins [1984: 324] for a similar thought, although I do not agree with Collins that “reason-giving 
explanations obviously refer actions to objectives, outcomes, or end-states that are caused by the explained 
events. 
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Even this more modest TRANSLATABILITY is implausible, though. For we need not 
use an infinitival clause to pick out a reason that is purposive, goal-directed, or 
instrumental in nature. –– and that seems to me more the cause of the difficulty for 
TRANSLATABILITY than any particular packaging of a reason or reasons-explanation. 
Consider, for example: 
 
Edmund skates near the edge because he believes there is thin ice in the middle. 
Edmund skates near the edge so that he will not fall through thin ice in the 
middle. 
 
I think that, as with purposive accounts, the second statement here is clearly reason-giving 
and explanatory. The second statement is also propositional: the ‘so that’ specifies a 
motivating consideration in propositional form, just as the ‘because’ operator does. But it 
seems to me no easier to translate between this pair of claims than it was to translate 
between the previous pair. We might try, for example: 
 
He is doing that because he believes that if he does, he will not fall through the 
ice. 
He is doing that so that he will not fall through thin ice in the middle. 
 
These two claims look more similar, such that we may higher hopes of translating 
between them. But do they have the same meaning? Not necessarily. For in giving a 
reasons-explanation, we hope to reveal the consideration that cast the action in a 
favorable light for the agent. Edmund surely could have thought to himself, “I had better 
stay near the edge so that I do not fall through” without thinking “If I skate near the edge, 
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I will not fall through.” Edmund might merely have considered the risk without 
considering what it would take to actually suffer the dreaded consequences; he might be 
aware that local bullies may come toss him in even if he keeps to the edge; he may think 
only that skating near the edge lessens his chances of falling through; and so on. So it 
seems to me that the above pair of claims do not even imply one another –– much less that 
there is a way of translating between them without change of meaning. 
The foregoing lead me to think that efforts to establish either a definitive and 
exclusive list of canonical or standard forms of reasons-explanations, or an explanatory 
constraint like TRANSLATABILITY, are misguided. There are simply too many regular, 
familiar, and seemingly acceptable reason-giving forms for such tactics to account for; 
and there are some particular forms that pretty clearly throw a wrench in things. I think it 
difficult, if not impossible, to rule out on such grounds any of the following forms as 
genuine reasons-explanations. 
 
A Φs for the reason that r. 
A’s reason for Φing is that r. 
A is responding to the consideration that r. 
A Φd because p. 
A is Φing because A believes that p. 
A is Φing because A’s reason is that r. 
A Φd because A wanted to Ψ. 
A Φd in order to Ψ. 
A’s purpose in Φing is to Ψ. 
A is Φing in view of Ψ. 
A is Φing so that p. 
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I make no claim about whether these reasons-explanations amount to the same 
explanation in every particular instance. I also make no claim about the ontologies of the 
entities ostensibly referenced by these explanatory claims, except to say that I think each 
of these claims may plausibly be understood as specifying A’s reason for Φing. So long as 
we accept an understanding of the axiom of REASONS-EXPLANATIONS such that we can 
explain an action by specifying the agent’s reason for performing that action, I think any 
of these forms might count as legitimate reasons-explanations of an action in a particular 
case. Any argument from error that relies on ruling out any of these explanatory forms 
with the sort of reasoning critiqued in this section, then, is unlikely to succeed. 
Propositionalism 
The final explanatory constraint I would like to examine is one which I am 
inclined to think that everyone on all sides of the arguments from error assumes to be 
true. As such, my rejection of this explanatory constraint would be perhaps the most 
radical of those I consider.  I will call this constraint 
 
PROPOSITIONALISM ABOUT REASONS-EXPLANATION: whenever an agent acts 
for a reason, any reasons-explanation of that action must be a proposition. 
 
I assume that it is transparent how an assumption like this has been part of the backdrop 
of the discussion so far. It is perhaps a result of combining (a certain interpretation of) 
REASONS-EXPLANATIONS and the natural thought that reasons are propositional entities. 
But it has independent plausibility of its own. After all, we have seen that many of the 
standard reason-giving and reasons-explanation forms are propositional, at least in that a 
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that-clause is often used to pick out the motivating reason or the explanans of the action. 
Indeed, this observation is not limited to reasons-explanations: the very general 
explanatory forms “P because q” and “What explains p is that q” are both propositional. 
By the same token, it is also not difficult to see how the implausibility of 
PROPOSITIONALISM would create some complications for many views and arguments in 
the area. On the additional assumptions that anything capturable by a that-clause is a 
proposition, and that the contents of mental states are propositional in this sense, it would 
become at least awkward to see how the Factive ViewM, Psychologism, the Knowledge 
View, and even the Belief View should be articulated (much less how they could be true). 
Similarly: on the assumption that propositions are the sort of thing that can be true or 
false, if reasons-explanations need not be propositions, it likewise becomes more difficult 
to see how any argument from error could rob Edmund, for example, of his reason for 
skating near the edge on the grounds that only truths can explain things. This is only one 
example; I trust it is clear how other arguments in the area might be similarly 
complicated. 
There is, then, a significant question about whether and in what sense explanation is 
propositional. This question is of interest to frameworks for explaining action, but also to 
explanatory frameworks in general. I shall not here defend the general or unqualified 
claim that explanation is not propositional. Instead, I wish to attend to some 
considerations which I think at least put some pressure on PROPOSITIONALISM as an 
explanatory constraint, and perhaps encourage us to articulate it more precisely.  A 
starting point here is to wonder to what extent it is generally plausible that explanation is 
propositional. A starting point there is to wonder about the ontology of explanantia. As we 
saw in the first chapter, it is perhaps natural to think of explanations as propositions or 
sentences, à la Hempel and Oppenheim: 
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By the explanandum, we understand the sentence describing the phenomenon to be 
explained (not that phenomenon itself); by the explanans, the class of those 
sentences which are adduced to account for the phenomenon. 97 
This is natural enough. But there are other ways of conceiving of explanatory entities. We 
might think, for example, that states of affairs can explain things –– even actions. 
According to Jonathan Dancy, 
Like Plantinga, I see an ontological gulf between things capable of being the case (i.e. 
states of affairs) and things capable of being true (either propositions or sentences). 
And only those capable of being the case are capable of being a good reason. 98 
If we combine this thought with Dancy’s thought that “it must be possible to act for a 
good reason,” as well as our axiom of REASONS-EXPLANATIONS, it might seem sensible to 
suppose that it is not propositions but rather states of affairs that explain actions done for 
reasons. 
Another common thought is that some of the things we wish to explain are events, 
and events are explained by other events. But events do not seem to be propositions. Even 
if, as Roderick Chisholm puts it, there is an intimate connection between propositions 
and states of affairs, we might think propositions and events are more distantly related: 
Events and propositions are species of states of affairs. A proposition could be defined as any 
state of affairs which is necessarily such that either it or its negation does not 
occur… We could now say that an event is a contingent state of affairs which is not 
a proposition and which implies change. 99 
Indeed, we might think, with Davidson, that the entities that explain actions in particular 
are not just any events, but those events which caused the action:100 
Events The most primitive explanation of an event gives its cause. 
                                                
97 See Hempel and Oppenheim [1948: 136-137]. 
98 See Dancy [2000: 117] for the passage and [2000: 103] for the quote connecting normative and 
motivating reasons. 
99 See Chisholm [1970: 20]. For more on the events-based conception of action explanation, see Davidson 
[1980], Hornsby [2004], and Kent Bach [1980]. 
100 See Davidson [1963: 698, 695]. 
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The signaling driver can answer the question ‘Why did you raise your arm when you 
did?’, and from the answer we learn the event that caused the action. 
Or, as Anscombe observed, we might think that even the view that actions are explained 
by those events which cause them admits of further disambiguation: 
If the question ‘Why did you do that?’ is put by someone who makes it clear that he wants 
me to mention the mental causes––i.e., what went on in my mind and issued in the 
action––I should perhaps give this account. 101 
We could go on here. But there is a prima facie case to be made that, ontologically, 
explanatory entities need not be propositions. So, if by PROPOSITIONALISM we intend to 
declare that that the entity that explains an action must, ontologically speaking, be a 
proposition, this claim faces a steep intuitive burden. 
However, as I have argued, our explanatory frameworks need not be limited by 
the ontology of explanatory entities. Even if what ultimately explains (in some 
metaphysical or causal sense) an action is an event, for example, we may be able to 
characterize that event propositionally (for example, “Angus punched his boss because his 
boss fired him”). In that case, the explanation of the action may still be propositional in a 
significant sense. Furthermore, in examining the merits of PROPOSITIONALISM, we are 
not simply interested in the nature of explanation in general (though that is of interest); 
rather, we are trying to focus in on constraints particular to action explanation. So 
perhaps these remarks about the possibly varying ontologies of explanatory entities in 
general are not directly to the point. 
It may be that there is something unique about reasons-explanations of actions, 
such that their form should be propositional. As I mentioned before, this thought could 
result from combining REASONS-EXPLANATIONS with the natural thought that reasons are 
                                                
101 See Anscombe [1957b: 324]. 
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propositional entities. After all, of the forms of reason-giving claims I put forth in the 
previous section, many of them do explicitly capture reasons in that-clauses: 
 
A Φs for the reason that r. 
A’s reason for Φing is that r. 
A is responding to the consideration that r. 
A is Φing because A believes that p. 
A is Φing so that p. 
 
Using the thought (which I have advocated for) that we can explain an action by offering 
up a reason-giving claim, this might lead us to believe that there is some significant or 
general sense in which PROPOSITIONALISM is true. But is it true that reasons-explanations 
must proceed in this way? This is not so clear to me. A starting point for putting pressure 
on this thought can be provided by some of the points I have already made in treating 
explanatory claims which I have called purposive and fragmentary. In addition to those 
just mentioned, the following reason-giving forms also seem adequate: 
 
for the reason that r. 
because p. 
because A believes that p. 
in order to Ψ. 
in view of Ψ. 
so that p. 
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Each of these, I think, would be perfectly acceptable ways of answering a question of the 
form, “Why is A Φing?” This is in no small part due to the fact that they each seem to be 
acceptable ways of making known that which motivated A to Φ, or which cast Φing in a 
favorable light for A. This would seem to suggest that these clauses are acceptable 
reasons-explanations, and therefore that PROPOSITIONALISM is in some significant sense 
false. It does not seem true that explanatory utterances, clauses, or claims must be offered 
in propositional form. 
 One could object here that at least some of these fragmentary accounts do not 
offer up the fragmentary clause as the explanans. When we say, for example, that “She did it 
because her boss fired her,” we offer up not “because her boss fired her,” but rather “her 
boss fired her” as the explanans of her action. But “her boss fired her” is a proposition; so 
the “because p” answer to the question “Why?” does not cast doubt on 
PROPOSITIONALISM in any serious way. Furthermore, of those fragmentary accounts for 
which we cannot say this, we can say that each of these fragments anyway seem to be 
elliptical for complete sentences or propositions: 
 
A is Φing for the reason that r. 
A is Φing because p. 
A is Φing because A believes that p. 
A is Φing in order to Ψ. 
A is Φing in view of Ψ. 
A is Φing so that p. 
 
If anything, we should say that these are the explanations of A’s Φing (and so, again, there 
is no serious challenge to PROPOSITIONALISM here). 
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As in the first chapter, we need not address the plausibility of the thought that 
these fragments are really elliptical for propositions or sentences. There are at least two 
points of response that do not require wading into that issue. The first is that even if these 
fragments are somehow more properly conceived of as elliptical propositions, it would not 
follow that what these fragments offer as explaining the action is a proposition. That is: it 
would not follow that what is playing an explanatory role is propositional. In fact, if we 
consider the line of objection here, we find more evidence supporting the idea that what 
is being offered to explain the action is not a proposition. For nothing is added to these 
fragments, qua explanatory claims, by transforming them into propositions. These 
propositions do not better enable us to locate A’s reason for Φing, understand the 
consideration that motivated A to Φ, or lend A’s Φing a greater level of rational 
intelligibility. On these fronts, we are just as satisfied with the fragmentary answers to the 
question “Why is A Φing?” Furthermore, if a reasons-explanation can be something that 
explains an agent’s action by giving the agent’s reason for acting, then (as we have been 
saying) it seems any reason-giving claim should count as a reasons-explanation. The 
fragmentary accounts do just as well as the propositional accounts qua reason-giving 
claims. If we ask Edmund why he is skating near the edge of the pond, and he responds, 
“For the reason that the ice in the middle of the pond is thin,” it is not as though we are 
at a loss as to what his reason for acting is. Even if this answer did somehow leave us at 
such a loss, we would not be helped at all if Edmund tried to clarify by saying, “My 
reason for skating near the edge is that the ice in the middle of the pond is thin.” These 
things being so, we should resist the demand that these fragments be transformed into the 
corresponding propositions before we count them as legitimate explanations. It seems that 
nothing by way of explanation would be gained in that transformation. 
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A second point of response was raised earlier in this chapter, and depends on the 
distinction I tried to draw between something’s explaining and something’s being the 
explanation or explanans of some other thing. Let us suppose that “to Ψ” or “for the reason 
that r” cannot be the explanation or the explanans of A’s Φing. From this it does not follow 
that these things cannot  in any way explain A’s Φing. Even if the clause “for the reason 
that there is thin ice in the middle of the pond” can only rationally explain Edmund’s 
skating as a proper part of the larger complex, “He did it for the reason that there is thin 
ice in the middle of the pond,” it still would not follow that the fragmentary clause does 
not explain Edmund’s skating. We can always say that these clauses explain Edmund’s 
action by giving or specifying that which motivated Edmund to so act. 
It may finally be objected that I have relied heavily on the conception of reasons-
explanation given earlier by such characterizations as 
 
[1a] A reason is the kind of thing that can be given in an answer to a “Why?” 
question. 
[1d] A reason is the kind of thing that can be a part of an action explanation. 
[1e] A reason is the kind of thing that can contribute to the explanation of an 
action. 
 
and have implicitly rejected those given by such characterizations as 
 
[1b] A reason is the kind of thing that can replace q in a claim of the form “P 
because q”. 
[1c] A reason is the kind of thing that can be the explanans of an action 
explanation. 
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But since it is perfectly obvious giving a claim of the form “P because q” and identifying 
the explanans are acceptable forms of explanation, my strategy here is weakened by the 
need to resist these forms. 
I have argued against [1b] and [1c] as general conceptions of the nature of the 
explanatory role of motivating reasons. In my view, a reason can play an explanatory role 
without being able to complete a ‘because’ claim or being the explanans of an action. I 
have also argued that it would be misguided to argue against this view by way of auxiliary 
constraints on explanation such as EXPLANANTIA ARE REASONS or TRANSLATABILITY. It 
would be a mistake to infer from any of this, however, that I think that these alternative 
ways of explaining action are illegitimate. Indeed, I happily allow that  
 
A Φd because p. 
A is Φing because A believes that p. 
What explains A’s Φing is that p. 
The explanans of A’s Φing is that p. 
 
are perfectly acceptable reason-giving and explanatory forms. I do not deny that reasons-
explanations are often propositional, or that the explanation of an agent’s action often 
just is the content of the agent’s reason for acting given in propositional form. Neither is it 
my view that the only acceptable framework for giving reasons-explanations of action is 
that according to which we explain the action by giving the reason for which it was done. 
Instead, I only reject the thought that reasons-explanations must or always come in some 
or other of these forms; and I only insist that one legitimate way of explaining action is by 
giving the reason for which it was done. 
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So if by PROPOSITIONALISM we intend that in a reasons-explanation the explanans 
must be a proposition, and by that we mean that the entity that explains the action 
(whether by making it happen, causing it to come about, or some other such) must belong 
to the ontological category ‘proposition,’ PROPOSITIONALISM faces a steep challenge from 
the apparent variance in the nature of explanatory entities. It seems, in general, that states 
of affairs, events, mental states and other sorts of things an be explanatory entities. If we 
adjust PROPOSITIONALISM to mean that the explanatory entity must be capable of being 
expressed in propositional form, and by that we mean that it must expressible in a that-
clause, then we face difficulties with purposes and translatability in general. Even if we 
overcome these difficulties, there will be a serious question about why explanatory entities 
must actually be packaged in these ways, and whether anything deep about the nature of 
explanation is being revealed here. If we focus instead on the explanatory claims we offer 
(or the answers to “Why?” questions) with respect to actions, we might mean by 
PROPOSITIONALISM that such claims must be propositions. But this seems questionable in 
the light of fragmentary and infinitival explanatory clauses. It seems implausible and 
unmotivated to claim that only when we have something propositional in form do we 
have something acceptable qua explanatory claim. If again we adjust PROPOSITIONALISM 
to mean that what explanatory claims offer as explaining the action in question, we face 
the same difficulties. 
In what sense is reasons-explanation propositional, then? It is not clear that there 
is anything both general and insightful to be said. There are some explanatory forms 
which are propositional; and there are some reason-giving forms which are propositional. 
If we opt to explain A’s Φing by way of a “P because q” claim, for example, then we 
commit ourselves to giving a propositional explanation of A’s Φing. If we opt to give A’s 
reason for Φing in propositional form, and also opt to explain A’s Φing by offering the 
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relevant reason-giving claim, then we also commit ourselves to giving a propositional 
explanation of A’s Φing. If we opt to say that A Φd for the reason that r, and also to 
explain A’s Φing by stating that A Φd for the reason that r, then we again commit 
ourselves to a propositional explanation of A’s Φing. We may opt for any of these 
methods, or others still; but we need not. We may opt instead to give A’s reason for Φing 
in infinitival form, and to explain A’s Φing by offering up the reason-giving claim. We 
may opt to explain A’s Φing by drawing attention, in any number of ways, to some state 
of affairs A found favorable. We could do similarly by casting something other than Φing 
(Ψing, for example), as the object of A's desire. We may opt for any of these methods, or 
others still; but we need not. And so on. These considerations before us, I think we should 
say that the burden of argument is on those who insist on one or another of these 
particular explanatory forms at the expense of the others. 
SUMMARY REMARKS 
It has been a long and circuitous route to arrive at what I believe to be a 
somewhat simple  and modest thought, which might serve as a summary of the main 
point of this chapter, and also as one of the main views that I am putting forward in this 
manuscript. The thought is just this. One way of explaining (in the sense delineated by 
reasons-explanations) an action is to give, specify, or otherwise reveal the reason for 
which the action was done. That being so, we can explain an action by offering up any 
claim or clause that gives, specifies, or otherwise reveals the agent’s reason for acting. 
Since there are many adequate forms of reason-giving claims, there are many adequate 
forms of reasons-explanations. The legitimacy of these variations casts serious doubt on 
many supposed constraints on action explanation tacitly assumed by those theorizing 
about error cases. To the extent that arguments from error –– whether aimed at telling us 
 195 
what an agent’s reason could or could not have been, or must have been –– rely on these 
constraints, the wide variation in the acceptable forms of reason-giving claims also casts 
serious doubt on these arguments. 
Breaking the Rules of Explanation 
In the first two chapters of this manuscript, I defended a particular package of 
views from various objections. That package includes a view about the factivity of acting 
for a reason, which I have called the 
 
Nonfactive ViewM: it is not the case that in order for A to Φ for the reason that r, 
it must be the case that r. 
 
It also includes a view about the cognitive constraint on acting for a reason, which I have 
called the 
 
Belief View: in order for A to Φ for the reason that r, A must believe that r. 
 
Finally, the package includes a view about the ontology of motivating reasons, which I 
have called 
 
Non-Psychologism: it is not the case that whenever A Φs for the reason that r, r is 
a psychological fact about A. 
 
Much of this chapter has been spent excavating, elucidating, and refusing supposed rules 
of explanation. Once we see that we are free to break those rules (or, if you like, that they 
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are not genuine rules), I have suggested, we may begin to see how difficult it can become 
to argue convincingly against this package of views in certain ways. The Argument from 
the Factivity of Explanation, Argument from the Factivity of Acting for a Reason, and 
other arguments from error become much less forceful. We should not be persuaded 
away from the view that Edmund skates near the edge of the pond for the (false) reason 
that the ice in the middle of the pond is thin on the grounds that this falsehood cannot be 
the explanation of Edmund’s skating, for it is not true that EXPLANANTIA ARE REASONS. 
Neither should we be persuaded, by similar reasoning, toward the view that Edmund’s 
reason must have been a psychological state, such as his belief that the ice in the middle of 
the pond is thin. We might say that Edmund’s reason must have been something he 
believed; and we should not be persuaded that it must have been something he knew by 
the thought that only then could we suppose that there is a reliable connection between 
Edmund’s reason for acting and his acting for that reason. For our understanding of 
action is not constrained by any thought like NO HAPPY ACCIDENTS. 
On the contrary, there is an embarrassment of explanatory riches at the disposal 
of such a package of views. That is in no small part due, I think, to the fact that reason-
giving claims are subject to few, if any, formal or universal rules. So long as we can 
explain an action by giving the reason for which it was done, action explanation will be in 
this sense permissive: there are many permissible ways to explain actions, and many 
permissible forms of action explanations. On this view, there are many acceptable 
frameworks for giving reasons-explanations of actions, and inside each framework many 
acceptable reasons-explanations of any given action. In a way, I should like to all at once 
agree with Anscombe, Dancy, Davidson, Hyman, Sandis, Schueler, and others: 102 
                                                
102 See Anscombe [1957a: 9], Dancy [2014: 90], Davidson [1963: 685], Hyman [1999: 443] Sandis [2013: 
36-37], and Schueler [2003: 56], respectively. 
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The answer I shall suggest is that [intentional actions] are the actions to which a certain 
sense of the question ‘Why?’ is given application; the sense is of course that in 
which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. 
We can say that what explains the action is that it was done for the reason that p, 
without committing ourselves to saying that what explains the action is that p. It 
would remain true, however, that we explain an action by giving the reason for 
which it is done. 
What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains the 
action by giving the agent’s reason for doing what he did? We may call such 
explanations rationalizations, and say that the reason rationalizes the action. 
Reasons can be stated or given; and the canonical form of a sentence stating or 
giving a person’s reason for doing or believing something is ‘A Φed because p’. 
What we infer from the above-mentioned explanatory statement, however, is not 
‘that p’, but that the agent thought or supposed that p… what explains the action 
is the whole statement. More accurately, it is people who explain actions by citing 
one or more agential reasons, thereby implying strictly that (a) the agent took p 
and/or q to count in favour of her action and (b) acted accordingly. 
Explanations of actions in terms of the agent’s reasons, I want to claim, work by 
citing the purpose or purposes for which the person who performed the action 
actually acted. 
It is true, I think, that reasons can be answers to questions of the form “Why did A Φ?”, 
that we can give reasons-explanations without giving the reason as the explanans, that 
reasons can rationalize actions, that we can give reasons-explanations in the form “P 
because q,” that we can give reasons-explanations in the form “A Φd in order to Ψ,” and 
so on. So, although the tone of this chapter has perhaps been negative, ultimately I would 
like to endorse a framework for action explanation that is quite ecumenical. What I think 
is not true is that the success of any of these frameworks shows any of the others to be 
wholly unsuccessful. For, as Dancy and Davidson remarked, 
There is more than one way of explaining an action… The [factive] form we have given 
our explanation commits us to the agent’s being correct… in supposing what his 
reason was to be the case. But we have other ways of explaining the action which 
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do not commit us in this sort of way, and which work equally well whether the 
agent was correct in this way or not. 
To describe an event in terms of its cause is not to identify the event with its cause, 
nor does explanation by redescription exclude causal explanation.103 
There is indeed more than one way of explaining an action, and the goodness of one 
reasons-explanation of an action need not preclude the goodness of any other. 
Before concluding, allow me to illustrate how I think this permissive approach 
toward reasons-explanations can afford great flexibility to a view packaging the 
Nonfactive ViewM, the Belief View, and Non-Psychologism. We can return to our 
original case of Edmund, who takes it that THIN ICE: the ice in the middle of the pond is 
thin. So, when he skates, he keeps to the edge of the pond. In fact, the ice in the middle of 
the pond is not thin. If the Nonfactive ViewM is correct, we can say that Edmund skates 
near the edge of the pond for the reason that THIN ICE. Since we can explain an action by 
giving the reason for which it was done, we give a reasons-explanation when we say that 
Edmund skates for the reason that THIN ICE. Can we, on this occasion, say that Edmund 
so skates because THIN ICE? Not unless we gloss ‘because’ here (à la Hornsby) with ‘for the 
reason’ –– for otherwise we violate our commitment to FACTIVE EXPLANATIONS. Does 
this somehow indict the view that Edmund skates for the reason that THIN ICE? Not 
unless we subscribe to some implausible explanatory constraint such as NO FALSE THAT-
CLAUSES, EXPLANANTIA ARE REASONS, or TRANSLATABILITY. Indeed, if we understand 
that a consideration can explain without being the explanans, we can even allow in some 
sense that “What explains Edmund’s skating near the edge is the consideration that the 
ice in the middle of the pond is thin.” The sense in which we allow this claim is revealed 
by the sense in which the consideration that THIN ICE can explain Edmund’s action: it 
can explain by being the consideration that motivated him to so act. 
                                                
103 See Dancy [2014: 346-347] and Davidson [1963: 695], respectively. 
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Now, if the Belief View is true, we can explain Edmund’s skating by giving THIN 
ICE  as his reason for acting, so long as he believes that THIN ICE. While this is at odds 
with the Psychologistic view that his reason is thin ice*: he believes that the ice in the middle 
is thin, this metaphysical fact does not preclude a Non-Psychologism from giving as a 
reasons-explanation the claim that “Edmund is skating near the edge because THIN ICE*. 
For there is no plausible rule that prevents us from picking out Edmund’s reason by 
specifying it as the salient consideration which Edmund believed to be the case. Neither is 
there any plausible constraint that rules out specifying Edmund’s reason in an infinitival 
clause, such as “in order to avoid thin ice.” So, we could say that he skates as he does in 
order to avoid thin ice. Does this impugn the Belief View, since “in order to avoid thin 
ice” is not something capable of being believed to be the case? Not unless we insist on 
some implausible constraint like PROPOSITIONALISM. For otherwise, we can content 
ourselves with the thought that only if we opt to cast Edmund’s action as a response to the 
consideration that r should we have to say that Edmund believes that r; and there is no 
such constraint on reasons-explanations such as “He did it in order to avoid thin ice.” We 
could go on here; but I hope I have given some feel for the kind of flexibility that a view 
like the one I have proposed possesses. 
Theorizing Without Arguments from Error 
Allow me to tie all of this together in the following way. Arguments from factual 
error are supposed to present a general problem in action theory. They are supposed to 
show us that no agent can act for a reason that is not the case. According to some, then, 
these cases are supposed to show us that some kind of Factive ViewM must be right. They 
are supposed to substantiate a general reason-robbing inference that no falsehood could 
be an agent’s reason for acting. This leaves us with a question, though: what is the agent’s 
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reason for acting in such cases? Psychologism, according to many, is the most appealing 
answer to this question. It is supposed to provide us with an appealing reason-replacing 
inference, to the conclusion that Edmund’s reason, for example, must have been some 
psychological fact about him. Arguments from procedural error are supposed to present a 
problem even for Psychologistic views of acting for a reason. They are supposed to 
substantiate a reason-robbing inference that nothing not known by the agent could be the 
agent’s reason for acting. But again, this leaves us with the question of what the agent’s 
reason is in these cases. The Knowledge View, according to some, is the most appealing 
answer to this question. 
So one can see how central the analysis of error cases has been to action theory in 
general. But I have argued that, quite generally, these arguments are misguided; and if we 
adopt the kind of permissivism about reason-giving claims and reasons-explanations that I 
have favored, then a theory comprised of the Nonfactive ViewM, Belief View, and Non-
Psychologism is not easily damaged by such criticisms. If I am right about that, then, one 
may be left wondering how theorizing about acting for a reason is to proceed. If what I 
have said is correct, then one might think that error cases are unlikely to tell one way or 
the other about the main views in the area. But it is might also be thought that the 
plausibility of theories of acting for a reason is heavily dependent upon their being able to 
say the right things about error cases. 
I do think that, unless the relevant explanatory constraints can be made plausible, 
or the argument from error can somehow be worked out without them, we should be 
much more cautious about the use of error cases in action theory. I also hope that what I 
have argued for here encourages some fairly serious re-evaluation of the theoretical 
landscape. But I think it would be an overreaction to say that any of this presents an 
impasse in our theorizing, or that it places the main competitors necessarily at a 
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stalemate. For recall that all of the arguments in question have made heavy use of the 
explanatory role of reasons for acting. What unifies these arguments, both in their 
apparent force and their ultimate failure, is the kinds of claims they make connecting 
reasons and explanations. If I am right, then we theorists should reconsider both our 
preconceptions about the nature of action explanation as well as its implications for 
action theory in general. For example, the precise sense in which reasons for acting play 
an explanatory role certainly deserves more attention; and action theory would do well to 
engage in debate, as philosophers of science have, about what it means for explanation to 
be factive –– or whether explanation is factive at all. 
More significantly, though, we should keep in mind that the explanatory 
connection between an action done for a reason and the reasons for which it the action is 
done is only one feature among very many that we might look at when evaluating 
theories in the area. Often underemphasized in these debates is, for example, plain 
conceptual analysis of acting for a reason and reason for acting. Often forgotten is the deep 
apparent similarity between acting for a reason and acting for a purpose (I should have 
liked to say much more about this). Often completely ignored is the tempting thought that 
whatever is said about action in these debates should be transplantable into theories of 
belief, believing for a reason, and reasons for believing (I shall say more about this in the 
next chapter). If the thought that motivating reasons for acting are propositions cannot be 
supported, for example, certain views in epistemology might be found implausible; on the 
other hand, if propositionalism about reasons for belief is undeniable, this may be reason 
to accept it for action. Looking elsewhere: very little has been said about what it is to 
respond to a reason; but certainly acting for a reason is a way of responding to a reason. 
Or perhaps we could, following Anscombe, look to the ways in which the nature of 
intention and intentional action might constrain what can plausibly be said about reasons 
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and acting for a reason. For example, some have argued for cognitive constraints on 
intention and intentional action; but if acting for a reason is a species of intentional 
action, then one might expect this to affect what we say about cognitive constraints on 
acting for a reason. Finally: not only might each of these issues have telling implications 
for acting for a reason, but also vice versa. For example, it is worth noticing that the 
factivity of normative reasons is almost always taken for granted. But when it is argued for, 
it is argued for in ways quite similar to the arguments criticized in this paper. Perhaps this 
issue also deserves some more attention. 
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Chapter Four:  Motivating Reason to Slow the Factive Turn in 
Epistemology 
In this final chapter, I would like to spend some time addressing some aspects of 
those additional questions just mentioned. I hope that the discussion so far has revealed 
that, though the package of views I have defended would be a minority view, practical 
philosophy has been increasingly considering the possibility of such nonstandard views 
(such as the Nonfactive ViewM, the Belief View, and Non-Psychologism). On the other 
hand, views analogous to the Factive ViewM, Knowledge View, and Psychologism have 
been gaining favor in epistemology. This makes for an intriguing time to be thinking 
about reasons in general. In this chapter, I hope to lay the foundation for a project that 
encourages more exchange between theorists of practical and epistemic reasons. I hope to 
do so by illustrating how such an exchange would be fruitful vis-à-vis the issue of factivity. 
The primary aim of this chapter will be to slow the ‘factive turn’ in epistemology, as it 
were, by appealing to some of the work done in the first three chapters on practical 
reasons. This primary aim is a part of a larger aim to provide a unified theory of reasons: 
motivating, normative, explanatory, practical, epistemic, moral, and otherwise. But the 
endgame of this chapter will be limited to a view according to which normative reasons for 
believing (or evidence, if you like) are, as I have argued concerning motivating reasons for 
action, not factive. I will argue that if motivating reasons for acting are not factive, then 
normative reasons for believing are not factive. In conjunction with the case that I have 
made for the nonfactivity of motivating reasons, this conditional helps to secure the 
conclusion that normative reasons for believing are not factive. But even without the case 
I have made for the antecedent of this conditional, I hope to be revealing a connection 
between between motivating reasons for acting and normative reasons for believing that 
is interesting in its own right. Indeed, I suspect that the implication of the main argument 
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of this paper will strike many as surprising, since it suggests that, in order to successfully 
establish the view that normative epistemic reasons are facts, one must fend off the view 
that motivating practical reasons need not be facts. 
The course of the chapter is as follows. I begin in the first section with some 
preliminary remarks about two standard distinctions in the theory of reasons: that 
between motivating and normative reasons, and that between practical and epistemic 
reasons. I also briefly review and spell out what the Factive and Nonfactive View of each 
of these looks like. I proceed in the second section of the paper to lay out an important 
claim on which my argument relies: the claim that our positions on the factivity of 
epistemic and practical normative reasons should agree. I defend this claim of uniformity 
from an initial concern, namely, that epistemic reasons owe their distinctive character 
precisely to their relation to the truth. That being the case, one might think that we have 
a special reason to think that epistemic reasons are facts –– one which does not also lend 
support to the idea that practical reasons are facts. But I show that this concern is 
misguided. 
With this claim of uniformity on board, I spend the next two sections of the paper 
establishing the following claim: if motivating reasons need not be facts, then normative 
reasons need not be facts. I begin in the third section with a brief reminder as to why one 
might think that motivating reasons need not be facts. I then move to motivate the 
thought that in some cases where A Φs for the reason that r and it is not the case that r, 
A’s Φing is rational; not only can an agent act in the light of a falsehood, but an agent can 
also act rationally in the light of a falsehood. I also claim that a plausible conception of 
rationality is one on which A’s Φing can be rational only if A’s Φing is done for some 
good reason. If this is all correct, then some false reasons for which agents act must also 
be good reasons –– and so some normative reasons must not be facts. 
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I connect all of the dots in the fourth section by briefly laying out my main 
argument against the factive turn in epistemology. In conjunction with the claim of 
uniformity from the second section, the previous two sections give us what we need to 
mount a somewhat surprising argument against factive views of epistemic normative 
reasons. In the fifth section I address two objections, both of which try to thread the 
needle a bit, by forcing a wedge between rationality and reasons-responsiveness. 
According to the first of these, since in the cases of interest A has no good reason to Φ, we 
must stop short of attributing rationality to A’s Φing. According to the second of these, we 
might concede that in these cases A’s Φing is rational, but not in any sense that implies that 
A Φs for a good reason. In the sixth section I consider a somewhat different way of 
resisting the central argument of the chapter. One might grant the core argument of my 
paper –– that the factivity of motivating and normative reasons rise and fall together –– 
and simply use it as a reductio against the view that practical motivating reasons need not 
be facts. I suggest that this is not as easily done as one might initially suppose. I conclude 
in the seventh section by looking forward, sketching out what I call the practical theory of 
epistemic reasons. This is a theory which takes the case for the Nonfactive ViewM, the 
Belief View, and Non-Pychologism seriously, and takes up analogous positions with 
respect to reasons for belief. In giving this sketch I hope to be pointing toward that larger 
project, alluded to earlier, of providing a comprehensive and unified theory of reasons. 
PRELIMINARY REMARKS 
As I said, I am primarily concerned to establish the claim that: if motivating 
reasons need not be facts, then normative reasons need not be facts. I have also said that 
my demonstration of this claim will operate primarily on “practical” reasons, but with 
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clear implications for “epistemic” reasons. Such a project calls for clarifications on two 
fronts. 
First, there is the standard distinction between motivating reasons and normative 
reasons, which we already have on board. We have seen that there is a debate concerning 
each of these as to whether they are facts. We have so far discussed the first –– the debate 
between the Factive ViewM and the Nonfactive ViewM –– in great detail. We noted at the 
beginning of the first chapter that this should be distinguished from the debate between 
the 
 
Factive ViewN: in order for r to be a reason for A to Φ, it must be the case that r 
 
and the Nonfactive ViewN (which is the denial of the Factive View). To borrow the earlier 
example: even if you know that I am running through the halls for the reason that I am 
late to give my eleven o’clock lecture, you might wonder whether there is any good reason 
for me to be running through the halls. Indeed, you might wonder whether I am, in 
running through the halls, acting for a good reason. That is: is the consideration which 
motivates me to run through the halls (that I am late) also a consideration that favors, 
justifies, or makes right my running through the halls? According to the Factive ViewN, 
the consideration that I am late can only favor my running through the halls if it is the 
case that I am late. The Nonfactive ViewN denies this, holding that the consideration that 
I am late is capable of favoring my action even if it is not the case that I am late. 
Here I have made the distinction between motivating and normative “practical” 
reasons, as they are called. But, as I have suggested, analogous issues manifest with 
respect to so-called “epistemic” reasons as well. This is the second front on which my 
project is in need of clarification. Borrowing from the literature is less useful in making 
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this distinction. For example, it is not uncommon to encounter the thought that practical 
reasons are reasons for acting (that is: considerations that favor actions) while epistemic 
reasons are reasons for believing (considerations that favor beliefs). But it is not difficult to 
see why that is not a sufficient way of making the distinction. The fact that my believing it 
to be so will make me happy certainly seems to be a reason for believing it to be so, but I 
doubt that any of us want to classify this consideration as an epistemic reason (at least, not 
in the standard sense, which is closely tied to the notion of evidence). It is no more 
promising to attempt making the distinction in terms of the contents of the considerations. 
In the example considered just above, the consideration that my clock reads five past eleven 
might be both a practical reason (in which case it probably favors my running through 
the halls) and an epistemic reason (in which case it probably favors my believing that I am 
late). 
I shall try to make the distinction in a different way. In doing so I shall follow 
roughly the distinction as laid out by Joseph Raz. 104 The distinction between practical 
and epistemic reasons is most easily thought of as a distinction between two kinds of 
normative reasons. According to this framework, practical reasons are considerations that 
owe their normative force to their relation to values. Epistemic reasons, on the other 
hand, are considerations that owe their normative force to their relation to the truth 
(which may itself be a kind of value). My being late to give my eleven o’clock lecture 
seems to be a practical reason in this sense: it favors my running through the halls, and it 
so favors in virtue of its relation to certain values (such as that of being punctual). As such, 
this is a practical reason; but there are epistemic reasons nearby. Suppose that you ask me 
                                                
104 See Raz [2011: 36-58] for further explication of this distinction, which I take to be standard. Notice that 
this crucial distinction remains intact even on views according to which truth is a kind of value (and 
epistemic reasons can therefore be thought of as a kind of practical reason). The distinction would then be 
grounded in a distinction between two kinds of values. Thanks to an anonymous referee for encouraging 
me to address this possibility. 
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why I believe that I am late, and I respond that the clock in my office reads quarter-past 
eleven. As such, this fact about my clock seems to be an epistemic reason: it favors my 
believing that I am late, and it so favors in virtue of its relation to the truth (about what 
time it is). 
In the literature on practical and moral reasons, the Factive ViewN is so far in the 
majority that it is often assumed without argument. Instead, the debate tends to be about 
in what sense reasons for acting are facts, or what kind of facts reasons for acting are. Here is 
Maria Alvarez: 
What sort of thing is a normative reason?… There is consensus that normative reasons 
are facts (Raz 1975; Scanlon 1998, though the consensus is not universal. The 
question is complicated by disagreement about what facts of any kind are: are they 
concrete or abstract entities? Is a fact the same as the corresponding true 
proposition, or is the fact the “truth-maker” of the proposition?105 
While there is controversy about the precise nature in which reasons for action are facts, 
there is little to no discussion as to whether they are facts. In the literature on epistemic 
reasons, things are a bit different. On the orthodox analysis of evidence as good reason to 
believe, the debate about the factivity of normative reasons in epistemology might be 
hiding under the label “the factivity of evidence.” On that topic, the Factive ViewN seems 
only recently to be coming into some favor. It is bolstered by recent defenses of the view 
that one’s evidence consists in those things one knows. Here is Thomas Kelly, charting 
out some of the territory. 
A second important division under this general heading is between theorists who hold 
that what evidence one has is completely fixed by one’s non-factive mental states 
and theorists who deny this. This division between ‘evidential internalists’ and 
‘evidential externalists’ cuts across the propositionalist/non-propositionalist 
distinction. Thus, a proponent of the classic sense data theory mentioned above 
will hold that one’s evidence is non-propositional and entirely a matter of what 
                                                
105 See Alvarez [2016: 6-8]. For views representing this mainstream assumption, see Dancy [2000; 2004], 
Darwall [1983], Parfit [2011], Raz [1975], Scanlon [1998], and Smith [1994]. 
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mental states one is in; this second, internalist commitment will be shared by 
various paradigmatic propositionalists, e.g., a coherentist who holds that one’s 
evidence consists of token beliefs that are sufficiently well-integrated with one 
another. On the other hand, a propositionalist who thinks that one’s evidence 
consists of all and only those propositions that one knows (e.g., Williamson 2000) 
will think that what evidence one has depends not only on what non-factive 
mental states one is in but also on how things stand in the external world. This 
‘externalism’ about evidence will also be endorsed by a non-propositionalist who 
takes at face value the many ordinary assertions which suggest that physical 
objects can themselves count as evidence in certain contexts.106 
One can see here that there are a variety of ways to hold Factive ViewN the concerning 
reasons for believing (or evidence). But they all hold, in one way or another, that such 
reasons are always facts. 
UNIFORMITY 
So much for preliminaries. I said at the outset that this paper is a part of a larger 
project that encourages more exchange between theories of practical and epistemic 
reasons. But, given the deep difference in the respective natures of practical and epistemic 
reasons, one might worry about the prospective fruitfulness of such an exchange. If there 
is legitimate reason to worry, the main argument of this paper might be robbed of some 
of its force. That is because the argument relies in part on the claim that I will call 
 
UNIFORMITY: ceteris paribus, the best theory of reasons will hold just one position 
about the factivity of reasons, which is true of every kind of reason. 
 
I mean this claim to apply within each of the realms of motivating and normative reasons 
independently, but across normative realms (moral, epistemic, practical, aesthetic, or 
                                                
106 See Thomas Kelly [2014: 5] for the standard thought that evidence is good reason to believe, and Kelly 
[2008: 941-943] for the quoted passaged (and also the rest of the paper for a nice discussion of how the 
debate concerning the factivity of evidence has developed). No doubt the work of Williamson [2000] has 
been enormously important on this front. See also Littlejohn [2012; 2013a; 2013b]. 
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otherwise) therein. Suppose, for example, that we become convinced that the Factive 
ViewN of epistemic reasons is correct. Then, according to the principle of UNIFORMITY, 
there is theoretical pressure to endorse the Factive ViewN of practical reasons. Similarly: if 
one becomes convinced that the Nonfactive ViewM of practical reasons is correct, then 
one is under some theoretical pressure to endorse the Nonfactive ViewM of epistemic 
reasons. For my part, I find this commitment to UNIFORMITY to be simply intuitive. In 
seems a good general method of inquiry to search out the most uniform and simple 
theory of the phenomena in question. Here is Maria Alvarez, expressing some sympathy 
for a similar thought applied specifically to reasons: 
It is more plausible to assume, at least at the outset, that there is some continuity or 
common thread linking the use of the term ‘reason’ in these different contexts––
an assumption that would remain tenable even if the roles that reasons can play in 
some contexts… should turn out to have some peculiar features not found 
elsewhere.107 
It is a further question, of course, whether the factivity (or nonfactivity) of reasons is one 
of these “common threads.” But I find no good reason not to extend the general 
preference for uniformity in theories to the subject matter of reasons. Is there any reason, 
for example, to expect that the considerations which motivate us to act and those which 
motivate us to believe should be different in this respect? We might hope instead that the 
phenomenon of rational motivation is uniform in nature. Since this principle is initially 
appealing, and I know of no good argument against it, I will treat it as a kind of working 
assumption.108 
                                                
107 See Alvarez [2010: 8]. 
108 One might think that the constraint could be supported by considerations of the theoretical virtue of 
simplicity. Maria Alvarez has convinced me that it is not straightforward how this could be done, so I have 
left out appeals to simplicity. Suppose we take a nonfactive view of motivating reasons for acting, for 
example. Presumably, we still admit facts into our ontology; so it is not clear that holding also that 
motivating reasons for believing are also not factive necessarily makes our ontology simpler. 
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Before moving on, I want to address one possible, though misguided, source of 
doubt about. The doubt may be due to the difference between practical and epistemic 
reasons just laid out. The distinguishing mark of epistemic reasons is supposed to be their 
relation to the truth (practical reasons stand in no such special relation); and the debate 
about the factivity of reasons is, essentially, a debate about whether something must be 
true in order to be a reason. Should we not, then, expect a deep difference between 
practical and epistemic reasons on the issue of factivity? I think not. There are two 
questions that need to be separated here. One is the question of what makes something a 
reason at all; another question is what makes something a reason of a particular kind. Put 
another way: one question is whether some consideration must be true (or be the case) in 
order to favor something else, while another question is what explains or grounds the 
ability of those things that do favor to favor in the way that they do.109 The distinction just 
laid out, of course, gives a standard answer to the second question. But that answer does 
not imply any answer to the first question. Suppose that r is an epistemic reason for some 
agent A to Φ (where Φing is, say, believing that p). The standard distinction tells us that 
what makes r an epistemic reason to Φ, rather than a practical reason to Φ, is the relation 
that r bears to the truth of p (for example, r might make it more likely to be true that p). 
This, of course, says nothing about whether r itself is true; it is not the truth of r, but rather 
the effect that r has on the truth of p, that is important for taking r to be an epistemic 
reason. But the debate over the factivity of reasons, applied here, would be a debate 
about whether r itself must be true in order to be a reason. Put yet another way: the 
standard distinction tells us that there are two ways in which a consideration can be made 
normatively relevant: one is via relation to values, and another is via relation to the truth. 
                                                
109 Thanks to Jonathan Dancy here. 
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Being a fact is neither of these, and indeed hardly seems to be a way of being normatively 
relevant at all. 
So we can see clearly that the special relation that epistemic reasons bear to the 
truth is really no reason at all to suspect that they will be deeply different from practical 
reasons vis-á-vis the issue of factivity. If the principle of UNIFORMITY is correct, there may 
be serious implications for theorizing about reasons –– especially if the natures of 
motivating and normative reasons can be connected in the manner I shall go on to claim 
in this paper. Together, these two claims amount to the thought that theories of reasons 
must take just one position on factivity, which holds for all kinds of reasons: motivating, 
normative, practical, epistemic, and perhaps otherwise. Consequently, someone who sets 
out to establish the factivity of normative epistemic reasons, for example, will be saddled 
with defending the factivity of these other varieties of reasons as well. 
ACTING RATIONALLY IN THE LIGHT OF A FALSEHOOD 
With these initial remarks in mind, I move in this section toward my central claim 
that if motivating reasons need not be facts, then normative reasons need not be facts (or, 
in other words, if the Nonfactive ViewM is correct, then the Nonfactive ViewN  is also 
correct). I will do so in part by working through a series of cases. We can begin with a 
familiar sort of case. 
 
ONE SKATER: Imagine a pond that has thin ice in the middle. Edna takes it that 
the ice in the middle of the pond is thin. So, when she skates, Edna keeps to the 
edge of the pond. You are on a nearby hill, and you see Edna skating. You ask her 
why she is skating as she is, and she tells you that the ice in the middle of the pond 
is thin. 
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We saw in the first chapter that, both intuitively and theoretically, it is plausible to 
suppose that Edna is skating near the edge of the pond for the reason that THIN ICE: the 
ice in the middle of the pond is thin. We can next consider the case of 
 
TWO SKATERS: Imagine two adjacent ponds. Edna takes it that the ice in the 
middle of one pond is thin. So, when she skates on it, she keeps to the edge of the 
pond. Edmund takes it that the ice in the middle of the other pond is thin. So, 
when he skates on it, he keeps to the edge of the pond. You are on a nearby hill, 
and you see both skaters skating –– but you have no view about how things are 
with the ice. As they finish, you ask them both why they keep to the edge while 
they skate. They both tell you that the ice in the middle of the pond is thin. When 
you get home, your sister informs you that the ice in the middle of Edmund’s 
pond is just fine. 
 
As I have argued, we should understand both characters in this case in just the same way 
as we understand Edna in ONE SKATER. In the case, you would readily accept both 
responses to your “Why?” question. Both Edna and Edmund have presented you with the 
consideration that motivated them to skate near the edge of the pond, and you can use 
this consideration to make sense of their skating near the edge of the pond. The 
information your sister gives you when you get home makes no difference to any of this. 
What your sister tells you about Edmund’s pond does not leave you confused as to what 
Edmund was doing or why he was doing it (although it might leave you confused as to 
why Edmund believes what he does). Despite the fact that Edmund was wrong about the 
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way the world is, you can still understand his behavior by a thought such as, “His reason 
for keeping to the edge was that the ice in the middle of the pond is thin.” 
At this juncture, we can set aside whether I have been successful in establishing 
that one can act in the light of a falsehood. As has been noted, we theorists might not be 
interested only in what the reasons for which agents act are or could be. We might also be 
interested in whether, when an agent acts for some reason or another, the agent is acting 
rationally in so doing. We might allow that, for example, Edmund acts for the reason that 
THIN ICE even though it is not the case that THIN ICE. But when he so acts, is his action 
rational? 
To get at this question, consider a second pair of cases. 
 
JUST SKATING: Imagine that Edmund is about to go skating. As he heads out, 
Edna tells him that the ice in the middle of the pond is thin. When Edmund goes 
out to the pond, the ice in the middle of the pond looks thin to him. Edmund 
takes it that the ice in the middle of the pond is thin. So, when he skates, Edmund 
keeps to the edge of the pond. Meanwhile, you are on a nearby hill, and you see 
Edmund skating. You approach him and ask him why he is skating as he is. He 
responds by saying that the ice in the middle of the pond is thin. 
 
There is nothing unusual about this case. This is the kind of situation that any of us living 
near a pond might find ourselves in on a nice winter day. I think that any of us in this 
case would accept Edmund’s response to our inquiry. If it occurred to us to ask the 
question at all (which, tellingly, I think it would not), we would deem Edmund’s action to 
be rational. I also think we would be right on both counts: Edmund does act for the reason 
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that THIN ICE, and Edmund’s skating near the edge, in light of the consideration that 
THIN ICE, is rational. Suppose though, that I add one detail to the case: 
 
IGNORANT SKATING: Imagine that Edmund is about to go skating. As he heads 
out, Edna tells him that the ice in the middle of the pond is thin. When Edmund 
goes out to the pond, the ice in the middle of the pond looks thin to him. Edmund 
takes it that the ice in the middle of the pond is thin. So, when he skates, Edmund 
keeps to the edge of the pond. Meanwhile, you are on a nearby hill, and you see 
Edmund skating. You approach him and ask him why he is skating as he is. He 
responds by telling you that the ice in the middle of the pond is thin. 
Unbeknownst to Edna, Edmund, and you, the ice in the middle of the pond is not 
thin. When you get home after skating, your sister tells you that the ice in the 
middle of the pond is not thin. 
 
Now, it seems to me that this second pair of cases is dialectically analogous to the first pair 
of cases, in the following way. We have the intuition about JUST SKATING that Edmund’s 
skating is rational. Just as with the transition from ONE SKATER to TWO SKATERS, adding 
the last detail here does nothing to alter our initial judgment. In moving from JUST 
SKATING to IGNORANT SKATING, Edmund goes from having a true belief about the pond 
to having a false belief; but so far as the rationality of his action is concerned, nothing has 
changed. Even when you learn that you, Edna, and Edmund were mistaken about 
whether the ice is thin, you still (correctly, I think) judge Edmund’s skating near the edge 
to be rational. 
Some may be tempted to deny what I have just said. That is, some will want to 
uphold the (intuitive) claim that Edmund’s action is rational in JUST SKATING, but deny it 
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in IGNORANT SKATING. But doing this requires not just denying the intuitive verdict in 
such cases, but also denying plausible general claim about rationality. This is the claim 
that 
 
ERROR NEED NOT CREATE IRRATIONALITY: in many cases, the difference 
between A’s being correct or incorrect about the truth of some consideration p is 
not the kind of difference that can, on its own, make a difference to whether A is 
Φing rationally. 110 
 
There are some facts such that an agent’s being wrong about them pretty clearly does 
impugn that agent’s rationality. If Edmund thought that there being five clouds in the sky 
was reason to keep to the edge of the pond, for example, and this was the only 
consideration that he could mention in giving an account of his skating, we might have 
our doubts about the rationality of his action. Perhaps we might say something similar 
about Anscombe’s well known example: 
If someone hunted out all the green books in his house and spread them out carefully on 
the roof, and gave one of these answers to the question ‘Why?’ his words would be 
unintelligible unless as joking and mystification. They would be unintelligible, not 
because one did not know what they meant, but because one could not make out 
what the man meant by saying them here… If we say ‘it does not make sense for 
this man to say he did this for no particular reason’ we are not ‘excluding a form 
of words from the language’; we are saying ‘we cannot understand such a man’.111 
We could go one further than Anscombe here, and say that we cannot consider this 
man’s action to be rational. If this man answered our “Why?” question with something 
like, “So that the mailman will come sooner,” we would judge his action to be positively 
                                                
110 Thanks to an anonymous referee here, whose comments helped me to formulate the claim in this way. 
111 See Anscombe [1957: 26-27]. 
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irrational. But Edmund’s being wrong about whether THIN ICE does not seem to fit this 
bill –– especially in cases like IGNORANT SKATING, where Edmund seemingly has good 
reason to believe that THIN ICE, and there is a clear connection between the consideration 
that THIN ICE and the act of skating near the edge of the pond. Deeming his action 
irrational, it seems to me, would be at odds with the plausible thought that ERROR NEED 
NOT CREATE IRRATIONALITY. 
In the light of these considerations, I think that the plausible thing to say is that 
Edmund’s skating near the edge is rational –– even IN IGNORANT SKATING. It seems 
possible not only to act in the light of a falsehood, but also to act rationally in the light of 
a falsehood. But what does this have to do with the factivity of normative reasons? To 
make the connection, consider one final case: 
 
SENSELESS SKATING: Imagine that Edmund is about to go skating. As he heads 
out, Edna tells him that the weather is nice, and that it is a great day for skating. 
When Edmund goes out to the pond, he does not notice anything strange about 
the ice. So, when he skates, Edmund keeps to the edge of the pond. Meanwhile, 
you are on a nearby hill, and you see Edmund skating. You approach him and ask 
why he is skating as he is. He responds by telling you that the weather is nice, that 
it is a great day for skating, and that he noticed nothing strange about the ice. 
 
Now, I think that any of us in this case would have our doubts as to the rationality of 
Edmund’s action. We may find it difficult to even make his action intelligible (as indication 
of this, notice the difficulty encountered in interpreting the “So” in the middle of the 
story). I think that the most plausible explanation of these reactions is that we cannot find, 
anywhere in Edmund’s account of his action, any good reason for doing what 
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Indeed, we cannot find in his account anything we could understand him as taking to be 
good reason for doing what he is doing (despite the fact that he has offered up some 
considerations in answering our “Why?” question). This makes it hard to suppose that his 
action is rational; for an action to be rational, it is natural to think, it must be done for 
some good reason. 
These observations suggest another way of making the point here. Even 
independent of our judgments about cases like SENSELESS SKATING, one plausible (even if 
naive) way of conceiving of rationality is as having an intimate connection to good 
reasons –– considerations that favor responses. We naturally conceive of rationality as 
some kind of appropriate reasons-responsiveness. If acting rationally is, inter alia, 
responding appropriately to reasons, then an action must at least be an appropriate 
response to some consideration in order to be rational. While this is a standard way of 
thinking about the rationality of belief, it is somewhat less common to find the thought 
clearly expressed about the rationality of action. But here are Juan Comesaña and 
Matthew McGrath expressing this intuitive conception: 
One does something rationally only if one has reasons that make it reasonable for one to 
do it and one does it on the basis of some (sub-)set of those reasons, i.e., one does it 
“for” those reasons.112 
I find this to be a very appealing thought. There are some who try to distinguish between 
rationality and reasons-responsiveness, and I will address that way of thinking 
momentarily. 113 Notice, though, that my claim here (and what my argument will require) 
is not that rationality just is responding appropriately to reasons. Instead, I claim only that 
appropriate reasons-responsiveness is necessary for rational action, so that if one acts 
rationally, it follows that one responded appropriately to some reason or another. 
                                                
112 See Comesaña and McGrath [2014: 62]. 
113 Thanks to Veli Mitova for pointing out the relevance of such views. 
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Something like this conception of rationality would explain why Edmund’s action in JUST 
SKATING and IGNORANT SKATING seems rational, but his action in SENSELESS SKATING 
does not. His action in the first two cases seems to exhibit appropriate responsiveness to 
the consideration that THIN ICE, but his action in SENSELESS SKATING shows no signs of 
responding appropriately to any considerations. 
MOTIVATING REASON TO SLOW THE FACTIVE TURN 
We now have in place the materials for my central argument against the Factive 
ViewN of epistemic reasons. It goes as follows. 
 
[1] In some cases where A Φs for the reason that r, it is not the case that r. 
[2] In some cases as described in [1], A’s Φing is rational. 
[3] A’s Φing can be rational only if A Φs for a good reason. 
[4] In such cases as described in [2], r must be a good reason for Φing. 
[5] Some good reasons for Φing are things that are not the case. 
[6] If the Nonfactive ViewN is true of practical reasons, then it is true of epistemic 
reasons. 
[7] Some epistemic normative reasons are things that are not the case. 
 
I argued extensively for premise [1] in the first chapter. Premise [2] is supported by 
judgments about Edmund’s action in JUST SKATING and IGNORANT SKATING, as well as 
the plausible principle that ERROR NEED NOT CREATE IRRATIONALITY. Premise [3] can 
be provided by a plausible explanation of our confusion about Edmund’s action in 
SENSELESS SKATING, as well as the plausible thought that rationality is some kind of 
appropriate reasons-responsiveness. Claim [4] follows from premises [1]-[3], on the 
 220 
simplifying assumption that, for example, THIN ICE is the only consideration Edmund is 
responding to in IGNORANT SKATING. Claim [5] follows from claim [4]. Premise [6] is an 
application of the principle of UNIFORMITY discussed in section two. The conclusion, [7], 
follows from claims [5] and [6]: epistemic reasons for belief –– or evidence, if you like –– 
need not be facts. 
The philosophical value of this argument, I hope you will agree, is not limited to 
its presenting a strong challenge to the Factive ViewN of epistemic reasons. That 
particular challenge relies on the truth of claim [1]. But, if the reasoning after claim [1] is 
sound, then we will have at least shown that if the Nonfactive ViewM of practical reasons 
is true, then the Nonfactive ViewN of epistemic reasons is true. If the argument is valid, 
this conditional claim will stand even if claim [1] is false or implausible. As I said at the 
beginning of this chapter, I think this would demonstrate and important and surprising 
connection between practical motivation and epistemic rationality. If this argument is 
correct, those wishing to force the factive turn in epistemology, as it were, will be saddled 
with defending the Factive ViewM of practical reasons. 
REASONS AND RATIONALITY 
Given the discussion of the first chapter, we might predict that many will be 
tempted to save the Factive ViewN of epistemic reasons by rejecting premise [1]. Since we 
have treated that issue extensively already, I move to treat two other serious objections to 
this argument. These two objections, if successful, would serve to sever the alleged 
connection between the Nonfactive ViewM of practical reasons and the Factive ViewN of 
epistemic reasons. 
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Appropriate Reasons-Responsiveness Without Rationality? 
The first of these objections is most straightforwardly thought of as an objection to 
premise [2]. According to this objection, although there might be something praiseworthy 
about what Edmund is doing in cases like TWO SKATERS and IGNORANT SKATING, we 
should stop short of saying that his action is rational. In order for his action to be rational, 
it must be a response to some good reason for acting. But in such cases, there are no good 
reasons for Edmund to do what he is doing. We know this because there is no feature of 
the world that favors his doing what he is doing. There is a feature that Edmund might think 
favors his skating near the edge, but alas, that feature is not a real feature of the situation. 
Since rationality consists in some kind of appropriate reasons-responsiveness, we must 
stop short of saying that his action is rational. 
One piece of this line of objection I will put off until later, since it is relevant to the 
other lines of objection as well. At this time I will make two points of response. My first 
response is to ask those hesitant to ascribe rationality to Edmund’s action to consider 
what terms of appraisal they might find applicable in its stead. We might naturally say, 
for example, that his action is reasonable; that his action is perfectly sensible; his action is 
easily intelligible; his action is understandable; it is what any rational agent in his position would do; 
and so on. Indeed, it might seem that skating near the edge of the pond is the only thing 
Edmund could have done such that we would describe his action in all of these ways. 
Suppose, for instance, that Edmund, taking it that THIN ICE, proceeded to skate 
incautiously all over the pond. Here I take it that we would all be well disposed to 
rationally criticize Edmund’s action (unless some detail were added to the story: perhaps 
Edmund is an adventurous fellow looking for a thrill, perhaps his friends put him up to it, 
perhaps he first skates timidly as a way of investigating whether the ice really is thin, et 
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cetera).114 Such as things are in TWO SKATERS and IGNORANT SKATING, though, I think 
that we would make any of the positive appraisals of Edmund’s action without hesitation 
–– and we would be correct in making those appraisals. But with this cluster of concepts 
before me I now feel puzzled about the initial hesitation to attribute rationality to 
Edmund’s action. It would be a fairly foreign, and perhaps somewhat artificial notion of 
rationality such that all of these things can truly be said of Edmund’s action, and yet we 
cannot truly describe his action as rational. So, to anyone offering this sort of resistance, I 
would first invite them to provide and motivate that further conception of rationality.115 
The second point of response to this line of objection is that while Edmund’s 
action may be ill-informed, it seems to me very difficult to uphold the claim that it is 
irrational, or that what he is doing is rationally impermissible. This is partly due to the plain 
intuitive judgment that Edmund’s action is not irrational. But this is also partly due to 
theoretical difficulties that arise if we render this verdict about what Edmund is doing. If 
Edmund’s action is irrational or rationally impermissible, there must be something that 
makes it so; it will not just be a brute fact that it is rationally impermissible for Edmund to 
skate near the edge of the pond. It seems generally plausible that 
 
NO BRUTE (IR)RATIONALITIES: If A’s Φing is rational (or irrational), there must 
be some Ψ in virtue of which A’s Φing is rational (or irrational). 
 
                                                
114 See Williams [1981: 109] for a similar thought –– although I do not want to imply that I am 
sympathetic to the sort of wholesale internalism represented there. 
115 I do not want to create the impression that this is an impossible task. Littlejohn [2017], for example, has 
tried his hand at teasing some of these notions apart (thanks to an anonymous referee for bringing this to 
my attention). Adjudicating whether such projects are successful is beyond the scope of this essay, but I say 
a bit more in the sixth section. 
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But what feature of the situation could make it rationally impermissible for Edmund to 
skate near the edge of the pond? If we are developing this line of objection with a 
sympathetic eye toward the Factive ViewN, perhaps we might try to say that it is the fact 
that it is not the case that THIN ICE which makes Edmund’s action irrational. But surely 
that is not correct. The mere fact that it is not the case that the ice in the middle of the 
pond is thin cannot make it positively irrational to skate near the edge of the pond 
(though it might be thought to bear on the rationality of Edmund’s believing that THIN 
ICE).116 At most, we might say (in line with the Factive ViewN) that its not being the case 
that THIN ICE prevents THIN ICE from making any action rational. With that in mind, 
perhaps the strategy might be to say, in view of NO BRUTE (IR)RATIONALITIES, that just as 
Edmund’s skating cannot easily be deemed irrational, neither can it easily be deemed 
rational.  There is simply no feature of the situation that can be adduced to adjudicate the 
issue in either direction. There is an issue about whether some question is being begged in 
favor of the Factive ViewN here. But I think that issue can be sidestepped in light of a 
more general point. Currently, we are considering the rational status of Edmund’s skating 
near the edge of the pond, limiting ourselves to two choices: either his skating is rationally 
permissible, or it is not. Perhaps the same argument that might underpin the claim that it 
is permissible can also be used to argue that it is not permissible. But even in that case, it 
seems that we are left with the bare intuition for making our choice here; and the intuitive 
judgment about the case is surely that Edmund’s action is rational. 
One might think that the trouble here is being created by a false dilemma, in that 
we are wrongly supposing that we must make a course-grained, conclusive judgement 
about whether Edmund’s action is all-things-considered rational (or not rational). Perhaps 
                                                
116 This might be thought; but as I will soon suggest, this thought is no more plausible than the thought 
presently under consideration. 
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instead we should admit the appealing idea that rationality comes in degrees. Perhaps 
Edmund’s action is rational to some degree, but not to the degree such that we should judge 
it to be rational full stop. I do not think this suggestion can help the one trying to plausibly 
avoid the verdict that Edmund’s skating near the edge of the pond is rational. For the 
principle NO BRUTE (IR)RATIONALITIES is no less plausible when we think of rationality as 
a gradable attribute than it was when we were thinking of rationality in more course-
grained terms. If Edmund’s skating near the edge of the pond has any rationality to 
recommend to it, but not as much as it otherwise could, there must be some feature(s) of 
the situation in virtue of which that is so. But in virtue of what could we award Edmund’s 
skating near the edge any degree of rationality, if not that it is the appropriate response to 
the consideration that THIN ICE? But then if we are prepared to deem his action rational 
(to some extent) in virtue of that fact, in virtue of what do we temper our estimation of the 
rationality of his action? We might say (again in line with the Factive ViewN) that the fact 
that it is not the case that THIN ICE is what prevents us from judging his action to be more 
fully rational. But this does not seem to be the right kind of thing to make this kind of 
difference. As John McDowell observes, 
It does not add to the explanatory power of explanations given by using those forms if 
things are as the agent relevantly takes them to be. If things are that way, that is 
just an extra fact about the situation; the action would have had the same 
intelligibility… if the act had been wrong in taking things to be that way.117 
McDowell’s remark concerns the rational explanation of action; but I think an analogous 
remark applies to the rational evaluation of action. If we say that in skating near the edge of 
the pond, Edmund is responding to the consideration that THIN ICE, we know more or 
less what we need to know to evaluate the rationality of his skating. That is because we 
know the practically relevant features: the consideration that THIN ICE is practically 
                                                
117 See McDowell [2013: 19]. 
 225 
relevant to where one should skate on the pond. But being a fact is not a way of being 
practically relevant (or practically irrelevant). In general, if asked in what way the 
consideration that p bears on the question of whether A should Φ, it seems a kind of 
category mistake to respond with anything like, “In that it is true that p.” So while THIN 
ICE does alter our judgment of the rationality of Edmund’s action (qua consideration that 
Edmund acted upon), its being the case that THIN ICE should not.118 
Rationality Without Good Reasons? 
So I think there is a general problem for this first line of objection, whether we are 
thinking of rationality in course-grained or fine-grained terms, about what feature(s) of 
the situation one could point to as the right kind of evidence to overturn the intuitive 
judgment that Edmund’s action is rational. Since I do not think we will find any such 
evidence, I turn to a second line of objection to my main argument against the Factive 
ViewN of epistemic reasons.  This line of resistance concedes premise [2] of the argument, 
but tries to do so in a sense that does not imply that Edmund had good reasons to do 
what he did. For example, we may be able to pinpoint considerations or features that 
allow us to rationalize (in Davidson’s sense) Edmund’s action, or perhaps even pick out 
some rational requirement that the action satisfies. But these things do not strictly imply 
that there is any good reason for Edmund to be skating near the edge of the pond. So we 
can in this sort of way admit that Edmund’s action is in some sense rational while resisting 
premise [3] and rejecting the idea that Edmund acted for any good reason.119 
                                                
118 Even if being a fact is not a way of being practically relevant, it might still be that only facts can have 
practical normative force. But I cannot see how that thought can be used here in a way that does not beg 
the question. 
119 One similar idea that I do not address here is the intriguing suggestion that rationality is governed by 
requirements of coherence or consistency, and reasons-responsiveness is simply a separate phenomenon. I 
do not address this because I cannot see what coherence requirement a character like Edmund could be 
described as satisfying, such that his satisfaction of it leads to the judgment that he is rational. See Alex 
Worsnip [2015] for more on this idea. 
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I have only one thing to say in response to this sort of resistance, and it seems to 
me a hard point to maneuver around. It is, in many ways, the thought that makes the 
central argument of this chapter compelling (if indeed it is compelling). The thought is 
this: if we grant that Edmund is acting for the reason that THIN ICE, and that he is 
responding appropriately to that consideration, some subtlety is required to proceed to 
say that he has no good reason for doing what he is (or that there is no consideration that 
favors his action). If he indeed has good reason for doing what he is doing, it seems at least 
awkward to deny that there is good reason for doing what he is doing. Now it seems to me 
undeniable that in acting, Edmund is responding to the consideration that THIN ICE. That 
is more or less a stipulation of the case. It also seems to me undeniable that Edmund is 
responding appropriately to this consideration. The appropriate thing to do, in the light 
of the consideration that THIN ICE, is to avoid the middle of the pond when skating (if it 
helps, we may add that Edmund believes that, too). Indeed, as we saw earlier, it would be 
seem quite inappropriate to respond to this consideration by, say, skating all over the 
pond. Now, we can ask the question: what makes it appropriate to respond to the 
consideration that THIN ICE by skating near the edge of the pond? The answer that 
suggests itself is precisely that which would also suggest itself if it were the case that THIN 
ICE: the consideration that THIN ICE counts in favor of the response in question. But 
admitting that THIN ICE favors skating near the edge of the pond is tantamount to 
admitting that THIN ICE is a good reason for skating near the edge of the pond; and 
hence, in this case, tantamount to admitting that some good reasons are falsehoods. 
It may be tempting here to make a psychologistic shift analogous to the one 
treated in the first three chapters: perhaps we should say that it is not THIN ICE that favors 
and makes appropriate Edmund’s skating near the edge, but rather THIN ICE* (Edmund 
believes that the ice in the middle of the pond is thin). Such a shift would be ill-advised, 
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though. As I argued in the second chapter, every theory must allow a distinction between 
A’s Φing for the reason that r and A’s Φing for the reason that A believes that r. Once we 
countenance this distinction, it becomes clear that psychologizing the normative reason in 
this case will not help. Speaking on the psychologistic shift with respect to motivating 
reasons, Jonathan Dancy says that 
This has the awkward consequence that in all such cases the agent makes a double 
mistake. In acting (as it seems to him) for the reason that p, he mistakenly takes it 
both to be the case that p and that he is acting for that reason; he is wrong on both 
counts. I, by contrast, remain unwilling to allow that in all cases where an agent 
makes a mistake, we need a different account of his reason for the relevant action. 
It still seems to me that the agent’s reason is what it is, whether he is right about 
that or not.120 
I think that analogous points apply to normative reasons. For a clearer example, we can 
recall Dancy’s illustration of the one who responds to the consideration that RATS: there 
are rats living in my shoes. The rational response to the consideration that RATS, it seems, 
is to call the pest control officer. But I have argued that this has a consequence some find 
unacceptable: it then seems difficult to deny that RATS favors calling the pest control 
officer, and therefore that some good reasons are falsehoods. Suppose instead that we say 
that what really favors calling the pest control officer is the consideration that RATS *: I 
believe that there are rats living in my shoes. If we  then keep the case such that the agent 
calls the pest control officer for the reason that RATS, we accuse the agent of a double 
mistake: the agent is mistaken both in believing that RATS and in believing that RATS 
favors calling the pest control officer. This seems to commit us to saying that the agent 
makes a rational error in calling the pest control officer; but it seems clear that the agent 
makes no rational error in calling the pest control officer. On the other hand, if we admit 
that the rational response to the consideration that RATS is to call the pest control officer, 
                                                
120 See Dancy [2014: 89]. 
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but say that the agent calls the pest control in the light of RATS *, we accuse the agent of a 
different double mistake: the agent is both mistaken about whether RATS, and also about 
what the consideration that RATS * favors (it surely favors calling the psychiatrist, rubbing 
one’s eyes, getting some fresh air, or what have you). 
There is surely a distinction between A’s Φing for the reason that r, and A’s Φing 
for the reason that A believes that r. The current line of resistance admits both that it is 
possible for A to Φ for the reason that r when it is not the case that r, and that in such 
cases A’s Φing might be rational. To resist the progression of my central argument in 
premise [3], we are looking for a way to allow all of this without admitting that in such 
cases, A Φs for a good reason. It is simply not clear to me what coherent story can be told 
using the resources of a kind of Psychologism about normative reasons. In that case, the 
challenge raised earlier remains: provide and motivate accounts of being the favored response 
and being the appropriate response such that one can cleanly tease these things apart when 
dealing with characters like Edmund. I am skeptical that this can be done; and until it is 
done, I think that we should say that Edmund’s skating near the edge of the pond is 
rational; and that is so because it favored by the false consideration that the ice in the 
middle of the pond is thin. Otherwise, we are left without a plausible account as to what 
makes his skating near the edge rational. 
CAN THE FACTIVE TURN BE FORCED? 
I think that the foregoing considerations land us back precisely where we were two 
sections ago: it is possible for an agent to act rationally in the light of the falsehood. If the 
agent acts rationally, there must be something in virtue of which that is so –– there must 
be a rationality-making feature on the scene. Not only that, it seems, but there must be a 
rationality-making feature on the scene, which the agent responded to in acting. If we are 
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dealing with a case in which the agent acts only in the light of falsehoods, it seems that we 
are forced to choose our rationality-maker(s) from among these falsehoods. But then some 
rationality-making features, favoring features, or good reasons must be falsehoods. 
There is one way of avoiding the conclusion of my argument that I have not 
discussed, and I should like to conclude the substance of this chapter by commenting on 
it. It is the piece of the first objection which I previously set aside for later. I know that 
there are many who have a sort of bedrock intuition that something that is not the case 
simply cannot favor anything. So long as we analyze good reasons (or normative reasons) 
as considerations that favor things, this amounts to a bedrock intuition that anything that 
is not the case simply cannot be a good reason. Some of those who have this thought may 
even find it to be more intuitive and plausible than each of the premises of my central 
argument here. Instead of resisting the cogency of the argument directly, then, one might 
claim that the conclusion of my argument serves up a reductio. The link that I worked to 
establish between practical motivating reasons and epistemic normative reasons could 
possibly be used against me in this way. I can see two general ways in which this might be 
tried. The first is that one might treat my argument as a kind of paradox: even though it 
cannot be said exactly what the flaw is in the argument, we know that something must be 
wrong with it given the conclusion it arrives at. The second possibility is that one might 
think that the implausibility of the conclusion of my argument should lead us to reject one 
of the premises in the argument –– perhaps whichever seems to be the weakest link. 
I am not sure how substantively I could proceed to debate my opponent who takes 
the first option here; but I also suspect that most will not be satisfied with that option. So I 
would like to close by making some remarks about the second option. I anticipate that 
most of my opponents will find the first premise to be the weak link here. My argument, 
in a sense, succeeds; but I have got it backwards. What the argument shows is not that the 
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Factive ViewN of epistemic reasons is false, but rather that the Factive ViewM of practical 
reasons is true. I would of course be pleased to receive the concession regarding the sense 
in which the argument succeeds. But this would be only a partial success if I intend to 
offer an argument for the Nonfactive ViewN of epistemic reasons. If the crucial 
connection made in this chapter between the factivity of motivating reasons and 
normative reasons holds, the question then becomes which of the Nonfactive ViewM and 
the Factive ViewN is more plausible. 
I myself feel the pull of the thought that something that is not the case cannot 
favor anything –– though not as strongly as I feel the pull of the thought that one can act 
for a reason that is not the case. In any event, I argued at length for the Nonfactive 
ViewM of practical reasons in the first chapter. What can be said in favor of the Factive 
ViewN of epistemic reasons? One strategy is to subscribe to what might be called the 
Knowledge View of epistemic reasons, according to which: in order for r to be a reason 
for A to Φ, A must know that r. Giving due treatment to such a view would take us outside 
the bounds of this present project. At this moment, I should only like to make a small 
point about a case involving a Hornsby-McDowell style Edmund, who truly believes, for 
good reason, that the ice in the middle of the pond is thin. It seems to me deeply 
implausible to say in this case that Edmund’s not knowing that the ice is thin precludes his 
skating near the edge of the pond from being rational. Perhaps this thought is ultimately 
correct, and some kind of Knowledge View of normative reasons is plausible. Still, 
though, it would not then be that that the Factive ViewN, per se, is correct. On this sort of 
view, it would not be the truth of the consideration that THIN ICE which puts it in a 
position to favor Edmund’s action. Rather, Edmund’s knowing that THIN ICE is what 
allows it to favor his action. So we find here no resources for saying that the Factive 
ViewN is correct in its own right. 
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I have begun to wonder just how independently plausible it is that something that 
is not the case cannot favor anything. Since at this point in the dialectic we are conceding 
that if the Nonfactive ViewM is true, then the Nonfactive ViewN is true, and I take myself 
to have made a strong case for the Nonfactive ViewM, I should like to try to lay the 
foundation for understanding the favoring relation nonfactively. In particular, I shall offer 
a conception on which the favoring relation is doubly nonfactive: in order for a claim of 
the form “P favors q” to be true, it need not be the case that p or that q. In painting such a 
picture, I think an analogy to logical or probabilistic implication is useful. Consider claims 
like “P implies q” or “P entails q.” In order to make such claims –– placing p and q in 
implication or entailment relations –– we need not know whether p or q is indeed true. 
These relations hold independently of the truth-values of the items so related. I think that 
an appealing conception of the favoring relation works analogously: in order to make a 
claim of the form “Φ favors Ψ,” we need not know whether it is the case that Φ or Ψ. I 
find this idea to be especially appealing for normative reasons for belief. We might think 
that the consideration that THIN ICE favors believing that DANGER: it is dangerous to skate 
in the middle of the pond. For this to be so, need it be the case that THIN ICE? I think not. 
Indeed, one appealing thought might be that the very thing that makes rational to believe 
DANGER on the basis of the consideration that THIN ICE just is that THIN ICE implies or 
makes it more likely that DANGER. But as we have just observed, we need not say that it is 
the case that THIN ICE in order to place it in an implication or entailment relation to 
DANGER. 
 So, at least for normative reasons for belief, there is some initial appeal to the idea 
that claims of the form “P favors believing that q” are insensitive to the truth of p. 
Abstracting away from belief, can we not also say that, in general, claims of the form “P 
favors Φing” are insensitive to the truth of p? If not, why not –– and what should we say 
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instead? There is clearly some relation of normative significance between, for example, 
THIN ICE and skating near the edge of the pond. Here is an alternative way of thinking, 
which perhaps threads together elements from all three lines of resistance consider so far. 
According to Jonathan Dancy, 
To explain the action, we show how doing it can have made sense to the agent… what we 
show is that, relative to how the agent took things to be, it made good sense to do 
this action. If things had been as he supposed, this action would indeed have been 
the right or sensible thing to do. 
There are two questions we can ask, then:                                                    
1. Did he do the right thing?                
2. Had things been the way he supposed them to be, would what he have 
did been right? 
The answer to the first question may be no even if the answer to the second is yes. 
Take a case where he (perhaps reasonably) believes that she would welcome his 
advances but is too shy to do much to encourage him. He acts in a way that would 
have been right if things had been as he supposed. But in fact things are not as he 
supposed, and what he does is not right (though perhaps pardonable, if his 
original belief was reasonable rather than, say, the result of lustful thinking). 121 
These remarks are made about what we might think of as moral reasons; but the same 
thoughts apply, Dancy holds, to other sorts of normative reasons: 
To We see that the distinction drawn above for the moral case can be drawn more 
generally, in terms of what there is most reason to do. There are two questions:  
1. Did he do what there was most reason to do?                        
2. Had things been the way he supposed them to be, would his action have 
been the one there was most reason to do?  
We explain the action by showing that the answer to the second question is yes. 
We make sense of the agent's doing what he did, even when there was inadequate 
reason to do it, by showing that he would have had good reason had things been 
as he supposed.  
                                                
121 Admittedly, there is some awkwardness about the second relata here. It is natural to think of the things 
that are favored as responses (bodily actions, attitudes, et cetera); and responses in the relevant sense cannot 
be true or false. We can set this aside, though, since our present concerns are about the first relata. 
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 What this shows is that to explain an action is to justify it only in a certain sense. It 
is not to show that it was what there was most reason to do. It is to show that it 
would have been if the agent's beliefs had been true. But to show this much is to 
mount some defence of the agent for so acting. For the agent's behaviour is 
pardonable if (roughly) his beliefs were pardonable and had they been true he 
would have been doing what he ought, or what there was most reason to do. 
This line of thought can perhaps countenance my analogy to logical implication, with a 
qualification. Talking about whether an action is justified is analogous not to talking 
about whether a proposition is entailed, but rather whether the entailed proposition is 
true. Even if p can entail q without being true, p cannot actually make it true that q unless p 
is true. Likewise, when we are talking of normative reasons, we are talking about features 
that make it the case that one should Φ, that the rational action is Φing, that the right thing 
to do is to Φ, or some other such. But nothing that is not the case can make anything else 
the case. Hence, normative reasons must be things that are the case. Now, what we have 
in cases like IGNORANT SKATING are considerations that were they so, would make it the case 
that one should Φ (or that it is rational to Φ, or some other such). This can explain why, 
even in situations where agents are wrong about the way the world is, we are tempted to 
describe their actions as rational. But in fact, this does nothing to show that these 
considerations actually favor anything when they are not so. 
This is a compelling line of response, and I am almost satisfied by it. I will close by 
trying to say what I think is lacking in it. To the extent that I find this sort of picture 
unsatisfying when applied to characters like Edmund, the dissatisfaction has its roots in 
two intuitive judgments (already mentioned) that I find hard to shake off. The first is that 
seems hard to deny that Edmund has good reason for skating near the edge of the pond. 
But if there is no good reason for doing that, we should like to know how we can make 
sense of the idea that he had any good reason for doing it: how can one have something 
that there is not? It could be replied that what it is to have a good reason is to take 
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something to be the case, and for that thing to be such that were it the case, then it would 
indeed favor what the agent takes it to favor. But I find this thought not completely 
satisfying, since Edmund’s action seems actually worthy of positive normative appraisal. It 
is not that were it the case that THIN ICE, then Edmund’s skating near the edge would have 
been sensible. It is that, even things being such as they are, Edmund’s action is sensible. 
So I think there is some pressure to say that whatever makes it the case that his action is 
sensible is also something such that it actually does make the action sensible –– not that it 
would have made the action sensible if things were otherwise. 
The second source of dissatisfaction, when applying Dancy’s analysis to characters 
like Edmund, is that I find hard to shake off the intuitive judgment that Edmund’s skating 
is not irrational. The analogue in the cases Dancy treats, I take it, would be that the 
action in question is wrong or impermissible, or that there was inadequate reason to do it (or 
perhaps most reason to do something else). In the cases Dancy is imagining, these verdicts 
are made more attractive by appeal to the thought that the actions, though strictly 
impermissible, might be pardonable or perhaps excusable. Though we can rationalize the 
actions by giving the reasons for which they were done, and in this way present a kind of 
defense of the actions even in cases where the motivating consideration is a falsehood, it 
remains that in these cases such explanations contain no real justification of the actions. 
In fact, we can see that there is justification for not doing what the agents in question did. 
So, though (for example) we could explain his advances by citing the motivating 
consideration that she would welcome his advances, if indeed she would not welcome his 
advances then we should say that what he did was impermissible (though perhaps 
pardonable). 
The problem with applying this analysis to cases like that of Edmund’s is that 
there are two important ways in which the cases are not analogous. The first is that, when 
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Edmund skates near the edge of the pond for the reason that the ice in the middle is thin, 
there is no hint that there is good reason for Edmund not to skate near the edge of the 
pond. In the examples Dancy treats, the wrong-making feature is conspicuous, since it is 
just the falsity or negation of the motivating consideration the agent takes to be the case. 
He is motivated by the consideration that she would welcome his advances; but in fact she 
would not welcome his advances, and that she would not welcome them is precisely what 
makes his action wrong. But this is not how things are in cases like IGNORANT SKATING. 
As we have already observed, it is not as though the fact that it is not the case that THIN 
ICE makes Edmund’s skating near the edge impermissible. In fact, there does not seem to 
be any feature around that we could cite as that which makes Edmund’s action irrational 
or impermissible. So not only does Edmund’s action seem rationally permissible; there is 
also little to no suspicion that it might be impermissible. In the cases Dancy analyzes, we 
can be offered softening considerations for saying that what the agent did was 
impermissible, by saying things like, “Were things as the agent supposed, then it would 
have been the right thing to do. So the agent’s action is perhaps pardonable or 
excusable.” But this kind of softening consideration only has weight if there is some sense 
in which we can clearly establish that they agent should not have done what she did. It 
makes no sense to say, “What you did was right, but you may be excused for doing it.” If 
there is no independent case to be made for the thought that Edmund should not have 
done what he did (or that there was no reason to do it), then softening considerations to 
the effect that his action is excusable should not warm us up to that thought. So it seems 
to me that we are left only with the judgment(s) that (for example) Edmund’s skating near 
the edge of the pond is rational, that he has good reason to so skate, and that there is no 
feature of the case that counts against his so skating. In the light of these considerations, 
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what should prevent us from saying that there was good reason for Edmund to do what 
he did? 
Summary Remarks 
So, as things stand, I am inclined to follow my argument through to its conclusion 
–– despite the admitted (though slight, in my view) discomfort in saying that r can favor 
A’s Φing even if it is not the case that r. I have made the case for the idea that A can Φ for 
the reason that r even if it is not the case that r. I have also made the case for the thought 
that when A so Φs, A’s Φing can be rational, and so may be done for good reason. There 
may be ways of divorcing Φing rationally from Φing for good reason, but I cannot so far 
see a clean way of making the distinction that would provide good grounds for rejecting 
the idea that, for example, Edmund acts for a good reason when he skates near the edge 
of the pond. So, I think we should follow the natural way of thinking on which if A’s Φing 
is rational, then there must be some good reason for A to Φ –– some consideration that 
counts in favor of A’s Φing. Since in cases like Edmund’s, the only good candidate is the 
false consideration that motivates him to act as he does, it is plausible to say that some 
good reasons are falsehoods. 
A PRACTICAL THEORY OF EPISTEMIC REASONS 
Since I have endorsed the principle of UNIFORMITY, I think that all of this goes 
equally well if we speak only of reasons for belief. Indeed, I think we need not even rely 
on the principle to make the connection between cases like IGNORANT SKATING and cases 
of believing for reasons. For suppose that instead of evaluating the rationality of 
Edmund’s skating near the edge of the pond, we evaluate the rationality of Edmund’s 
belief that it is dangerous to skate in the middle of the pond. It seems even more 
appealing to me in this case to say that Edmund’s response to the false consideration that 
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THIN ICE is rational. It is rational to believe, on the basis of the reasonably believed 
consideration that THIN ICE, that it is dangerous to skate in the middle of the pond. That 
it is not the case that THIN ICE makes no difference to this. It is tempting to think, though, 
that a belief can only be rational if it is held on the basis of those things that actually make 
it rational. Here is John Turri on the standard conception of the relation between what 
are called “doxastic” and “propositional” justification: 
IF (i) p is propositionally justified for S in virtue of S’s having reason(s) R, and (ii) S 
believes p on the basis of R, THEN S’s belief that p is doxastically justified.122 
I take it is standard to think of the connection not merely as a conditional, but also as a 
sort of analysis of doxastic justification.123 Using this taxonomy, it seems to me clear that 
we should say that Edmund’s belief that skating in the middle of the pond is dangerous is 
doxastically justified: he has reasons for believing it, and he believes it on the basis of 
those reasons. 
So while I have used the assumption of UNIFORMITY to temporarily bridge the 
gap between so-called practical and epistemic reasons in this manuscript, I think that 
there is an independent case to be made for the Nonfactive ViewN of reasons for belief.124  
In fact, I think that each of the main positions I have argued for with respect to reasons 
for action are independently just as plausible as positions about reasons for belief. So, I 
also think there is a good case to be made for the Nonfactive ViewM applied to the 
reasons for which agents believe. Epistemologists tend not to talk of motivation; instead, 
discussion of the Nonfactive ViewM may he hiding in the debate concerning the nature of 
                                                
122 See Turri [2010: 314]. Turri proceeds to argue against this claim; but he acknowledges that it is almost 
universally held among epistemologists. See my footnote 22. 
123 For evidence of this, see the passages that Turn [2010: 313-314] cites, which include work from 
Jonathan Kvanvig, John Pollock, Joseph Cruz, Marshall Swain, Keith Korcz, and Richard Feldman. 
124 This would put me at odds with those who think that only facts can be evidence. See Williamson [2000] 
and Littlejohn [2012] for two strong defenses of the factive position. 
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what is called the epistemic basing relation. Here is a standard conception of that 
relation, from Keith Allen Korcz: 
The epistemic basing relation is the relation that holds between a reason and a belief if 
and only if the reason is a reason for which the belief is held.125 
So, perhaps defending the Nonfactive ViewM in epistemology amounts to saying that the 
epistemic basing relation is not factive: it is not the case that, in order for A’s belief that p 
to based on the consideration that r, it must be the case that r. I think that one could make 
a case for this position in much the same way that I have made the case for the 
Nonfactive ViewM of reasons for acting here. This would have some interesting 
consequences worth exploring. To mention just one: one of the mainstream views about 
the epistemic basing relation is that it is a kind of causal relation. But if the basing relation 
is nonfactive –– that is: if A’s belief that p can be based on the consideration that r even 
when it is not the case that r –– then there is some serious pressure not to say that the 
basing relation is causal, since nothing that is not the case can cause anything. 
There should also be a debate about reasons for belief analogous to the one I 
waded into in my second chapter here. An important question about reasons for belief is: 
in order for A to belief that p for the reason that r, what cognitive connection must A stand 
in to r? It seems to me that much too little has been said on this topic.126 Now, the issue of 
whether reasons are beliefs has been given some treatment. According to John Turri, for 
example, “Epistemic reasons are mental states. They are not propositions or non-mental 
facts.” But according to David Enoch, 
                                                
125 See Korcz [2015: 1]. 
126 See Enoch [2010], Littlejohn [2012], and Williamson [2000] for rare examples of those who have 
discussed the issue. Even they treat it only in passing, though, as a part of a larger project about the nature 
of normative reasons for belief. 
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When it comes to your reasons, or what you take to be the epistemically relevant features of the 
circumstances, it is quite clear… that your reason is that Adam is wrong, not that 
you believe that he is.127 
This debate, however, is clearly analogous to the debate I have marked out between 
Psychologism and Non-Psychologism. It is not analogous to the debate about the 
cognitive constraint on acting for a reason. I do think, though, that both the Belief View 
and Non-Psychologism are attractive positions about reasons for belief. In order for A to 
believe that p for the reason that r, A must believe that r; and when A so believes, A’s 
reason is (usually) that r, rather than that A believes that r. 
In this manuscript I have defended a theory packaging together the Nonfactive 
ViewM, the Belief View, Non-Psychologism, and the Nonfactive ViewN of acting for 
reasons. I have tried to show that the best arguments from opponents should not persuade 
us away from this intuitive package of views; and in doing so I have given special 
attention to what I have called arguments from error. Such arguments should not compel 
us toward the Factive ViewM, the Knowledge View, Psychologism, or the Factive ViewN 
of acting for reasons. A complete theory of reasons and responding to reasons will not 
discuss only reasons for acting, but also reasons for believing (and perhaps other sorts of 
reasons as well). I have (merely) suggested here at the end that a plausible view on this 
second front would be one that packages the analogous Nonfactive ViewM, the Belief 
View, Non-Psychologism, and Nonfactive ViewN on reasons for belief. I also expect that 
objections analogous to those treated in this manuscript are no more promising in the 
realm of epistemic reasons. A complete theory of reasons would thoroughly lay out and 
defend this package of views for reasons for belief; I leave this more expansive project to 
future work. 
 
                                                
127 See Turri [2009: 490] and Enoch [2010: 983]. 
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